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THE FINANCIAL PROVISIONS OF THE NEW
WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
Part III
RICHARD 0. KUMMERT*
B. Regulation of Asset Distributions
2. Distributions of Assets From Stated Capital.
a. Nimble Dividends. One of the most important innovations'"
in the New Act578 is the provision permitting payments of cash or
property out of the unreserved and unrestricted net earnings of the
current fiscal year and the next preceding fiscal year taken as a
single period.577  The principal effect of this provision is to permit
distributions of assets when a deficit in earned surplus exists.578
*Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.S., 1953, Illinois Institute of
Technology; M.B.A., 1955, Northwestern University; LL.B., 1961, Stanford Law
School.
'Under the old act, cash or property dividends could be paid only from a
corporation's surplus, i.e., excess of assets over liabilities and capital stock. See
Kummert, The Financial Provisions of The New Washington Business Corporation
Act part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. 119-28 (1966) [hereinafter cited as part 1I, 42
WASH. L. REv. at -. Hence, if a corporation had a deficit in earned surplus and
no paid-in surplus, earnings in any period would be applied to reduction of the
deficit rather than be available for distribution.
The "old act," following the terms of reference adopted in the first part of this
article, 41 WASH. L. REv. (1966) [hereinafter cited as part I, 41 WASH. L. REv.
at -] refers to the UyooRm BUSINESS CoapoRATION Acr, now codified as WASH.
REv. CODE §§ 23.010.010-.970 (1958). The UNiFORm BUSINESS CORPORATION Acr
adopts substantially the provisions of the MODEL BusixNsss CoRPoRATION ACT[hereinafter referred to as "Uniform Act"] prepared by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in
1928. See 9 U.L.A. 115 (1957).
' The New Act refers to the new Washington Business Corporation Act,
adopted March 20, 1965, Wash. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 53. See part I, 41 WASH. L.
REv. at 207 n.1. The New Act is based substantially upon the provisions of the MODEL
BusINESS CoRoRAnoN AcT, [hereinafter referred to as the "Model Act"], prepared
and revised by the Committee on Corporation Law of the American Bar Association.
Differences between the New Act and the Model Act not discussed in any part of
this article are listed in part 1, 41 WASH. L. REv. at 207 n.2.
I WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420(1) (1965).
' The New Act does not, as other nimble dividend statutes do, (see, e.g.,
CALiF. CoRP. CODE § 1500(b) (West 1955)) cover the point explicitly. See, however, the
Comment appearing in 1 Model Act Ann. § 40(a) 1. One interpretation problem
that the New Act seems to avoid concerns the case where the corporation begins the
relevant period with a deficit and then earns a little bit more than the deficit. If the
current earnings statute is triggered by a lack of earned surplus, then it may not
apply in the case posed, with the result that the distribution is limited to the
excess of the earnings over the deficit. Under the New Act, however, it seems clear
that the full amount of the earnings will be available.
If the Act contained only the language stated above, it could be argued that net
earnings should be interpreted to permit dividends only when no deficit in earned
surplus exists. See McDowell, The Theory of Capital in Virginia: An Historical
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Such distributions, called nimble dividends.79 because of the speed
with which directors must act to prevent application of the earnings
to the deficit,"s° are in essence distributions out of stated capital.
In partial recognition of this fact, the New Act proscribes such
distributions when the corporation is or would be rendered unable
to meet its obligations in the usual course of its business or when
the resultant net assets of the corporation would be less than the
voluntary liquidation preference of shares having preferential rights
to assets in the event of liquidation. 81
The wisdom of nimble dividend statutes, which are currently in
effect in only a distinct minority of states,"8 2 has long been debated. 8 3
Comma and A Disjunctive Conjunction, 6 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35, 39 (1949). But
the use of earned surplus as a primary source for cash dividends, see part II, 42
WASH. L. REv. at 122 et seq., means that if the nimble dividend provision is to have
any separate meaning it would be in the situation of a deficit in earned surplus.
Note that there is no requirement that capital surplus equal to the deficit be
present in the corporation nor that such surplus be exhausted before dividends from
current earnings are declared.
' The name is attributed to Professor Ralph T. Baker. See 62 HARV. L. REV.
130 (1948).
' See McCormick, Nimble Dividends: Some States Do Permit Dividends
Despite Deficit in Accumulated Earnings, 88 J. ACCOUNTANCY 196 (1949). Directors
presumably are permitted a reasonable time (e.g., at least until the corporation's
accounts are audited) after the close of the current fiscal year in which to make the
distribution. See R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1229 (3d unabr.
ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as BAKER & CARY] ; Hills, Model Corporation Act,
48 HARV. L. REv. 1334, 1366 n.51 (1935). As to how early in the current fiscal year a
distribution can be made, see text infra beginning note 618.
" WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.420, f I and (1) (1965). WASH. REv. CODE §
23A.08.420, 1 1 (1965) also states that the privilege to pay nimble dividends can be
limited by article provision.
In accord with the citation conventions established in part I, 41 WASH. L. REv.
at 213 n.32, unnumbered paragraphs in the new provisions will be referred to as
"fI" with numbers in order of their appearance. The New Act's paragraph numbers
(in parentheses) will be used whenever they appear.
12 Only eleven states (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-402-I (A) (3) (1966); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1500(b) (West 1955); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 170(a)(2) (1953); GA. CODE
ANN. § 22-1835 (1965) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3501(B) (1949) ; Mix.,. STAT.
ANN., § 301-22 subdiv. 2(3) (1947) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-407(1) (1967) ;
NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.290 (1957) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(a) (2) (1963) ; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1.132(a) (1953) ; and Wyo. STAT. § 17.36.39(a) (1961)) cur-
rently have nimble dividend statutes in effect.
A number of other states have statutes that can be construed to permit nimble
dividends. See list in 1 MODEL ACT ANN. § 40(a) 1 2.02(1). For cases involving
interpretation of ambiguous statutes, see Mangham v. State, 11 Ga. App. 440, 75
S.E. 508 (1912) (holding that an early Georgia statute proscribing payment of
dividends except from "actual legitimate net earnings of its investments" pro-
hibited payment of a nimble dividend); Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 214
F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1954) (holding that Wisconsin statute permitting payments from
net profits did not permit nimble dividends); United States v. Riely, 169 F.2d 542
(4th Cir. 1948) (holding that Virginia statute permitting dividends "out of net
earnings, or out of ... assets in excess of ... capital" permitted nimble dividends);
Grand Traverse Hotel Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 860 (W.D. Mich. 1948)
(holding that Michigan statute permitting dividends from earned surplus or from
net earnings permitted nimble dividends); but see Senior Investment Corp., 2 T.C.
[ VOL. 43 :337
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Such a statute can be best evaluated through an analysis of the
interests of the various participants in a corporate enterprise-cred-
itors, preferred shareholders, common shareholders, corporate man-
agement, and society generally 5 4 -as they relate to distributions from
earnings despite a deficit. Creditors would obviously prefer that
the stated capital "cushion" be restored before any distributions
are made.58  But the strength of their claim for restoration in a
particular situation presumably would depend upon, inter alia, whether
(1) the fair value of the corporation's assets remaining after the
distribution was greater than its liabilities;"' (2) the corporation
would be rendered incapable of meeting its obligations in the fore-
seeable future; 587 (3) the deficit resulted from improper distribu-
124, 140-43 (1943) (holding contra on the Michigan statute). All of these cases,
with the exception of Mangham, involved the undistributed profits tax rather than
questions of corporation law. For discussion of the cases, see McCormick, supra
note 580, at 198-201 and McDowell, supra note 578.
Delaware, in 1927, became the first state to adopt a statute specifically permit-
ting nimble dividends. See BAKER & CARY at 1229. That statute was criticized
by Berle, Investors and the Revised Delaware Corporation Act, 29 COLUx. L. REv.
562, 575-76 (1929). Ballantine & Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon
Dividends Under Modern Corporation Laws, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 229, 247-48 (1935)
promptly rose to the defense of such statutes. The controversy over distributions
from current earnings in the face of a deficit, however, predates the American
experience; it had its source in a line of English cases (Lee v. Neuchatel Asphalte
Co., 41 Ch. D. 1 (1889); Verner v. General Commercial Trust, [1894] 2 Ch. 239;
National Bank of Wales, [1899] 2 Ch. 629; Dovey v. Cory, [1901] A.C. 477; and
Ammonia Soda Co. v. Chamberlain, [1918] 1 Ch. 266 (1917)) that seemed to
endorse such distributions. For discussion of these cases, see Weiner, Theory of
Anglo-American Dividend Law: The English Cases, 28 COLUx. L. REv. 1046,
1056-57 (1928); PALMER, COMPANY LAW 213-18 (18th ed. A. F. Topham 1948);
H. HATFIELD, ACCOUNTING 272-75 (1927); Yanney, The Case Law Relating to
Company Dividends, in W. BAXTER & S. DAVIDSON, STUDIES IN AccoUNTING THEORY
435-42 (1962).
'See Berks Broadcasting Co. v. Craumer, 356 Pa. 620, 52 A.2d 571 (1947);
BAKER & CARY at 1171.
'Accounting opinion seems quite firmly against declaration of dividends in
the face of a deficit in earned surplus. See, e.g., R. Wixox, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK
22.30-31 (4th ed. 1956); H. HATFIELD, SURPLUS AND DIVIDENDs 26 (1943). The
reasons offered for this position are that the corporation has not yet earned any-
thing distributable to shareholders (see H. HATFIELD, supra) and that it views the
capital impairment test with an improper definition of capital (ie., capital at the
beginning of the period) in mind.
' For nimble dividend statutes imposing such a limitation, see ARK. STAT.
Am. § 64-402-11(A) (3) (1966); CAL. CoRP. CODE § 1501 (West 1955) ; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 301-22 subdiv. 2(3) (1947); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50 (a) (2) (1963) ; OKL.A.
STAT. ANT. tit. 18, § 1.132(a) (1953) ; and Wyo. STAY. § 17.36.39(a) (1961) (currently
payment of the dividend must be at least one and one-quarter times the corporation's
debts and liabilities (excluding stated capital)).
' For nimble dividend statutes imposing such a limitation, see ARx. STAT.
ANN. § 64-402-Il(B) (2) (1966) ; CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501 (West 1955); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-50(c) (1) (1963); OFLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.133(2) (1953); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 17.36.39 1 (1957); and Hills, supra note 580, at 1365. Hills' Act also
required that the corporation's current assets after payment of the dividend be at least
one and one-quarter times the amount of the corporation's current liabilities. Id.
1967]
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tions 5S8 or from extraordinary non-recurring losses; 5 9 (4) the deficit
approaches the amount of stated capital;5 0 (5) management intends
to distribute all of the current earnings; 59 ' and (6) the earnings
are of such a nature as may reasonably be expected to continue.' 9 2
Some interests of preferred shareholders are advanced by the
existence of a nimble dividend statute because such a statute may
enable preferred dividends to be continued without reduction of
stated capital, which step, requiring as it does approval of common
shareholders, usually can be obtained only at the cost of concessions
by preferred shareholders.59 3 However, the preferred obviously desire
'" No statute currently makes this distinction. For the suggestion, see Solether
& Jennings, The Minnesota Business Corporation Act, 12 Wis. L. Rv. 419, 435
(1937); H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 582 (rev. ed. 1946). Solether & Jennings
supra explain the limitation in terms of the foreseeable risks to the stated capital,
of which improper distributions is not one.
A related problem concerns payment of nimble dividends when the deficit arose
from the issuance of watered stock (see part II, 42 WASH. L. Rv. at 168-69 as to
the probability under the New Act that a reduction in earned surplus results from
watered assets). If the arguments previously advanced (part II, 42 WASH. L. REv.
at 170-71) as to why earned surplus should not bear the charge for a reduction of
watered assets are approved, then the existence of a nimble dividend provision
should likewise be approved. If, however, it is desired that the water be eliminated
by earnings before dividends of any sort can be declared, then obviously the nimble
dividend provision should be limited depending on the source of the deficit. In
the latter connection, it should be noted that a bankruptcy solvency test and protec-
tion of preferred liquidation preferences may operate to eliminate much of the
problem.
'Ballantine & Hills, supra note 583, at 247 offer the following example as a
partial justification for nimble dividend statutes:
Suppose a corporation owns ten houses or ten motor buses, each worth
$10,000 and each earning $1,000 per year. If one is destroyed without insurance,
the current earnings would still be $9,000 per year. If there is a capital deficit
of $10,000, more than a year of profitable operation will be needed to obtain a
surplus. Must the income of the shareholders be entirely cut off and all the
earnings applied to wipe out the deficit unless the legal capital be reduced?
May not the restoration of the deficit be spread over several years, continuing
dividends in the meantime at a reduced rate or upon the preferred shares only?
See also H. BALLANTINE, supra note 588, at 580-81.
'OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1.132 (a) (3) (1953) and Hills, supra note 580, at
1364 and 1367 n.51 raise this issue by requiring that in a one-class case, no dividends
be paid until the fair value of net assets equal one-half of the stated capital.
" Only Hills, supra note 580, at 1364 (only two-thirds of the earnings could be
distributed) and OKLA. STAT. ANx. tit. 18, § 1.132(3)(1953) (only one-half of the
earnings can be distributed) impose such a limitation.
'2A frequent objection to nimble dividend statutes is that they permit a
corporation with alternating periods of prosperity and depression to declare divi-
dends despite the gradual erosion of stated capital. See H. HATFIELD, mupra note
585, at 26; Berle, supra note 583, at 575-76.
Hills, supra note 580, at 1366 n.51 seems to recognize this interest with his sug-
gestion that it might be desirable to establish a standard of prudence and due care
applicable to dividends within legal bounds.
' See Ballantine & Hills, supra note 583, at 247-48; Baker & Cary at 1231-32
(quoting the commentary accompanying the North Carolina nimble dividend pro-
visions). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(b) (1965), in recognition of this interest, further
provides that any charter clause attempting to make nimble dividends unavailable
[ VOL. 43 :337
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to prevent distributions to common shareholders from current earn-
ings at least until the net assets exceed the preferred shares' liquida-
tion preference 594 and possibly until the deficit is eliminated.595 The
preferred shareholders may find some conflict in their own interests
when the net assets as a result of a deficit are less than their
liquidation preference and the corporation has current earnings. In
such a situation, some preferred shareholders may favor retention
of assets in the corporation until the liquidation preference is covered
so as to protect their earnings claim. Other preferred shareholders
may desire that the dividend payments be kept as current as possible
despite the shortage in liquidation preference coverage. 96
Common shareholders generally would prefer that distribution from
current earnings be made to the extent that the distribution would
not impede the corporation's earining capacity.591 However, some may
feel that since the distribution is in essence a return of their invest-
ment, notice should be given to the shareholders stating the extra-
for the payment of preferential dividends will be null and void. Such a provision
would seem to be a worthwhile limitation on the power to make article provisions
under WAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 f 1 (1965).
" All of the statutes listed in note 582 supra and Hills, supra note 580, at 1364
provide protection to the liquidation preference of the preferred. They vary as to
whether the preferred shares should receive distributions when net assets are less
than the amount of the preference. See note 596 infra.
I Only OKLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.132(a) (3) (1953) and Hills, supra note 580,
at 1364 provide that corporations with preference shares outstanding will be able to
distribute nimble dividends only to those shares.
' CAL. CoRP. CODE § 1500(b) (West 1955) and Mixr. STAT. ANN. § 301.22 subdiv.
2(3) (1945) provide that nimble dividends may be distributed on preferred shares
even though the net assets are less than the amount of the liquidation preference of
the preferred. Aax. STAT. ANN. § 64-402-11 (B) (3) (1966); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 170(a)(2)(1953); GA. CODE ANN. §22-1835 (1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
17-3502 (1949); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 15-407(1) (1967) ; NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.290(1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(c) (3) (1965) ; and Wyo. STAT. § 17.36.39(a) (1965)
prohibit dividends on any class of shares if net assets are less than the amount of the
liquidation preference. OKLA. GEN. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.132(a) (3) (1953) goes even fur-
ther by requiring that net assets before any distribution to the preferred shares must
equal the amount of the liquidation preference plus fifty per cent of the difference
between total stated capital and the amount of the preferences.
' This interest is suggested by the example posed by Ballantine & Hills, supra
note 583. See also H. BALLANTINE, supra note 588, at 582 where the suggestion is
made that in a one-class case, net assets equal to one-half of the stated capital should
be retained. This seems to be an attempt to define b y formula means the interest
stated in text. For a statute currently imposing such a test, see OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1.132(a) (3) (1953).
Support for the common shareholders' position is offered by statutes permitting
easy reduction of stated capital, since virtually the same results may be achieved
under a reduction as under the nimble dividend privilege. See Latty, Uncertainties
In Permissive Sources of Dividends Under Present G.S. 55-116, 34 N.C.L. REv.
261, 268-69 (1956). Most proponents of the nimble dividend privilege recognize
the efficacy of a reduction of capital as an alternative but favor nimble dividends
because of the omission of shareholder approval. See 25 MiNx. L. REv. 744, 771(1941); Ballantine & Hills, supra note 583, at 248; BAYER & CARY at 1229.
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ordinary character of the distribution and the circumstances thereof."'
Corporate management presumably would prefer maximum latitude
in making distributions to shareholders simply because of the favor-
able implications that distributions have for shareholders as to the
operation of the corporation. Additionally, management would prefer
a legal standard that is relatively clear in application so as to minimize
potential liability. Society's interest is probably best served by a
healthy continuing corporation.
A fair accommodation of these competing interests is possible by
modifying slightly the New Act nimble dividend provision and by
construing its terms in full view of the interests concerned. The
creditor's solvency interest would be met if, as previously suggested,5 99
the solvency limitation stated in the Act is extended to include the
bankruptcy test of solvency in addition to the equity test. Further pro-
tection of that interest arises from the liquidation preference limitation
found in the Act. Inclusion of the latter limitation should not generally
prove adverse to preferred shareholders in the long run and would be
fairer to common shareholders.0 0 The preferred shareholders' interest
should be strengthened with respect to distributions on the common
shares by requiring that only one-half of any earnings available after
the preferred liquidation preference is met and all accrued preferred
dividends are paid be distributable.60 ' In one-class cases, the basic con-
flict between creditors and shareholders with respect to the possibility
of non-recurring or seasonal earnings is partly resolved by the New Act
requirement that earnings be computed for a two-year period. 2 But it
...See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 588, at 582. Only OKLA. STAT. ANIN. tit. 18,
§ 1.132 (c) (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(a)(1)(1965); and Hills, supra note 580,
at 1364 include such a provision.
'See part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 131-32.
'See Hills, supra note 580, at 1366 n.51.
" Even with these protections, preferred shareholders may desire to add further
refinements on the corporation's power to pay dividends in their preferred stock
agreement. See Buxbaum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L.
REV. 243, 255-57 (1954); Note, Consideration of "Nimble Dividend" Statutes in
Drafting Preferred Share Contracts, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 584, 588-89 (1956).
There is a general analogy between distributions from current earnings and from
paid-in surplus. See Buttimer, Dividends and the Law, 36 ACCOUNTING REv. 434, 436-
37 (1961) who suggests that regulations of each type of distribution ought to be con-
sistent with each other; Hills, supra note 580, at 1365 n.50. It is hoped that the amend-
ments proposed to New Act regulations governing capital surplus distributions (see
part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 136-41) and nimble dividends are consistent.
6'The two-year computation base found in the New Act and its Model Act
prototype is unique. CAL. CORP. CODE 1500 (b) (West 1955) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18.
§ 1.13 2 (a) (3) (1953) ; and Wyo. STAT. § 17.36.39(a) (1965) allow dividends out of net
profits earned during the preceding accounting period, which can not be less than
six months or more than one year in duration. ARK. STAT. ANN. §64-402-II(A)(3)
[ VOL. 43 :337
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would seem that creditors and shareholders should both share in the
benefits of improved earnings, rather than have all the benefits accrue
to the shareholders, as under the New Act. Therefore, there should be
added to the New Act a limitation that only one-half of any earnings
be distributable until the deficit is eliminated. °8 And it would be
desirable to add a requirement to the Act that shareholders be notified
that a distribution is being made from current earnings despite a
deficit.
If no changes are made in the New Act provision, a number of
construction problems will arise regarding its terms. 604 A prime
example is the term "net earnings" which is not defined by the Act.
The term has heavy accounting overtones and a relatively clear
(1966) permits dividends from net profits for the fiscal year then current.
DEL.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2) (1953); GA. CODE Axx. §22-1835 (1966); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §17-3501(B)(1949) (apparently, since it is modelled on the
Delaware statute, but contains an "s" after the words "preceding year") ; MIN. STAT.
ANN. § 301.22 subdiv. 2(3) (1947) ; MoNr. REv. CODES ANN. 15-407(1) (1967) ; and
NEv. REv. STAT. § 78-290 (1965) permit dividends from net earnings for the current
fiscal year or the preceding fiscal year. N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-50(a)(2)(1965) con-
tains a similar provision except that the reference is to accounting periods which must
not be less than six months or more than one year in duration. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 170(a) (2) (1953) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1835 (1966) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §
15-407(1) (1967) ; and NEv. REv. STAT. § 78-290 (1965) go on to add either an "and"
or an "or both" to the above formulation, the effect of which is not clear.
Two-year provisions seem much preferable to one-year provisions since the former
help to screen short-term earnings increases from valid long-term earnings improve-
ment. Of the two-year formulations, that chosen by the New (Model) Act seems su-
perior to the remaining such provisions because it makes clear that the operations of
the years concerned must be blended to determine the amount eligible for dividend. The
other provisions are capable of the construction that if the corporation in the preceding
year has a loss, that year is ignored. See D. KEHL, COPORATE DIVIDENDS 65 (1941).
' This view rejects the notion that there should be available to the creditors a safety
factor at least equal to perhaps one-half of the stated capital. The two-year computation
approach alleviates some of the need for such a provision. In addition, the most im-
portant factor for creditors who have been creditors during a period of substantial
losses and who have not made special arrangements limiting distributions would appear
to be that the corporation's operations have improved and will continue to improve in
the future. If the latter conditions are met, there will be no immediate need to apply
earnings to the deficit to any specific level.
The suggestions in text also reject the notion that a limitation on nimble dividends
should be placed where the deficit arises from illegal distributions. This type of limita-
tion appears to be an attempt to reinforce the director liability provisions as an extra
sanction against illegal distributions. There is no guarantee under the provision that
the guilty parties will bear the onus of the extra sanction. Moreover, it is hard to see
why the creditors' position is any different from a case where the deficit arose from
operations; indeed, the corporation may be better able to produce earnings in the fu-
ture. Hence, it would appear better to impose a more severe sanction, if necessary,
than to add this particular indirect sanction.
'The only cases involving nimble dividend statutes to come before the courts have
not posed significant questions of interpretation. See Weinberg v. Baltimore Birch
Co., 34 Del. Ch. 586, 108 A.2d 81, aff'd, 114 A.2d 812 (Ch. 1954), aft'd, 114 A.2d 812
(Sup. Ct. 1955) (involving determination of whether certain charter clauses represented
a restriction on the power to pay nimble dividends under the Delaware statute); Mor-
ris v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 31 Del. Ch. 20, 63 A.2d 577 (1949) (involving




relationship to earned surplus, °5 which the draftsmen defined by
means of an early accounting definition. 6 Hence, it would seem
that, following the analysis previously presented," 7 a court faced
with an interpretation question should determine the content of the
term under generally accepted accounting principles and then deter-
mine whether the accounting result should be qualified so as to provide
a better accommodation of the interests of the groups involved.
The reference to accounting principles leaves us with many of
the problems considered earlier in connection with computing earned
surplus"" and with one major new problem: 0 " are net earnings to
It seems reasonably clear that net earnings become part of earned surplus (defined
by WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(12) (1965) as the balance of a corporation's net
profits, income, gains and losses from date of incorporation). Cf. P. GRADY, INVENTORY
OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No.
7, 202-203 (1964). It does seem unfortunate that the draftsmen chose "net earnings"
over "net profits" since the latter would not have increased the number of undefined
terms in the statute.
See part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 126 n.364.
' See part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 125-28. The advocates of the "current values"
approach to dividend fund determinations, see part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 171-73,
presumably would argue in favor of determining earnings by comparing the current
value of the corporation's net assets at the end of the fiscal years concerned. It should
be noted that this approach not only involves problems of unrealized appreciation, see
part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 148-53, but also potentially involves use of an all-
inclusive income statement approach to defining earnings. See BAKER & CARY at 1230
and text discussion infra beginning note 609.
The following problems considered in connection with the determination of earned
surplus will also be problems in computing net earnings:
1. Effect of unrealized appreciation on net earnings. The Accounting Principles
Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 1965 ap-
proved an earlier Institute rule to the effect that "unrealized profit should not be
credited to income account of the corporation either directly or indirectly .... " See
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, STATUS OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS,
OPINION No. 6, at 1 11 (1965) which does not disapprove the rule quoted that
appears in AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, at 11 (1961). Although the rule has
generally been interpreted as applying to appreciation on inventory goods, see
part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. 119, 150 n.463, it is clear that appreciation on fixed assets
is subject to the same restrictions. See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, STATUS OF
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS, OPINION No. 6 ff 17 (1965); Hackney, Ac-
counting Principles in Corporation Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 791, 807
(1965); R. WIXON, supra note 585, at 5.7; and L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 16.20 (2d ed. 1963). It would seem that a similar result
should obtain in determining net earnings for purposes of a nimble dividend statute.
See analysis in part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 152-53. Indeed, one can argue that
even if unrealized appreciation is recognized as a source of earned surplus for
purposes of regular dividends, it should not be recognized as a source of net
earnings for nimble dividend purposes simply because of the less stable condition
of a corporation proposing to pay a nimble dividend.
2. Effect of unrealized diminution in assets upon net earnings. As previously noted,
part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 154-55, accounting recognition of unrealized di-
minution in value depends upon the type of asset involved and the permanence of
the decline involved. A secondary problem has to do with classification of the loss
as one deductible from current operating earnings or as one deductible from accu-
mulated earnings. The accountants' rules carefully applied (see part II, 42 WASH.
L. REv. at 156-57) will generally produce appropriate results in determining
whether unrealized losses ought to be recognized in the general accounting process
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be computed inclusive or exclusive of extraordinary transactions and
accounting adjustments occurring during the period which relate
to prior periods? After many years of debate,610 the Accounting
Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants recently opined that net income should reflect all items of
profit or loss recognized during the period except prior period adjust-
for the period concerned. Then a secondary decision must be made as to whether
such losses ought to be considered as affecting net earnings for the purposes of
nimble dividend declarations. See text infra beginning note 609.
3. Effect of rising price levels and replacement costs upon net earnings. See discus-
sions of each subject in part 1I, 42 WAsH. L. REv. at 157-61, 173, to the effect
that price-level adjustments should be made in determining net earnings but that
lack of objective techniques for determination of replacement costs precludes a
legal standard requiring deduction of depreciation and other expenses determined
on such costs.
4. Effect of a subsidiary's earnings upon a parent corporation's net earnings. Refer-
ence should be made to part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 161-63, relating to the
various accounting procedures that may be used in reporting parent-subsidiary
operations. Although the language in WASH. REV CODE § 23A.08.420(1) (1965)
regarding earned surplus dividends ("only out of the unreserved and unrestricted
earned surplus of the corporation") can be interpreted to prohibit use of consoli-
dated data, the statute's language on nimble dividends is curiously ambiguous ("or
out of the unreserved and unrestricted net earnings of the current fiscal year and
the next preceding fiscal year .... "). Presumably the word "corporation's" is to
be implied following the word "the" in the latter clause since whatever decision
is reached on the effect of a subsidiary's earnings upon the parent's earned surplus
ought to carry over to the determination of net earnings.
As noted earlier, see part II, 42 WAsH. L. REv. at 167, even though con-
solidated data may not be used in determining the dividend fund, a court
could reach the same result by interpreting the language of the act to permit the
economic-basis of reporting. In the event that the problem is to be solved by
statute, as suggested in the portion cited above, all that need be added to the
Pennsylvania statute is a clause permitting a dividend from the special type of
capital surplus even though the parent has a deficit in earned surplus.
'Another significant question posed by the reference concerns the need for
consistency in reporting of transactions between the various periods concerned.
See BAKER & CARY at 1229. Accounting principles currently rely upon a high
degree of consistency as a means of making interperiod comparisons meaningful.
See, e.g., P. GRADY, supra note 605, at 31-32. A similar degree of consistency should
be required in determining net earnings for nimble dividend purposes. The latter
does not mean that a corporation should not be permitted to adopt a new method of
reporting on a new operation or some other change supported by good business
reasons. But it should not be permitted to shift, for example, from the LIFO to the
FIFO method of inventory pricing simply to enlarge its net earnings for dividend
purposes.
An analogous problem exists with respect to the propriety of the charges giving
rise to the earned surplus deficit. These charges must be carefully examined to see
that during the periods giving rise to the deficit extra expenses were not recognized
solely for the purposes of enhancing net earnings of later nimble dividend periods.
Cf. the problem noted by Callahan, Statutory Protection of Creditors in Reduction
of Capital Stock, 2 OHio ST. L.J. 220, 233-34 (1936); Comment, Writing Down
Fixed Assets and Stated Capital, 44 YALE L.J. 1025, 1035 (1935) in connection with
reductions of capital. See text beginning note 674 infra.
'The history of the debate, involving the members of AICPA, inter se, and the




ments.61 Prior period adjustments, defined to be those material
adjustments which can be specifically identified with and directly
related to business activities of particular prior periods, are not
attributable to economic events occurring subsequent to the date of
financial statements for the prior period, depend primarily on deter-
minations by persons other than management, and were not suscept-
ible to reasonable estimation prior to the period of recording,612 are
made directly to earned surplus.61 3  Treatment of the accounting
net income as the "net earnings" for purposes of a nimble dividend
declaration will not produce a satisfactory accommodation of the
various interests involved. The accounting interpretation would per-
mit gains from unusual sales of assets not acquired for resale to
swell the net earnings available for distribution. 14 But there are
strong overtones in the nimble dividend privilege that the level of
net earnings involved can be expected to continue. 1 5 Moreover,
inclusion of extraordinary gains may lead managers to make unneces-
sary sales simply for the purpose of inflating the fund available.
Hence, it might seem that net earnings ought to be computed on
a regular operating basis for the period concerned. But this view
also goes too far since net earnings would then ignore losses from
extraordinary transactions or transactions requiring prior period ad-
justments occurring during the period. The creditors' interest would
appear to require that the overall deficit become no worse as a result
of transactions occurring during the years concerned and the declara-
tion of a nimble dividend.616 Hence net earnings should take into
.1 ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, REPORTING THE RESULTS OF OPERATIONS, OPIN-
ION No. 9 ff 3 (1967).612 Id. at ff 23.
013Id. at ff 18. It is contemplated that such adjustments will be rare. See id. at
ff 23. Examples include material, nonrecurring adjustments or settlements of income
taxes, of renegotiation proceedings or of utility revenue under rate processes and
settlements of significant amounts resulting from litigation. Id.
Extraordinary transactions, defined as events and transactions of material effect
which would not be expected to recur frequently and which would not be considered
as recurring factors in any evaluation of the ordinary operating processes of the
business, see id. at ff 21, are shown under a special caption, following income
before extraordinary items and before net income, on the income statement. Id. atf1 20. Examples include material gains and losses from sale or abandonment of a
plant or a significant segment of the business, the sale of an investment not acquired
for resale, the writeoff of goodwill due to unusual events during the period, the
condemnation or expropriation of properties and a major devaluation of a foreign
currency. Id. at ff 21.
... It is assumed that the sale is not likely to recur frequently and that the gain is
material. See note 613 supra.
"'
1 See D. KEIIL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 152-53 (1941).
"'
6See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 588, at 582; 25 MINN. L. REv. 744, 773 (1941)
but see D. KEHL, supra note 615, at 65 interpreting the Delaware statute contra.
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account extraordinary and prior period losses to the extent they
exceed extraordinary and prior period gains during the period, and,
apart from such offsetting value, extraordinary and prior period gains
should be excluded.617
Several other problems of construction arise under the New Act
provision. The first concerns the term "current fiscal year." It
seems generally assumed that fiscal year has reference to the corpor-
ation's regular annual accounting cycle.618 But even if this is true,
is it possible to combine the earnings of only a part of the current
fiscal year with the earnings of the next preceding fiscal year? The
answer would appear to be that the current year must be completed
before the calculation can be made in order to minimize management
manipulation.619
Another difficult problem concerns the operation of the two-year
computation period where a number of years are involved. Assume,
for example, that a corporation in the first three years of its existence
loses $100,000. In year 4, it loses $15,000. In year 5, it has net
earnings of $25,000 and its managers declare the maximum permis-
sible nimble dividend, $10,000. Suppose in year 6 the corporation
has net earnings of $25,000. What is the maximum permissible
nimble dividend-$50,000? $40,000? or $25,000? The statute read
literally would permit $50,000, the sum of the net earnings for years
5 and 6. But it would seem that the very process of combining
two years ought to mean that the $15,000 of year 5 earnings applied
to the year 4 loss is thereafter unavailable for the dividend.
Moreover, it would also appear that the amount of net earnings
paid as a dividend should not be available in a later year. Hence,
the answer would appear to be $25,000. Further, suppose instead
that no dividend was declared in year 5 and that at the end of year
6 (the net earnings in each year being the same as assumed above),
the directors declare as a nimble dividend $15,000. Assume that in
year 7 the corporation has net earnings of $25,000. How much is
617 Under AccouNTiNG PRINCIPLES BOARD OPINION No. 9, supra note 611, at 111 20,
26, extraordinary transactions and prior period adjustments are shown on financial
statements net of the federal income tax effect. It would appear that similar treat-
ment ought to be afforded to the items when included or excluded as indicated in
text.
" See BAKER & CARY at 1230.
"1 Solether & Jennings, supra note 588, at 436 suggest that similar language
should be interpreted to mean that the "current" fiscal year refers to the year for
which rather than during which the dividends are declared. The result would be
that current earnings would not become payable until they have been definitely
ascertained as of the close of the year.
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the maximum permissible nimble dividend - $50,000? or $35,000?
Here it would seem that the dividend in year 6 should be charged
to the earnings of the current year and that the net earnings yet
available for distribution should only be the original net earnings
less the dividend. Hence the answer would appear to be $35,000.
A final question that may be raised in connection with a nimble
dividend provision is what types of distributions should be allowed
from such earnings. If current earnings can be used to support a
distribution of cash or property, should they also be usable to support
purchases of the corporation's shares? As a source for stock divi-
dends? These questions can be better answered in connection with
the discussion of each of these subjects below.2 '
b. Dividends By Wasting Asset Corporations. Both Acts contain
the common provision621 permitting corporations engaged in the busi-
ness of exploiting natural resources or property having a limited
life622 to declare cash dividends out of depletion reserves.Y In partial
recognition of the fact that such dividends may represent a return
' See text infra beginning at notes 805 and 852.
... 1 MODEL ACT ANN. § 40(b) ff 2.03 indicates that only 15 states (Arizona,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and
Wisconsin) do not have a dividend fund provision relating to dividends by wasting
asset corporations. South Dakota should be deleted from this list. See S.D. Laws
ch. 22 § 42(2) (Business Corp. Act (1965) ).
"' Both Acts give as examples of assets with limited lives a lease for a term of
years or a patent. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23.01.250(7) (1958); 23A.08.420(2)
(1965).
" See WASH. REv. CODE §§23.01.250(7) (1958), 23A.08.420(2) (1965). The
language used in text is taken from the New Act. The language in the old act
varies from that in the New Act in the following respects: (1) the corporations
eligible under the old act are those owning wasting assets intended for sale in the
ordinary course of business such as mines, or oil or gas wells, or timber; (2) the
effect of a corporation's eligibility under the old act is that it need not deduct the
depletion of such assets by sale or lapse of time in the computation of the fund
available for dividends and such a corporation may pay dividends from the net
profits arising from its business without deduction of such depletion; and (3) the
old act permitted depletion dividends to be paid in cash or property. Compare
WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(7) & (4) (1958) with WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 (2)(1965). The old act's approach in providing examples of the assets involved is superior
to the New Act formulation simply in terms of natural resources. Presumably the
latter must be interpreted to include activities in which under generally accepted
accounting principles depletion (rather than some other form of amortization) is
taken. But the accounting guidelines as to which assets are subject to depletion are not
particularly clear. Compare H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF AccOuNTxING-
INTERMEDIATE 323 (6th ed. 1965) (limiting depletion to wasting assets such as mines,
timber, or oil wells) with W. PATON & W. PATON, JR., ASSET ACCOUNTING 438 (1952)
(stocks of game, fisheries, orchards and agricultural land may be included). As to the
preferable technique for stating the exception, see note 645 infra. The rationale for the
New Act's limitation of depletion dividends to cash is not stated. Possibly the thought
was to limit such dividends to funds generated by exploiting the resource. See note 630
infra.
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of stated capital,624 the New Act adds the requirements that the
corporation be solvent in the equitable sense before and after the
distribution6 2 and that dividends be identified as a distribution from
depletion reserves. 6 Rather surprisingly, however, the New Act
fails to offer even the rather vague protection afforded by the old
provision to preferred shareholders in wasting asset corporations.627
The genesis of the wasting assets exception6 2 was an early assertion
'Neither Act makes clear whether traditional dividend sources-i.e., earned
surplus or current earnings under the New Act and surplus computed with a deduc-
tion for depletion under the old act-must be exhausted before distributions can be
paid "out of" depletion reserves. This issue, which is analogous to the question
raised in connection with distributions from capital surplus (see part II, 42 WASH.
L. RFv. at 138 & nn.414-15), is fairly important because of the fact that under the
New Act depletion reserves can only be used as a source of cash dividends and not
as a source of property dividends, share dividends, or share repurchases. Accounting
authorities are clearly against the practice of paying dividends out of depletion
reserves (see, e.g., R. MoNTGoMERY, AUDITING 409 (8th ed. N. LENHART & P.
DEFLiESE 1957); H. HATFIELD, supra note 585, at 45) and hence take the position
that traditional sources must be exhausted before depletion reserves be used. See,
e.g., M. MooNiTz & L. JORDAN, AccouNTING, AN ANALYSIS OF ITS PROBLEMS 418
(rev. ed. 1963). No aspect of dividend policy contradicts this result.
A related question concerns how the corporation is to account for a dividend paid
out of depletion reserves. Some companies apparently simply omit depletion allow-
ances in financial statements (see MONTGOMERY, supra at 408; P. GRADY, supra
note 605, at 153), which practice would further confuse shareholders receiving
the distribution. To eliminate this practice, the New Act should be amended to
include the provision in TEX. Bus. Co". AcT art 2.39(5) (1956) requiring that
any such dividend be carried in the corporation's accounting records in a separate
account which is appropriately titled and shown on all financial statements as a
deduction from the reserve accounts on the basis of which the dividend was paid.
See also H. FINNEY & H. MmlLER, supra note 623, at 327.
'WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.420 1 1 (1965).
'WASH. REv. CODE §23A.08.420(2) (1965). In addition, the amount per share
paid from such reserves must be disclosed to the recipient shareholders concurrently
with the distribution. This notice is essential to shareholders in order that they
may give the distribution appropriate treatment for federal income tax purposes.
See generally INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 301, 316. But to be useful the notice must
indicate to the shareholder how the depletion reserve was computed and the status of
the corporation's earnings and profits account See Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2(e) (1955).
'WASH. REv. CODE §23.01.250(7) (1958) stated that distributions made from
surplus computed without deduction of depletion were "subject... to the rights of
the shareholders of different classes." The Commissioners' Note in 9 U.L.A. 171(1957) indicates that this requirement would be satisfied only if "a sufficient amount
of the net profits [is] ... retained to insure the repayment of principal to the holders
of the preferred shares." Presumably this language is intended to refer only to those
cases where the corporation has net profits because of the failure to take depletion.
So interpreted, the language would produce protection of the preferred shareholders'
interest similar (but not identical) to that afforded by the New Act to such share-
holders on most types of distributions. See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 132 et
seq. On appropriate protections for preferred shareholders, see note 646 infra.Shortly after Morawetz wrote, the Court of Appeal in England decided Lee
v. Neuchatel Asphalte Co., 41 Ch. D. 1 (1889). There a common shareholder sought
to enjoin the distribution of a dividend to preferred shareholders from "profits"
computed without deduction for depletion on the ground that the limited-period
mineral concession held by the company was a wasting asset and hence declaration
of a dividend without depletion deductions would represent a return of capital.
The company's articles of association provided that depletion need not be deducted
in determining net profits available for dividends. The preferred shares were
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by Morawetz that depletion need not be taken by a corporation
with one class of shareholders where its sole purpose was to invest
in a specific wasting asset. 0 ' The tenor of his argument was that
if such a corporation was not permitted to distribute cash as the
asset was exploited, it would become virtually an investment company
with respect to the dollars that would build up as a result of the
deduction of depletion from revenues.63 Shareholders in such cor-
entitled to a seven per cent annual dividend and participated rateably after the
common shares had received a like dividend. In the event of liquidation, all shares
participated rateably. Evidence offered at the trial court indicated that the conces-
sion was of greater value at the time of trial (because of renegotiation) than at the
time the corporation was formed. Three judges, relying in varying degrees upon
the notion of fixed and circulating capital, refused to enjoin the dividend. For
discussion, see Gold, Fixed and Circulating Capital In The English Law of Dizi-
dends, 6 TORONTO L.J. 14 (1945). Despite the numerous possibilities for confining
the case, it was promptly introduced into American cases (see Excelsior Water
& Mining Co. v. Pierce, 90 Cal. 131, 27 P. 44 (1891) (also citing Morawetz)) and
was soon cited as adopting a "wasting assets" exception to statutes barring distri-
butions resulting in capital impairment. See, e.g., 1 W. CooK, STOCK AND STOCK-
HOLDERS AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 724 (3d ed. 1894); W. CLARK, CORPORA-
TIONS 346 (1st ed. 1897). For discussion of later American cases, see Wittenberg v.
Federal Min. & Smelting Co., 15 Del. Ch. 147, 133 A. 48 (Ch. 1926), aff'd, 15 Del.
Ch. 409, 138 A. 347 (1927) (suggesting restriction on Lee where preferred shares
with a liquidation preference are present); Williams, Dividends From Wasting
Assets Corporations, 43 VAr . VA. L.Q. 53, 58-59 (1936); W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5347 (1958 rev. vol.).
The first American statute on the subject, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2) (1953),
was adopted in response to the decisions in Wittenberg v. Federal Min. & Smelting
Co., supra, denying a resource-exploiting corporation the right to declare cash
dividends without taking into account depletion. See BAKER & CARY at 1289.
" 1 V. MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 415-16 (2d ed. 1886). Morawetz went
on to say that a mining company could not expand its ability to pay dividends by
selling (presumably without profit) a portion of its property. (To the same effect
is Excelsior Min. Co. v. Pierce, 40 Cal. 131, 27 P. 44 (1891).) Precisely how such
a sale can be distinguished from periodic sales of the mined product is not made
clear. Possibly the property sale can be distinguished from periodic sales of product
on the grounds of creditor expectations, i.e., on the ground that creditors of mining
companies expect distributions as the product is mined in ordinary course of
business but do not anticipate extraordinary sales of the mining property. See V.
MORAWETZ supra, at 416; see also WASH. REV. CODE §23.01.250(7) (1958) limiting
the depletion excuse to corporations owning wasting assets intended for sale in the
ordinary course of business (query: how often do corporations hold mines for sale
in the ordinary course?). But Morawetz seems to undermine this distinction with
his further statement that "no dividend can be declared without considering the
rights of creditors, and providing for future liabilities." Id. In any event, the
New Act formulation would seem to preclude distributions in the event of realiza-
tion by sale because such sales will not increase the amount in the depletion reserve.
Indeed, it would seem that a sale of the property would deprive the corporation of all
rights to distribute "out of" the depletion reserve since the depletion reserve will
disappear in connection with the sale. Compare the treatment afforded by N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(b) (McKinney 1963) which permits a corporation to declare
dividends in excess of surplus, computed after deduction for depletion, to the extent that
the cost of the wasting asset has been recovered by depletion reserves, amortization
or sale.
" If it can be assumed that revenues are received in cash, a wasting-asset
corporation will experience a greater increase in cash during the year than the
amount of its net profits simply because depletion represents an allocation of a pre-
viously incurred cost rather than a current cash outlay. For illustrations of the
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porations were said to prefer to invest the funds produced rather
than to let the corporation's directors undertake this task.6"' Also,
creditors and shareholders were said to possess the common knowledge
that mining companies distributed funds out of capital and could
protect themselves by agreement against this risk if they desired." 2
In evaluating Morawetz' argument, it should first be noted that
generally accepted accounting principles now,"33 in contrast to when
Morawetz wrote,6 34 require that appropriate charges for depletion
be made. Hence, it is doubtful that creditors and shareholders are
generally aware that depletion may be ignored in determining the
dividend fund.635 Moreover, depreciation has the same potential cash
build up effect where a corporation does not replace its equipment;63 6
yet no suggestion has recently been made that depreciation can be
ignored in determining a corporation's dividend capacity.637 Perhaps
more mining companies than manufacturing companies operate with
dollar build up that may occur (both dealing with depreciation), see R. AmORY
& C. HARDEE, supra note 610, at 273-75; de Capriles, Modern Financial Accounting
(Part II), 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 10-13 (1963).
A secondary factor undoubtedly leading to early expansion of the depletion
avoidance exception was the difficulty in computing depletion. See Greenough
& Ayer, Funds Available For Corporate Dividends in Washington, 9 WAsH.
L. RFv. 123, 140 (1934); 25 MINN. L. REv. 744, 769 (1940). Such computation
requires determination of the cost of the depletable asset, which may be difficult to
determine where capital stock is issued, (for various techniques, see, e.g., R. WixoN,
supra note 585, at 15.2-.6; Fernald, Peloubet & Norton, Accounting for Nonferrous
Metal Mining Properties and Their Depletion, 68 J. ACcOUNTANCY 105-108 (1939))
and the amount of the resource available on a commercial basis. The latter on
occasion may be largely guess work. R. WixoN, supra, at 15.14.
'See Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law: American Statutes
and Cases, 29 COLUm. L. Rxv. 461, 482 (1929).
"'-See 1 V MORAWETZ, supra note 629, at 416; Comment, Corporations: Liquidat-
ing Dividends By Wasting Asset Corporations in California, 34 CALIF. L. REV.
204, 210 (1946).
See, e.g., P. GRADY, supra note 605, at 148-49; W. PATON & W. PATON, JR.,
ASSET AccOUNTNG 443 (1952); and R. M GxOMERY, supra note 624, at 280. A
number of companies, however, omit deplkion charges, relying in part upon state
statutes permitting dividends "out of" depletion reserves. See id. at 279; P. GaADY,
supra, at 153; Seitelman, The Depletion Problem, 28 AccOuNTING REv. 102, 106 (1953).
See also AICPA AccouNTING TRENDS AND TECHNIQUES 194 (12th ed. 1966) indicating
that among large corporations few engaged in resource exploitation did not take
depletion charges.
"See Peloubet, Natural Resource Assets-Their Treatment In Acconnts and
Valuation, 16 HARV. Bus. REv. 74, 75-76 (1937).
'Indeed, the inclusion of the notice provision in the New Act seems to be at
least in part responsive to this fact.
See examples cited in note 630 supra.
It should be noted that Morawetz in a paragraph preceding his discussion of
depletion allowances recommends that depreciation be taken into account in deter-
mining a corporation's dividend capacity. 1 V. MORAWETZ, supra note 629, at 414-15.
' For a review of the authorities, see BAKER & CARY at 1271-85. A slight
qualification of the text statement appears in IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-130(7) (1948)
which allows wasting asset corporations to disregard depreciation of plant and equip-
ment in determining the size of the dividend fund.
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a view to liquidation when present assets are exhausted6 3 8 but a
fairer exception would concern itself with all corporations operating
with a view to liquidating rather than singling out the predominant
group.'" :) Finally, why should it make a difference in a resource-
depleting corporation whether the resource is acquired for an annual
payment rather than a bulk payment at the outset?64  Despite the
similarity in economic effect, Morawetz' argument would provide no
exception in the lease case. These factors suggest that as a matter
of good dividend policy, the depletion deduction exception ought
to be abolished. 41'
Even if the case for a wasting assets exception is found persuasive,
several changes should be made in the New provision so as to confine
the benefits of the exception to the intended recipients. Clearly,
some limitation should be inserted in the Act preventing a resource-
depleting corporation that intends to reinvest funds received in other
resources from qualifying for the exception. 4 - Corporations desiring
' Seitelman, supra note 633, at 106 surveyed 24 corporations engaged in non-
ferrous metal mining (the sample drawn from corporations listed in Moody's
Industrial Record) and concluded that not one of the corporations was operating with
a view to liquidating.
See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 588, at 587. Cf. the statutes listed in note 642
infra which deal with corporations organized to liquidate specific assets.
" See Ballantine & Hills, supra note 583, at 251 where the authors compare the
case of a leasehold acquired for a bulk payment with a leasehold subject to an annual
obligation to pay rent.
H. BALLANTINE, supra note 588, at 587 states:
The statutory exception in dividend statutes derived from erroneous English
decisions, excusing deduction for depletion of wasting assets, is based on no
sufficient reason or need. Such lax provisions for liquidating dividends should
be repealed. No corporation should be authorized to make gradual returns of
their investment to shareholders without statutory proceedings to reduce capital.
It may be argued that if the wasting assets exception is abolished, a one-shot
mining corporation will have no recourse but to let depletion funds accumulate. But
available solutions include at least repurchase of redeemable preferred shares if the
corporation has such or reduction of capital. See text discussions on each topic
infra, beginning notes 653 and 715, respectively.
"-See Ballantine & Hills, supra note 583, at 251. No statute (except possibly
GA. CODE ANN. §22-1835 (1966) ["a corporation organized substantially for the
liquidation or exploitation of specific assets..."]) has undertaken to limit the
wasting assets exception in the manner described in text. However, a number do
include as part of the depletion exception corporations organized to liquidate
specific assets. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1503 (West 1955) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-130(7)
(1948); MD. CODE ANY. art. 23, §37(8) (1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. §301.22(5)
(1947); N.Y., Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(b) (McKinney 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1.132(b) (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1702(A) (3) (1967). For drafts of
statutes attempting to reach the result discussed in text, see Hills, M11odel Corporation
Act, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1365 (1935) ; Comment, Corporations: Liquidating Divi-
dends By lasting Asset Corporations in California, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 204, 211-12
(1946).
A preliminary question is whether the required relationship between the corpora-
tion's total operations and that part devoted to resource exploitation is made
sufficiently clear in the New Act. WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.420(2) (1965) requires
that the corporation be engaged in the business of exploiting natural resources or
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to qualify should be required to have article provisions authorizing
such distributions, 43 to file appropriate notification with the secretary
of state, and to denominate themselves as resource liquidating cor-
porations. 4 4 The depletion exception should be restated in terms
that would prohibit the payment of dividends when there was a
deficit in earned surplus greater than the amount in the depletion
owning property having a limited life. This suggests (albeit not too clearly) that
resource exploitation must be quite a substantial portion of the corporation's
activities. For clearer resolutions of the problem, see, e.g., CALIF. CORP. CODE § 1503
(West 1955) ("engaged solely or substantially in the exploitation of mines..."); and
MINN. STAT. ANN. §301.22(5) (1947) ("engaged principally..."). Note that the
New Act so interpreted is a good deal narrower than the old provision ("a corpora-
tion which owns wasting assets..."). WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(7) (1958).
See in this connection BAKER & CARY at 1291 where the authors ask whether a cor-
poration with a mine representing 40% of its activity should be denied the privilege
while a 90% mining corporation receives it.
The Washington draftsmen, in order to make the new provision parallel to the old,
added the language concerning corporations owning property having a limited life
to the Model Act predecessor section, Model Act §40(b). The Note, Dividends
From Contributed Capital and Protection of Preferred Shareholders, 65 HiAv. L.
REv. 1203, 1206 (1952) prefers the narrower Model Act formulation as affording
more protection to the preferred. However, if the business is read broadly, a
liquidation-view is required and Mr. Weiner's suggestion for protecting preferred
shares is adopted, see note 646 infra, the extension would not appear to be
required.
'Neither the old nor the New Act requires that the corporation's articles of
incorporation authorize directors to make such distributions. Compare WASH.
REv. CODE § 23.01.250(7) (1958) with WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420(2) (1965).
In order to achieve this result, the Washington draftsmen had to amend the Model
Act predecessor to the New Act provision, Model Act §40(b), to delete such a
requirement.
There is a general analogy between depletion dividends, distributions from
capital surplus (see Buttimer, Dividends and The Law, 36 AccoUNTING REv. 434
(1961)), and distributions from surplus arising from reductions of capital. The
requirements for distributions of capital surplus and reduction surplus both suggest
the desirability of requiring a shareholder approval of depletion dividends. See
part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 136-41 and text beginning at note 676 infra. But if
depletion dividends required a shareholder vote, then there would be no substantive
difference between reducing stated capital and depletion dividends. On the theory
that depletion dividends, if they can be supported at all, are meant to be less
rigorous than a reduction of capital and to avoid the burden otherwise imposed
because of frequent distribution of depletion dividends, such requirement seems
unnecessary. See BAKER & CAY at 1292.
" The purpose of this requirement is obviously to notify creditors and outside
investors that the corporation intends to declare depletion dividends.
TEX. Bus. CoRP. AcT art. 1.02(17) (1956) requires that the phrase "a consuming
assets corporation" must be used as part of a corporation's official corporate name if
it desires to avoid depletion for dividend purposes. The corporation must give the
phrase equal prominence with the rest of the corporate name on its financial state-
ments and certificates representing shares. All certificates representing shares in
such corporations must further state "This corporation is permitted by law to pay
dividends out of reserves which may impair its stated capital." It is assumed
that the statute has been amended pursuant to the suggestion made in part II, 42
WASH. L. REv. 131-32 (1966) that the bankruptcy insolvency test be added to the
equitable insolvency test for dividends. For statutory language dealing with this
precise problem, see TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art. 2.39(1) (1956).
IND. ANN. STAT. §25-211 (Additional Supp. 1967) qualifies a provision generally
similar to WASH. REv. CoDE § 23.01.250(7) (1958) by making distributions from deple-
tion "subject to the rights of creditors." Precisely what power is granted to corpora-
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reserve and no current earnings available for distribution.645 Finally,
provisions protecting the liquidation preference, common capital cush-
ion and current earnings claim of preferred shares should be in-
serted.64
tions by this provision is not clear. CALIF. CORP. CODE § 1503 (West 1955), MD. ANN.
CODE art. 23, § 37(a) (8) (1966), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.22(5) (1947) all in-
clude a requirement that adequate provision be made for meeting debts and liabilities.
Such language is so hopelessly vague as to afford little protection for creditors. See
BAKER & CARY at 1293.
" The phenomenon described in text may occur because the New Act defines a
corporation's dividend capacity in terms of the depletion reserve rather than in
terms of earned surplus or current earnings computed without deduction for deple-
tion. For better formulations of the dividend limitation, see N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-50(d) (1963) ; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(b) (McKinney 1963). Both formu-
lations also avoid the misleading implications that arise from language permitting
payment of cash dividends out of depletion reserves. See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at
119 n.317; M. MOONITZ & L. JORDAN, ACCOUNTING, AN ANALYSIS OF ITS PROBLEMS
418 (rev. ed. 1963).
Hackney, The Financial Provisions of The Model Business Corporation Act, 70
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1385 n.130 (1957) points out another difficulty with the New
Act formulation: use of depletion reserves as a source may cause confusion in view
of the directors' power under WASH. REV. CODE §23A.16.130 (1965) to abolish
reserves created out of earned surplus. Fortunately, the draftsmen's comment to
Model Act § 40(b) (1960) clearly indicates depletion reserves are not to be included.
See 1 MODEL ACT ANN. §40(b) 4 (1960).
The New York provision highlights another difficulty with the New Act formula-
tion with its limitation of depletion dividends "to the extent that the cost of the
wasting asset ... has been recovered by depletion reserves." As pointed out earlier,
see note 630 supra, determination of the asset's cost (and hence the maximum
potential depletion) is exceedingly difficult. Indeed, it may be determined on the
basis of appraised value, e.g., R. WIxoN, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 15.3-15.6 (4th
ed. 1956), in which the only limits on value would be the par value of stock issued(if any), the extent of discretion afforded to directors under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23A.08.160 f[ 3 (1965) (see part I, 41 WASH. L. REV. at 248-49 (1966), and con-
ceivably S.E.C. regulation. See L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 3.6-3.9; 3.11-3.13 (2d rev. ed. 1966). Allowing dividends from depletion
reserves can only accentuate the desirability of high valuations. Removing the
emphasis on the depletion reserve as a source, as suggested above, will aid on the
problem. In addition, it would seem that a concept approaching cost for federal
income tax purposes (see Treas. Reg. § 1.316-2(e) (1955)) should be adopted as the
appropriate cost in the New York formulation above.
"For judicial support of the view that Morawetz' rationale should not extend
to two-class corporations, see Wittenberg v. Federal Min. & Smelting Co., 15 Del.
Ch. 147, 133 A. 48, 51 (Ch. 1926), aff'd, 15 Del. Ch. 409, 138 A. 347 (1927).
On the basis of the discussion appearing in part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at
132-36, it may seem that all that need be done is to add a liquidation preference
protection clause to WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.420(2) (1965) similar to that
appearing in WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.420(1) (1965). As Weiner, Theory of
Anglo-American Dividend Law: American Statutes and Cases, 29 COLUM. L. REV.
461, 482 (1929) points out, however, the result of such a clause in a depletion
deduction exception situation is to redeem the common stock while permitting it to
retain all other rights in the company, or a conversion of the common shares to
shares with the true preference. He suggests that any such distributions be made
first to the preferred shares in partial redemption, and, only after the preferred
shares are eliminated, then to common shareholders. (For an analogous provision,
see CALIF. CORP. CODE § 1500(c) (West 1955).) See also N. LATTIN & R. JENNINGS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1164 n.1 (3d ed. 1958) suggesting in the
alternative pro rata distribution between the classes. The most protective statute, TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT. art. 2.39 (2), (3) (1956), requires only that all cumulative preferred
dividends be paid first and that net assets equal the voluntary liquidation preference
after the distribution. Note that this statute offers inadequate protection to preferred
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c. Distribution of Assets Following Reduction of Capital. The old
act provided that the capital stock 647 of a corporation could be re-
duced if the holders of two-thirds of the voting power of all share-
holders approved, articles of reduction were filed with and certified
by the secretary of state, and the reduction did not reduce the fair
value of the assets of the corporation to an amount less than the total
amount of its debts and liabilities plus the amount of its capital stock
as so reduced.648 Several ambiguities were present in these provisions.
A reduction of capital in and of itself involves no distribution of assets
shares with no liquidation preference. Other statutes range from no provision at all(a clear majority) to requirements of adequate provision for liquidation preferences
(see, e.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 1503 (West 1955)) and protection of rights of sharehold-
ers of different classes (see, e.g., OLa.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.132(b) (1953) ; WASH.
REV. CODE § 2301.250(7) (1958)) to standard liquidation preference protection
clauses. (See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(b) (McKinney Supp. 1967).)
As to how the "adequate provision" and "protection of rights" clauses might be
interpreted by a court, see Note, Dividends From Contributed Capital and Protection
of Preferred Shareholders, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1203, 1207 (1952) and note 627, supra.
One alternative that might be considered to the suggestions presented by Mr.
Weiner and Professors Lattin and Jennings is the requirement of a favorable vote by
two-thirds of the preferred shares as a class before any distribution could be made.
See BAKER & CARY at 1292. The earlier suggestions, however, seem more tenable
since common shareholders have a comparative advantage over preferred share-
holders because of superior organization and management connections. See 65
HARV. L. REv. at 1213.
It may be argued that a court would protect preferred shareholders in the event of
a proposed dividend to common shareholders under the New provision despite the
absence of a specific clause protecting preferred shareholders. Cf. Wittenberg v.
Federal Min. & Smelting Co., 15 Del. Ch. 147, 133 A. 48, 51 (Ch. 1926), af'd, 25
Del. Ch. 409, 138 A. 347 (1927), bill dismissed on change of statute, 15 Del. Ch.
351, 138 A. 352 (Ch. 1927). But cf. Mellon v. Mississippi Wine Glass Co., 129 La.
406, 56 So. 343 (1911) (rejecting a preferred shareholder's action to compel creation
of a sinking fund for the benefit of preferred shareholders). Even if the court were
favorably disposed, it is hard to see how it could avoid the relatively clear negative
legislative intent manifested in clear inclusion of a liquidation preference clause
where one was desired in the New Act.
On protection of preferred shareholders' interest generally, see D. KEHL, CORPORAET
DIVDENDS 225-34 (1941); 75 U. PA. L. PEv. 350 (1926).
WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.010(10) (1958) defines "capital stock" as (a) "the
aggregate amount of par value of all allotted shares having a par value, including
such shares allotted as stock dividends, and (b) the aggregate of cash, and the value
of any consideration other than cash ... agreed to be given or rendered as payment
for all allotted shares having no par value, plus such amounts as may have been
transferred from surplus upon the allotment of stock dividends in shares having no
par value."
ISee WAsH. REV. CODE § 23.01.430 (1958). The articles of reduction must
state that the proposed reduction will not reduce the fair value of the assets of the
corporation to an amount less than the total amount of its debts and liabilities plus
the amount of its capital stock as so reduced. WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.430(2)
(1958). WASH. REv. CODE §23.01.430(3) (1958) then conditions validity of the
reduction upon a requirement that the reduction would not reduce the actual value of
corporate assets to an extent prohibited by subsection (2). No explanation of the
difference in terminology appears in the Commissioners' Notes (see 9 U.L.A. 197-98(1957)). Commentators treat the two terms as synonymous, see e.g., Gose, Legal
Significance of "Capital Stock", 32 WASH. L. REv. 1, 22 (1957), as appears appro-
priate in view of the interrelation between subsections (2) and (3).
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and hence it was not entirely clear what the last limitation meant. 49
Where the reduction was to occur by means of a reduction of the par
value of outstanding shares, it was not clear whether an amendment of
the articles of incorporation was required in addition to preparation of
articles of reduction' ° Where the reduction was for the purpose of
removing an amount voluntarily transferred to capital stock by the
directors, it was not clear what procedure was required."' Finally,
some doubt existed as to whether cancellations of shares acquired out
of surplus or by donation required reduction procedure. 5 -
Under the New Act, the procedure for and limitations upon reduc-
tions of stated capital 53 depend on how the reduction is to be ac-
" Gose, supra note 648, at 22 argues that the statute must be interpreted to
require that no distribution of assets can be made in connection with a capital
stock reduction which would leave less assets than specified by the statute. See also
Greenough & Ayer, Funds Available for Corporate Dividends in Washington,
9 WASH. L. REV. 63, 71-72 (1934). Even this construction, however, does not
completely resolve problems with the asset restriction. If the restriction were
omitted, a corporation's dividend capacity would be determined by virtue of the
regulations in WASH. REV. CODE §23.01.250 (1958) under the terms of which
unrealized appreciation could not be recognized but unrealized losses were recog-
nized. See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 148, 154. Thus, in determining a cor-
poration's dividend capacity, assets were valued in essence at cost or market,
whichever was lower. The language in the asset restriction, as interpreted by
Gose, seems to permit all assets to be valued at their current value even where that
valuation would produce unrealized appreciation on balance. It seems unlikely that
this result was intended by draftsmen so careful to include a special prohibition
against dividends from unrealized appreciation. About the best one can do with the
asset restriction language is to assume it was designed to reinforce the dividend
provisions by requiring that in the event of a reduction of capital stock, all
unrealized losses would be taken into account before any asset distributions could
be made. This construction would then accord with accounting notions as to
correct reduction procedure. See authorities discussed infra at note 681. Cf. WASH.
REV. CODE § 23.01.420(3) (1959) governing recapitalizations. Hay v. The Big Bend
Land Co., 32 Wn. 2d 887, 204 P.2d 488 (1949) presented the court with a case where
the asset restriction might have been in issue but the question was not raised.
'°See Commissioners' Note, 9 U.L.A. 197 (1957) which is ambivalent; Gose
supra note 648 at 25.
" Voluntary transfers to capital stock were not part of "capital stock" as
defined by statute (see WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.010(10) (1958) quoted in note 647
supra) and hence it was arguable that removing such amounts did not reduce capital
stock. It seems likely, however, that courts would stretch the capital stock category
to cover such transfers, particularly if there had been any creditor reliance thereon.
'WASH. REV. CODE §23.01.430(1) (1959) makes no exceptions for share can-
cellations. Cf. D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 351-52 (1966). However, Gose,
supra note 648 at 25-26 can be read as stating that no filing is required on cancella-
tion of shares donated pro rata by the shareholders. See Palmer, Choosing the Share
Strncture of a Washington Business Corporation, 37 WASH. L. REV. 557. 564
n.32 (1962).
"'"Stated capital" is defined in WASH. REV. CODE §23A.04.010(10) (1965) as:
the sum of (a) the par value of all shares of the corporation having a par value
that have been issued, (b) the amount of the consideration received by the
corporation for all shares of the corporation without par value that have been
issued, except such part of the consideration therefor as may have been
allocated to capital surplus in a manner permitted by law, and (c) such amounts
not included in clauses (a) and (b) of this paragraph as have been transferred
to stated capital of the corporation, whether upon the issue of shares as a share
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complished. Redeemable shares are cancelled when purchased or re-
deemed by the corporation. 5' Other shares reacquired by a corpora-
tion may be cancelled by resolution of its board of directors.655 In
either case, stated capital is deemed reduced by that part of the stated
capital which was represented by the shares cancelled upon filing with
the secretary of state a statement of cancellation.656 Where stated
capital is to be reduced by reducing the aggregate par value of shares
having par value or the aggregate of stated capital allocated to shares
issued without par value,657 the New Act requires that the procedure
for amending the corporation's articles of incorporation (i.e., director
resolution, notice to shareholders, approval by holders of two-thirds of
appropriate share classes) be followed.65 8 After filing the amendment
dividend or otherwise, minus all reductions from such sum as have been
effected in a manner permitted by law....
c' WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.100(1) (1965).
nWASH. REv. CODE §23A.16.110(1) (1965).
'See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23A.16.100, .110 (1965). The statement of cancellation
in each case must be executed in triplicate by the corporation's president or vice
president and by its secretary or assistant secretary and verified by one of the
signatories. It must set forth the name of the corporation, the number and type of
shares cancelled, the aggregate number of issued shares, itemized by classes and
series, after giving effect to the cancellation, and the amount of stated capital after
giving effect to the cancellation. The three copies of this statement must be filed
with the secretary of state, who returns two endorsed copies. One of the endorsed
copies must then be filed with the office of county auditor of the county in which the
registered office of the corporation is situated.
See 2 MODEL AcT AN. § 63 ff 4; 766 Op. ILL. A'r'y GEN. 85 (1935). Specific
authority for reducing stated capital by means of reducing the par value of shares
and of converting from par value to no par shares can be found in WASH. REv.
CODE §§ 23A.16.010(5), (8) (1965). But the statute gives no hint that a reduction
of the aggregate of the stated capital allocated to shares issued without par
value can be accomplished by an amendment to the articles of incorporation. Under
the Model Act, this reference seems rather strange as the articles nowhere contain
a statement of the stated capital allocated to no par shares. In Washington,
however, by virtue of a fee provision added to the provision regulating articles of
incorporation, the aggregate value of no par shares appears in the articles or is
filed by affidavit. See WASH. REv. CODE §§23A.12.020(5), 23A.40.050 (1965). In
view of the difference in shareholder voting requirements present in WASH. REv.
CODE §23A.16.020(3) (1965) and the other provision that potentially could regulate
reductions of capital related to no par shares, WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.120(1965), it would be desirable to include no par reductions specifically in §
23A.16.020(3) (1965), if that was the draftsmen's desire.
' See WASH. REv. CoDE § 23A.16.020 (1965). As to whether the directors'
resolution must set forth the effect of the reduction, see 766 Op. ILL. Arr'Y. GEN.
85 (1935). After approval by shareholders, articles of amendment executed in
triplicate by the corporation's president or vice-president and by its secretary or an
assistant secretary and verified by one of the signatories xmust be filed with the
secretary of state. Such articles must set forth the classes and numbers of shares
eligible to vote on the question and the vote thereon and a statement as to how the
reduction of capital is to be effected and how much it is reduced.
Such amendments may also be accomplished as part of a merger or consolidation
plan. See 2 MODEL AcT Ai. § 63 ff 4. The procedure there is essentially the same
as for an amendment of the corporation's articles of incorporation (apart from the
need for approval by shareholders of both corporations). See WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 23A.20.010, .020, .030, .060, and .070 (1965).
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with the secretary of state and upon his issuance of a certificate of
amendment, the amendment becomes effective and stated capital is
reduced to the extent indicated in the amendment." 9 Finally, amounts
transferred voluntarily to stated capital66 ° may be reduced upon adop-
tion of a resolution by directors to that effect, approval by holders of
a majority of shares entitled to vote on the issue, and filing with the
secretary of state of a statement of reduction." 1
The only limitation imposed by the New Act upon the size of a
reduction of stated capital appears in the section setting forth the
procedures for reducing amounts voluntarily transferred to stated
capital.6 2 That section provides that no such reduction may be made
which would reduce the amount of aggregate stated capital of the
corporation to an amount equal to or less than the aggregate preferen-
tial amounts payable upon all issued shares having a preferential right
in the assets of the corporation in the event of an involuntary liquida-
tion, plus the aggregate par value of all issued shares having a par
value but no preferential right in the assets of the corporation in the
event of involuntary liquidation 6 3 The New Act does, however, set
limits upon distributions of assets from surplus created by any type of
reduction of capital by providing that such surplus is capital sur-
plus.664 It will be recalled that asset distributions from capital surplus
are generally 65 permitted under the New Act only when authorized by
As to when a class of shares is entitled to vote as a class on a proposed amend-
ment (in which event there must be approval by holders of two-thirds of the shares
in such class and of the total shares entitled to vote on the question), see WASH. REV.
CODE § 23A.16.030 (1965). On the specific question of whether preferred shareholders
are entitled to vote as a class, see note 702 infra.
"See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23A.16.060, .040(7) (1965).
'See Garrett, Capital and Surphls Under the New Corporation Statutes, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 239, 255 (1958) ; 2 MODEL ACT ANN. § 63 ff 4.
"'WASH. REV. CODE §23A.16.120(1) (1965). Note that preferred shares, which
do not vote under the articles of incorporation, will not vote on this question.
1 2 Compare WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23A.16.100, .110, and .010 (1965) with WASH.
REV. CODE § 23A.16.120 (1965).
'WASH. REV. CODE §23A.16.120(5) (1965). Assuming that this means of pro-
tecting the preferred's interest in total stated capital is adopted, see text infra
beginning at note 700, it is unclear why a reduction should not be permitted where
the result is total stated capital equal to the liquidation preference plus par value of
shares without liquidation preference.
' WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.16.130 f 1 (1965).
'Under WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.430 f1 2 (1967), the directors through their
own action may distribute cash dividends out of capital surplus to holders of shares
having a cumulative preferential right to receive dividends in discharge of their
cumulative dividend rights if the corporation has no earned surplus and the
corporation's solvency is not in question. Also, under WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.430
(2) (1967), regulated investment companies can make distributions of cash out of
capital surplus without an authorizing article provision or shareholder approval.
As to the corporation's right to purchase its own shares from capital surplus,
see text infra beginning at note 727.
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the articles of incorporation or a majority of all shares outstanding,
all cumulative dividends accrued have been paid, the corporation is
not insolvent before such payment and will not be rendered insolvent
by the payment, shareholders are notified of the source of the distri-
bution, and the remaining net assets will exceed the aggregate prefer-
ential amount payable in the event of voluntary liquidation to share-
holders of preference shares.666 It should also be recalled that capital
surplus may be applied by the directors to the reduction or elimination
of any deficit arising from losses, however incurred, after earned sur-
plus is exhausted.6 6 7 Apparently it is not required that a corporation
with an earned surplus deficit undergoing a reduction of capital must
apply capital surplus created by the reduction to the elimination of
the deficit before any asset distribution can be made from such capital
surplus.66 s
Evaluation of these provisions can best proceed from an analysis of
'See WASH. REv. CODE §23A.08.430 (1967); part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at
136-41.
'WASH. REv. CODE §23A.16.130 1 2 (1965). WASH. REv. CODE §23A.04.010(12)(1965) and its Model Act predecessor, §2(e), appear to be in error in their sug-
gestion that stated capital can be applied to the elimination of a deficit, since no
specific authority for such action appears in the New (or Model) Act. See Bailey,
Safeguarding the Claims of Creditors, 4 BAYLOR L. REv. 470, 481 (1952). As to
what may have led to the error, see Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the
Model Bushess Corporation Act, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1387 n.138 (1957).
It is unclear why the earned surplus deficit which can be cancelled is limited to
one arising from losses. Does this provision mean that an earned surplus deficit
resulting from an illegal distribution cannot be eliminated by reducing stated
capital? See id. at 1386-87 n.137. See also potential problems in eliminating
water in assets. See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 169 n.548. It would appear that
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130 1 2 (1965) should be broadened to cover elimination
of earned surplus deficits generally.
' The second full paragraph of WASH. REv. CODE §23A.08.430 (1967) contains
the only reference in that section to a required relationship between the earned
surplus and capital surplus accounts that must exist before capital surplus may be
distributed. That provision would appear to permit capital surplus arising from a
reduction of capital to be used to pay cumulative dividends despite a deficit in
earned surplus. A fortiori it would appear that a corporation could generally make
asset distributions from reduction surplus despite an earned surplus deficit under
the remaining provisions in WASH. REv. CODE §23A.08.430 (1967). See part II,
42 WASH. L. REv. 138 at n.414. It may be argued, however, that the general
incorporation of the accountants' definition of earned surplus, including therein
specific reference to elimination of an earned surplus deficit by application of
capital surplus, has resulted in the incorporation of the accountants' principles
regarding reductions of capital. See D. HERWiTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 362 (1966).
Under their procedures, it seems reasonably clear that the earned surplus deficit must
be eliminated before any asset distribution can be made. See, e.g., Miller, Quasi-
Reorganizations in Reverse, 23 ACCOUNTING REv. 154, 155 (1948). While this
construction certainly would be in line with the interests of the various groups
concerned, see text infra beginning note 669, it is difficult to square with the
provisions of WASH. REv. CODE §23A.08.430 (1967) and those in WASH. REv.
CODE §23A.16.130 ff 3 (1965). The latter, dealing with the application of capital
surplus to earned surplus deficits, contains no hint that elimination of such deficits




the effects of a reduction of capital upon the interests of the creditors,
preferred shareholders, and common shareholders of the corporation
involved.66"' Creditors are less concerned with the reduction itself than
with what is to be done with the surplus arising out of the reduction."'
If it is proposed that the surplus be used to support a distribution of
assets, creditors will obviously argue for minimization of the amount
distributable since any such distribution results in a diminution of
assets upon which at least pre-reduction creditors are presumed to
have relied in extending credit to the corporation.6 17 ' At a minimum,
the creditors' interest here requires that the amount of surplus avail-
able for distribution be reduced by any deficit in earned surplus and
by the amount of any losses not yet recognized that are foreseeableY -
Full satisfaction of their interest under the classic theory of stated
capital would obviously require that no asset distributions be made.
Where the surplus arising out of the reduction is not to be distributed
but is to be applied to the elimination of an earned surplus deficit,
the creditors' general interest is similar to their interest in connection
with "nimble" dividends:6 73 apart from the operation of either priv-
ilege, future earnings of the corporation would be frozen until the
deficit was cured with a corresponding increase in the assets available
for creditors' claims. Here,6 74 as there, 7' a danger exists that assets
' Possible uses and abuses of the reduction technique are set forth in Note,
The Current Law Regarding Reduction of Capital: Its Methodology, Purposes
and Dangers, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 723, 724-26 (1962). Historical material on
reduction appears in D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 350-51 (1966). Cases are
summarized in Annot., Reduction of Capital Stock and Distribution of Capital
Assets Upon Reduction, 35 A.L.R.2d 1149 (1954).
"See, e.g., D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 358 (1966); BAKER & CARY at
1308-09. Because of what may be done with surplus arising from a reduction of capital,
creditors are interested in being notified of a proposed reduction. See note 694 in ra.
" See BAKER & CARY at 1309.
'As to the possibility that the former requirement can be read into the New
Act, see note 668 supra. As to the possibility that the latter requirement may be
read into the Act, see D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 359 (1966).
'See Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation
Act, 70 HARV. L. Rlv. 1357, 1387-88 (1957); Seward, Sources of Distributions to
Stockholders, 5 BAYLOR L. REv. 242, 255 (1953). As to the creditors' interest in
connection with nimble dividends, see text supra beginning note 584.
Note that if a decline in replacement cost of equipment or general price level is
present, the creditors' interest is complicated in ways previously discussed. See
part II, 42 WAsH. L. REv. at 157-61, 173; Comment, Writing Down Fixed Assets
and Stated Capital, 44 YALE L.J. 1025, 1031-34 (1935). It is assumed in this sec-
tion that price level changes have either been taken into account or are not
present and that replacement value changes are currently ignored in determining
stated capital protection.
"See Callahan, Statutory Protection of Creditors in Reduction of Capital
Stock, 2 OHIO ST. L. 3. 220, 233-34 (1936); Comment, Writing Down Fixed
Assets and Stated Capital, 44 YALE L. J. 1025, 1035 (1935).
'See note 609 supra.
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will be written down below their present value with the effect of inflat-
ing earnings available for distribution.
Preferred shareholders' interests in connection with a reduction of
capital are generally similar to those of creditors: to the extent that
surplus arising from the reduction is used to support increased current
or future asset distributions, assets otherwise available to produce
earnings and to insure their liquidation preference are lost.676  In
addition to this interest in the total amount of stated capital, preferred
shareholders also on occasion have an interest in the type of stated
capital being reduced.6 77 Finally, with respect to potential distribu-
tions of assets from the surplus arising from a reduction of capital,
preferred shareholders have basically the same interests as indicated
in the previous discussion of distributions of capital contributions in
excess of legal minima.6 78
While common shareholders generally may not be concerned over
the amount of stated capital attributed to their shares, possible intra-
class conflict concerning the wisdom of elimination of an earned sur-
plus deficit or distribution of assets would seem to indicate that their
acquiescence in a reduction of their capital is necessary.670 In addi-
tion, they have strong interests in preventing use of the reduction
surplus in a way that gives misleading inferences as to the profitability
of the corporation. Thus, fair asset valuations after the reduction are
essential if the corporation's future earnings and profitmaking ability
are not to be overstated.8 Similarly, common shareholders need to
be informed that reduction surplus has been applied to an operating
deficit and to be reminded of that fact for some reasonable period in
order to allow accurate assessment of the corporation's total perfor-
mance."8' Finally, shareholders need to be informed when distribu-
" See D. HERWITZ, BusINEss PLANNING 362-63 (1966); Note, Dividends From
Contributed Capital and Protection of Preferred Shareholders, 65 HARv. L. REv.
1203, 1204 (1952).
' See D. HERwITz, Busi-Ess PLANNING 364-65 (1966). Some courts have taken
the position that all common capital must be extinguished before preferred capital
can be reduced. See Page v. Whittenton Mfg. Co., 211 Mass. 424, 97 N.E. 1006(1912). As Herwitz points out, however, the critical issue in most reductions is
the total amount of stated capital as the preferred's liquidation preference is un-
touched by a reduction. See id. at 364. Thus, the fact that preferred stated capital
is subject to reduction is relevant only on issues of class voting and in cases where
the common may be able to reduce common stated capital later without preferred
shareholders' consent.
On this subject, see part II, 42 WAsH. L. REv. at 136-41.
-See id. at 138.
'See Comment, Writing Down Fixed Assets and Stated Capital, 44 YALE
L. J. 1025, 1039 (1935).
nThese interests are suggested by the accounting procedure for a quasi-
reorganization (the accounting title for a reduction of capital) as described in
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tions are made from surplus arising from the reduction so that they
will not be misled as to the corporation's past earnings.682
The least adequately protected interest under either statute is the
creditors' interest in limiting asset distributions from surplus arising
from a reduction of capital.6 3 The asset restriction imposed by the
old act was illusory.68 4 The protection afforded this interest under the
New Act685 seems to come down to the equitable insolvency test,68 6
management's general reluctance to approach shareholders with a
reduction proposal,6 87 and the accountants' general reluctance to ap-
prove reductions where there is any prospect that the corporation will
generate profits in the foreseeable future. 8 Other statutes over the
years have tried a variety of techniques for protecting this aspect of
the creditors' interest including requiring publication of notice of
the reduction,"' payment of all debts as a condition to reduction,690
AICPA, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 7A (1953). To the same effect are
the SEC requirements. See L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
3.28-3.31 (2d ed. 1966).
"
2 See part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 138.
'This is not to say that the creditors' interest in connection with the use of
reduction surplus to eliminate deficits does not need further protection than that
afforded by the New Act. Thus, creditors should receive adequate notice of the
proposed reduction before it takes place so that they can take whatever steps are
necessary to protect their interests in view of the possibility of future distribu-
tions. See note 694 infra. Moreover, assets must be valued fairly in connection
with such a procedure if future earnings are not to be overstated. See text infra
at note 697. But application of the reduction surplus to elimination of a deficit
causes no immediate distribution of assets and seems supportable by the same gen-
eral policy considerations discussed in connection with nimble dividends. See
text supra beginning at note 584. See also note 696 infra as to whether the assets
test suggested ought to require accumulation of assets up to the prescribed level in
connection with a deficit elimination type of reduction.
" The asset restriction, however interpreted (see note 649 supra), sets no limit
on the extent to which stated capital can be reduced and hence does not prevent
withdrawal of assets down to equality with liabilities. See Gose, Legal Significance
of "Capital Stock", 32 WASH. L. REv. 1, 22 (1957); Note, The Current Law
Regarding Reduction of Capital: Its Mlethodology, Purposes and Dangers, 110
U. PA. L. REV. 723, 732 (1962).
' Creditors may also be protected by provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyances Act (see part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 129). Section 5 of the Act,
relating to conveyances without fair consideration leaving the transferor with unreason-
ably small capital, appears particularly relevant here. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.40.050
(1958).
'See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.430(1) (1967). Even if the bankruptcy test of
insolvency is added to the Act, see part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 131-32, this pro-
tection is no greater than that afforded under the old act. See note 684 supra.
'
7 See 25 MINN. L. REV. 744, 782 (1941). An additional factor affording protection
is management's desire to maintain the creditors' goodwill. See Comment, Wl"riting
Down Fixed Assets and Stated Capital, 44 YALE L. J. 1025, 1031 (1935).
'See, e.g., Miller, Quasi-Reorganiations In Reverse, 23 ACCOUNTING REV.
154, 155 (1948); and H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUN'TING,
INTERMEDIATE 493-94 (6th ed. 1965).
'See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §244(e) (1967) (notice of the reduction of
capital must be published at least once in a newspaper published in the county in
which the corporation has its registered office within fifteen days after filing the
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judicial691 or administrative6 92 regulation of the proceedings, or main-
tenance by the corporation of specified ratio of assets to liabilities693
after any such distribution. Of these approaches, the last, supple-
mented by adequate notice to creditors and an opportunity to enjoin
certificate of reduction); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:11-5 (1937) (a certificate stating the
fact of reduction of capital and the manner of effecting the same and terms and
conditions thereof shall be published for three weeks successively, at least once
each week, in a newspaper published in the county in which the principal office of
the corporation is located); HAw.%AI REv. LAWS § 172-52(e) (Supp. 1965) (similar
to New Jersey except that four weekly insertions in a newspaper of general
circulation are required).
'°See § 28 of the Delaware Corporation Law discussed in State ex rel. Radio
Corp. of America v. Benson, 32 Del. 576, 128 A. 107 (1924); Cf., Note, Capital
Stock Reduction As Affecting the Rights of Creditors, 47 HARV. L. REv. 693,
698 (1934).
"This approach, suggested by the Note, Capital Stock Reduction as Affecting
the Rights of Creditors, 47 HARv. L. REv. 693, 697-98 (1934) and by the Comment,
Writing Down Fixed Assets and Stated Capital, 44 YALE L. J. 1025, 1051 (1935),
does not appear to have been adopted in the United States. The origin of the
suggestion was the provisions in the English Companies Act requiring court
sanction of reductions of capital where the rights of creditors are affected. For a
thorough exposition of English practice and authorities, see Rice, Capital Reduc-
tion and Its Effects on Class Rights, 23 CoNvEY. (N.S.) 244 (1959). Generally,
consent of creditors must be obtained to any reduction of capital which will result
in a return of capital. Creditors who do not consent must be paid off or provision
made for their debts. See PALMER, COMPANY LAW 84-86 (18th ed. 1948).6
"See, e.g., HAWAII REv. LAws § 172-52(e) (Supp. 1965). Under that statute, if
the reduction involves the retirement or reduction in the par value of any shares
which are issued, or the release or cancellation of any stock subscription, publica-
tion of the reduction must be made (see note 689 siupra). If no protests or objections
are made to the state's director of regulatory agencies within thirty days after the
first publication of notice, the director shall approve the reduction. Otherwise, the
director shall proceed to consider any objections made, and if the director is there-
upon satisfied that the required vote or "other determination has been obtained,"
he will enter the reduction. The other determination apparently refers to satisfac-
tion of the 2-for-1 assets-liabilities and net asset equivalence with par tests im-
posed by Hawaii. HAWAII REv. LAws § 172-52 (a) (Supp. 1965). A similar proce-
dure was at one time in effect in Texas (see TEX. ANNt. CirV. STAT. art. 1332 (1925))
described in Comment, Writing Down Fixed Assets and Stated Capital, 44 YALE
L. J. 1025, 1042 (1935) but was abandoned in favor of provisions generally on the
pattern of the Model Act. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. art. 4.10-13, 2.40 (1956).
The Note, The Current Law Regarding Reduction of Capital: Its Methodology,
Purposes and Dangers, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 723, 741 (1962) recommends that reduc-
tions be regulated by means of a required standard of business exigency the
presence of which a state official would determine. Precisely when a reduction
should be permitted was not made clear. Cf. N.C. GErN. STAT. § 55-50(e) (1) (1965)
requiring a determination by directors that the assets of the corporation are in excess
of the needs of the business. In view of the obvious difficulties in defining such a
standard and in administering it, an assets test appears to be a more feasible solution.
See, e.g., CA1ir. CoRP. CODE §§ 1907, 1908 (West 1955) (5-to-4 fair value asset-
to-liability ratio); HAwAI REv. LAws § 172-52(g) (Supp. 1965) (2-to-1 asset-to-
liability ratio and equality of assets (net?) to total par value of remaining capital
stock of the corporation); N.C. GEr. STAT. §55-50(e)(3) (1965) (2-to-1 fair value
assets-to-liability ratio); MONT. REv. CODE § 15-212 (1947) (capital stock must at
least equal the corporation's indebtedness, or 2-to-1 asset-to-liability ratio); S.D.
CODE § 11.0205 (Supp. 1960) (same); Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARv. L.
REv. 1334, 1364-65 (1935) (5-to-4 fair value current asset-to-current liability ratio);
Callahan, Statutory Protection of Creditors in Reduction of Capital Stock, 2
Onio ST. L.J. 220, 231 (1936) (2-to-1 current assets-to-unsecured liabilities).
Washington at one time required that the assets remaining after a reduction must
be twice as large as the corporation's debts. See REM. REv. STAT. § 3830 (1932) in
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proposed distributions,694 seems to be the most feasible.69 Among the
various ratios possible, the requirement imposed by California on dis-
tributions of reduction surplus-that the assets after the distribution
taken at their fair present value shall at least equal one and one-quarter
times the corporation's debts and liabilities-seems reasonable.9 6 and
effect from 1866 until the old act was adopted in 1933. See Gose, Legal Significance of
"Capital Stock", 32 WASH. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1957).
'Notice to creditors and an opportunity to object before distributions are
made from reduction surplus appear fundamental to adequate protection of the
creditors' interest. See Callahan, supra note 674, at 237-38. As earlier noted, see
note 683, creditors should receive notice of a proposed reduction even where the
surplus is to be used to eliminate a deficit. Publication of the fact of reduction in
a local newspaper appears inadequate as a means of communicating with creditors;
many creditors may be out-of-state or may not follow newspaper notices. Hence, it
would appear that each creditor should receive timely personal notice of every
proposed reduction of capital of significance. See MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.20, .43
(1963) (requiring personal notice to unsecured creditors where reduction of capital
is in excess of 50 percent of capital). Such notice should describe the technique
for reducing stated capital, present financial information necessary to evaluate the
fairness of asset statement, and where a distribution of reduction surplus is con-
templated, present data with which to determine whether the assets test would be met.
Distributions from reduction surplus should be prohibited for a period of at
least two weeks following delivery of notice to the creditors (see Callahan, supra
note 674, at 239 recommending thirty day interim; CAL. CORP. CODE § 1908 (West
1955) (two weeks) ) in order to give creditors the opportunity to examine the
statement and to commence action to prevent the distribution if illegal.
" Creditors obviously would be better protected if payment were required as a
condition of the reduction. But payment would cause an asset drain at a time that
most corporations seeking reduction could not afford one and would not be necessary
if the corporation were merely seeking to eliminate a deficit. Even if a distribu-
tion of assets were currently contemplated, the question of whether creditors should
be paid before such a distribution ultimately should turn on the relative size of net
assets (or stated capital) as compared to the amount of the liabilities. Hence, the
best approach seems to be to focus directly on the net assets factor.
As to whether the type of assets present ought to be a factor, see note 696 in!ra.
' CAL. CORP. CODE § 1907 (West 1955). Choice of an appropriate ratio raises
issues similar to those raised in determining what is an appropriate ratio of debt
to equity before the debt will be recognized as debt for federal income tax purposes,
and the amount of equity necessary before the corporate entity will be recognized.
On those subjects, see D. HERWITZ, BusINEss PLANNING 69-76, 133-47 (1966). The
present issue is determination of a general minimum standard capital structure
below which the creditors' interest is unduly threatened. Requiring assets to be
twice the amount of liabilities (a 1-to-I ratio of debt to equity) appears unrealistic
as a minimum standard. The test proposed in text, on the other hand, which permits
a 4-to-1 ratio of debt to equity, seems more in accord with minimum capital struc-
ture notions.
A secondary issue under the assets test is whether unrealized appreciation ought
to be taken into account in measuring assets for purposes of the test. The fact that
unrealized appreciation apparently may be recognized as capital surplus (see part
II, 42 WASH. L. Rxv. at 153) suggests that most corporations involved in reductions
of capital will either have no unrealized appreciation or appreciation matched or
exceeded by unrealized depreciation. Accounting authorities, to the extent they
have considered the issue, are not unfavorable. See H. FINNEY & H. MILLER,
PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING, INTERMEDIATE 499 (6th ed. 1965); Werntz, Some
Current Problems in Accounting, 14 ACCOUNTING REv. 117, 118-23 (1939). (Cal-
ifornia authorities have not considered the question. See 1 BALLANTINE & STERLING,
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS 345-46 (4th ed. 1966).) It would appear that since
a liberal ratio has been adopted, the creditors' interest should be further strengthened
by disregarding unrealized appreciation for purposes of the test.
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should be added to the New Act. Additional implementing amend-
ments to the Act would also be needed labelling all surplus arising out
of reductions of capital as reduction surplus,697 requiring that all
A third issue that arises under the assets test is whether the test ought to be
concerned solely with current assets as against current liabilities. Callahan, stpra
note 693, at 231 argues that no distribution should be made from reduction surplus
unless a 2-to-1 current assets to unsecured (presumably current) liabilities ratio
exists. See also Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1334, 1364-65
(1935). Liquidity is a factor with any distribution of assets from a corporation.
This factor has been recognized by the New Act by means of the equitable insol-
vency test which appears to cover the creditor interest concerned in connection with a
distribution of reduction surplus. The unprotected creditor interest under the New Act
appears to be that of intermediate-term creditors, which interest seems protected under
the California assets test.
A fourth issue that may be raised about the assets test is whether the test ought
to operate in such a way that distributions to shareholders after a reduction could
not be made unless assets exceeded one and one-quarter times the corporation's
liabilities. Cf. the suggestion in Note, Capital Stock Reduction as Affecting the
Rights of Creditors, 47 HARv. L. REv. 693, 698 (1934) that all surplus arising from
the reduction be impounded until all existing unsecured claims have been dis-
charged. So stated the test would operate primarily where the corporation had used
reduction surplus to write off an earned surplus deficit and proposed to make a
distribution from later earnings. Such application of the test would be supported
by the analysis set forth in connection with the nimble-dividend requirement that
only part of the earnings be currently distributable. See text supra beginning note
602. But it is difficult to support such a limitation unless there generally exists a
limitation on the distribution of assets, whether or not from earned surplus, of a
similar type. Hills, supra, required current assets to be one and one-quarter times
the corporation's liabilities after any dividend distribution. Limitations of this
sort have not generally been accepted presumably because of the uneven way they
hit corporations with varying asset-liability requirements. For an excellent sum-
mary of the weaknesses in a current ratio test, see Blough, Accounting and Auditing
Problems, 108 J. AccouNTANcy (Aug. 1959) 76-77. It therefore would appear
unwise to prescribe generally such a requirement or to prescribe it in connection
with distributions out of earned surplus after a reduction of capital.
Finally, it may be argued that use of a fair present value standard involves the
corporation in the difficult matter of determining current values. See part II, 42
WAs H. L. REv. at 171-72. Reductions of capital, however, should be relatively rare
events, and in any event, accountants here generally attempt to determine such
values in this context. See, e.g., AICPA, AccouNrING RESEARCH BuLL. No. 43, ch.
7A (1953). Hence, the requirement does not seem unreasonable.
'See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1906 (West 1955); TEx. Bus. Cornt. Act art. 4.13(a)(1956). Segregation of the surplus arising from reductions of capital is necessary
because an assets test is not imposed on distributions of capital surplus. A number
of statutes impose such a test on distributions of capital surplus (and hence simply
label surplus arising from reductions of capital as capital surplus) presumably in
recognition of the strong resemblance between surplus arising from a contribution
of a shareholder not placed in stated capital and surplus arising from a reduction
of amounts attributed to stated capital. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-50(e)(3)
(1965); Hills, Model Corporation Act 48 HARv. L. REv. 1334, 1364-65 (1935).
While equation of capital surplus with stated capital would be a useful simplifica-
tion in the New Act, short of such complete assimilation of capital surplus into
stated capital it would seem that capital surplus ought to be more readily available
than stated capital. Application of the assets test to surplus arising from reductions
of capital but not to capital surplus generally achieves this result. More funda-
mentally, more stringent standards appear warranted on distributions from stated
capital since creditor expectations concerning the maintenance of that level of
assets in the corporation are much stronger than they are for maintenance of
amounts of capital surplus.
If the surplus arising from capital reductions is labelled reduction surplus, then
additional amendments will be necessary to indicate what uses are permissible.
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assets be written down to fair present value in connection with any
reduction of capital69 and requiring that any deficit in earned surplus
be eliminated before any asset distribution is made from reduction
surplus.6 99
The assets test should be supplemented by provisions prohibiting
asset distributions from reduction surplus when the net assets re-
maining after the distribution do not exceed the liquidation preference
of any preferred shares outstanding.7 0 The preferred shareholders'
interest in the total amount of stated capital could be protected either
by provisions prohibiting reduction of stated capital below their liqui-
dation preference 70 1 or by provisions authorizing a class vote for even
non-voting shares in connection with reductions of capital other than
those involving cancellation of shares acquired by the corporation out
of surplus or stated capital.7 2 The latter approach seems preferable
Thus, directors should be authorized (and in some cases required, see text at note 699)
to apply reduction surplus to the elimination of earned surplus deficits, see CAL.
CORP. § 1910 (West 1955), and to distribute assets to shareholders subject to
limitations discussed in text. Whether corporations should be authorized to
reacquire their own shares from reduction surplus is a matter of debate. Compare
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1906 (West 1955) limiting share acquisitions to preferred shares
with N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-52, -50 (1965) apparently permitting acquisition of shares
from reduction surplus without application of the assets test. Subject to the equitable
rules suggested in text infra beginning note 807 no reasons appear why corporations
should not be able to acquire their own shares from reduction surplus so long as the
assets test is met.
'This requirement is basically modelled on the procedures that accountants
follow under quasi-reorganizations. See AICPA, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL.
No. 43, ch. 7A, T 4 (1953). It appears necessary to give creditors information
regarding application of the assets test in the event a distribution is planned and
to give shareholders the information they require regarding the corporation's
profitability.
'This requirement is imposed not so much for the creditors' benefit (their
interest in this connection is adequately protected by the assets test) as for the
benefit of shareholders who must interpret future financial statements. In short, it
is simply an attempt to incorporate the accountants' requirement that earned surplus
should emerge from a quasi-reorganization with a zero balance. See Miller, Quasi-
Reorganiations in Reverse, 23 ACCOUNTING REv. 154, 155 (1948).
' These provisions would parallel those already in existence governing distri-
butions of capital surplus. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.430(4) (1967) prohibiting
asset distributions from capital surplus unless the liquidation preference of pre-
ferred shares is protected. See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 133.
"'iCf. WASH. REv. CODE §23A.16.120(5) (1965), which prohibits reductions of
capital pertaining to amounts voluntarily to stated capital where the remaining
stated capital would be less than the amount of the preferred liquidation preference
and the par value of outstanding non-preference shares. Note that preferred shares do
not vote on such reductions. See WASH. REv. CODE §23A.16.120(1)(C) (1965). As
Herwitz notes, this provision seems inconsistent with WASH. REv. CODE §
23A.08.170 J 2 (1965). D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 365 (1966).
'
2Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1334, 1376 (1935) would
require both protection of the liquidation preference and a class vote whether or
not the class otherwise votes. In view of the preferred shareholders' interest in
stated capital (see text beginning note 676 and following note 702), the liquidation
preference protection appears unnecessary.
Under the New Act, where a reduction occurs by means of a cancellation of
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since it will permit preferred shareholders to agree to total stated
capital less than their preference rather than perhaps forcing a reduc-
tion of the liquidation preference." 3 And, of course, the class vote
approach will permit preferred shareholders to protect their interest
in the amount of their own stated capital. Finally, the interest of
preferred shareholders in possible distributions of reduction surplus
should be protected by provisions of the sort previously discussed in
connection with distributions of capital contributions in excess of legal
minima. 70 4
Protection of the common shareholders' interest would be better
afforded if the corporation were required to disclose to its shareholders
that reduction surplus had been applied by the directors to an earned
surplus deficit,705 and to indicate to shareholders on financial state-
shares acquired by the corporation, the preferred shareholders have no say in the
reduction procedure. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.110 (1965). Where the reduc-
tion occurs by means of an article amendment, the interest of the preferred (typically
non-voting) is protected only to the extent that WASH. REV. CODE §23A.16.030
(1965) authorizes the preferred to vote and to vote as a class on the amendment.
That authorization is clear in the event that the preferred's par-value or liquidation
preference is involved but is unclear where its own stated capital or the stated
capital of common shares is involved. The latter issues depend on whether such
amendment changes the "preferences, limitations or relative rights of the shares of
such class." WASH. REv. CODE §23A.16.030(5) (1965). Cf. Brill v. Blakely, 308
N.Y. 951, 127 N.E.2d 96 (1955) (holding that a reduction of preferred stated capital
entitled preferred shareholders to receive the appraised value of their shares because
it altered a "preferential right" of the shares); In Matter of Kinney, 279 N.Y. 423,
18 N.E.2d 645 (1939) (holding that a reduction of common stated capital gave
preferred shareholders same right). S.E.C. authorities under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act provision using similar language appear in BAYER & CARY
at 1319 n.17. See also id. at 1320 & n.18 for arguments that preferred shares, if not
entitled to a class vote in these circumstances, should be protected by a freeze on divi-
dends to the common. For possible equitable limitations on capital reductions to prevent
unfairness to preferred shares, see H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 631-40 (rev. ed.
1946). As to possible equitable protection of common shareholders in connection with
a reduction, see Hay v. Big Bend Land Co., 32 Wn. 2d 887, 204 P.2d 488 (1949).
' See D. HERWiTz, BusiNqss PLANNING 365 (1966).
No valid reason appears as to why different standards should be applied to
reductions of capital based on the way that the reduction occurs. But see N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAw § 516 (McKinney 1963) which permits directors, subject to a
liquidation preference protection clause, to reduce stated capital arising from
amounts voluntarily transferred to stated capital or from no par shares. Disclosure
must be made to the shareholders.
' See discussion in part II, 42 WAsH. L. REv. at 139-40.
' Cf. CAL.. CORP. CODE § 1910 (West 1955); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 21.43 (1963).
N.Y. Bus. CORP. AcT. § 517(4) (McKinney 1963) requires that shareholders must
approve the application of capital surplus to the elimination of any deficit in the
earned surplus account Such approval seems unnecessary as to an application of
reduction surplus to a deficit in view of the need for shareholder approval to create
the reduction surplus and the requirement of notice to shareholders of the applica-
tion. Application of capital surplus to a deficit should require the vote of share-
holders by classes (whether or not entitled to vote by the articles) to protect the
interest of preferred shareholders in such surplus (see part II, 42 WASH. L. REv.




ments that reduction surplus had been applied to the deficit for a period
of ten years.
716
One last matter that may be raised in connection with reduction of
capital is Professor Miller's 70 7 suggestion that the requirements and
limitations imposed upon a reduction of capital be imposed upon the
recognition of and distributions from unrealized appreciation. The
principal effects of the adoption of that proposal in the present context
would be that a shareholder vote would be required before the appre-
ciation would be recognized and creditors would be informed of the
recognition and the valuation process before any distributions are
made. While this procedure would not eliminate the problems in
computing current values or in maintaining liquidity previously
noted,70 the attendant publicity should curb excess valuations without
depriving corporations of the possibility of recognizing unrealized
appreciation in appropriate cases.70 9 Consideration should be given to
this means of dealing with the problem of unrealized appreciation.
"'See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1704(c) (1967); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.§1701.32(G) (1964) (5 years). AICPA, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 46
(1956) appears to limit the required period for "dating" earned surplus to ten
years, barring exceptional circumstances. The S.E.C. apparently agrees generally
with this view, although it reserves the right to discontinue dating earned surplus
at an earlier date in the light of special circumstances. See RAPPAPORT, supra note
681, at 3.30. Since no harm should arise from a prolonged "dating" period, ten years is
suggested as a statutory standard.
'See Miller, Quasi-Reorganizations in Reverse, 23 ACCOUNTING REv. 154,
156-57 (1948). See also Erickson, Quasi-Reorganizations and Related Tax Effects,
6 ARTHUR ANDERSEN CHRONICLE 173 (July 1946); and W. PATON & W. PATON, JR.
ASSET ACCOUNTING 345-49 (1952).
Miller would require, consistent with the requirements in a quasi-reorganization,
that any earned surplus in existence at the date of reorganization be capitalized and
that earned surplus be dated as of the date of reorganization. On the basis of pre-
vious analysis, it would appear that earned surplus ought to be exhausted before
unrealized appreciation is utilized. See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 136-41; 148-53.
PATON & PATON, supra, at 346-48, consistent with the reduction of capital analogy,
would credit unrealized appreciation to shareholders' equity.
"'See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 152-53, 171-73.
" In view of the extensive list of problems arising in connection with the use
of unrealized appreciation as a source for asset distributions, see part II, 42 WASH.
L. REV. at 151-53, 171-73, some justification must be offered for recognizing any
use of appreciation. A ready example is a closely-held corporation whose asset
appreciation has caused the value of its shares to be far greater than its stated
capital and surplus. If that corporation under a restriction on transfers of shares
agreement must repurchase the shares, even on an installment purchase (see text infra
beginning note 799), there are substantial possibilities that it will be unable to
complete the purchase if the unrealized appreciation is not recognized. (See the two
most recent cases involving recognition of unrealized appreciation, Mountain State
Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960), and Baxter
v. Lancer, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).) In short, just as there may be
cases where corporations with earned surplus should not as a matter of good financial
policy declare dividends, there are also cases where application of existing general
rules would permit no dividend where good financial judgment would permit a
distribution, But since managements may be too eager to classify their corporation
as one in the second category, some check upon their discretion, whether by the
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3. Share Redemptions and Purchases.
Under the old act,710 a corporation could redeem its preferred
shares only if the fair value711 of the corporation's assets after the
redemption was at least equal to the total amount of its debts and
liabilities plus the amount of its capital stock as so reduced. In
contrast, corporations were permitted to purchase their own shares
only so long as the purchase would not cause any impairment of
the capital stock of the corporation. 712 The Washington Supreme
procedures regulating capital surplus distributions as previously discussed (see
part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 153) or, better yet, by reduction of capital proceedings
appears warranted.
I See WASH. RIv. CODE § 23.01.440 (1958). The corporation must file a
certificate with the secretary of state and the office of the auditor for the county in
which the corporation has its registered office showing compliance with share
provisions governing redemption, the corporation's financial condition, and the
effect of the redemption on the corporation's financial structure. Redeemed shares
are cancelled. The recording of the certificate hence has the effect of reducing the
corporation's stated capital by the amount thereof applicable to the redeemed shares.
This provision, which does not appear in the UmrlFoim BusINEss CORPORATION
AcT, was added to the old act in 1939. See Wash. Sess. Laws of 1939, ch. 143 § 15. It
bears obvious resemblance to a provision that had been the law prior to adoption
of the Uniform Act. See Wash. Sess. Laws of 1919, ch. 172 § 1.
I" WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.01.440 (1958) also states that no reduction of capital
stock (and hence no redemption of shares) shall be valid unless it complies with the
requirements of WAsH. RE~v. CODE § 23.01.430 (3) (1958): (1) that the secretary of
state must have filed articles of reduction and issued a certificate of reduction; and
(2) that the reduction must not reduce the actual value of corporate assets to an
extent prohibited by WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.01.430(2) (1958). The latter provision
is identical with the limitations stated in text above. The distinction between
actual and fair value of assets is not clear. However, the draftsmen's failure to use
the language and approach used in defining the dividend fund (see WASH. REv.
CODE § 23.01250 (1958)) and the general tenor of "fair" and "actual" values
suggests that current market values, here including unrealized appreciation, is the
relevant standard. Note that the possibility of construing the value limitation to
exclude unrealized appreciation earlier discussed in connection with reductions of
capital under WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.430 (1958), see note 649, stpra, does not seem
available as here a distribution of assets is made and that distribution does not
depend on the existence of surplus.
'See WAsr. REv. CODE §23.01.120(2) (1958). This provision was added to
the old act by Wash. Sess. Laws of 1947, ch. 195 § 1. Prior to 1947, Washington
courts held that corporations were not empowered to traffic in their own shares and
that the trust fund doctrine prohibited share reacquisitions unless undertaken in
connection with reductions of capital. See, e.g., Barto v. Nix, 15 Wash. 563, 568,
46 P. 1033, 1034 (1896) (dictum); Tait v. Pigott, 32 Wash. 344, 347, 73 P. 364,
365 (1903); Kom v. COdy Detective Agency, 76 Wash. 540, 543, 136 P. 1155, 1156
(1913); State er rel. Howland v. Olympia Veneer Co., 138 Wash. 144, 150, 244
P. 261, 263 (1926). But see Yeaton v. Eagle Oil & Refining CO., 4 Wash. 183, 29
P. 1051 (1892). The court in these cases was helped in reaching its conclusion by
statutory language prohibiting withdrawal, division, or payment of a corporation's
capital stock unless by means of reduction of capital (see, e.g., Kom v. Cody
Detective Agency, supra). The Uniform Act contained no such language (nor any
other relating to the problem) but the court read WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23.01.250, .260
(1958) as having the same effect as the old statutes. See Whittaker v. Weller, 8
Wn. 2d 18, 21, 111 P.2d 218, 220 (1941). The only exceptions to the rule that the
court recognized were for stock received from shareholders in cancellation of
indebtedness (see Barto v. Nix, 15 Wash. 563, 569, 46 P. 1033, 1034 (1896) (sub-
scription indebtedness); Mitchell v. Blue Star Mining CO., 98 Wash. 191, 167 P.
130 (1917) (stock assessments); and Child v. Idaho Hewer Mines, 155 Wash. 280,
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Court appears to have interpreted "impairment of capital stock" to
mean that purchases can be made only out of surplus.713 Thus,
assuming a constant price level,7 1 a corporation under the old act
could redeem preferred shares out of stated capital but could purchase
shares-redeemable or not-only out of surplus.
Redeemable shares that had been called in were cancelled and
retired and the corporation's stated capital reduced accordingly."
The status of purchased shares was not clear under the old act716
284 P. 80 (1930) (same)) and as gifts. (Shaw v. Carr, 93 Wash. 550, 553, 161 P.
345, 346 (1916)).
All states now permit corporations to acquire their own shares. See 1 Model
Act Ann. § 5 ff 2.02 (1960).
" The court in Jackson v. Colagrossi, 50 Wn. 2d 572, 574, 575, 313 P.2d 697, 699
(1947) interpreting the clause made the following inconsistent statements:
However, by the 1947 amendment, a corporation was permitted to repurchase its
own shares provided there was an earned surplus with which to pay therefor....
The legislature in authorizing a corporation to purchase its own stock, copied
the Delaware statute almost verbatim.... The Delaware statute was construed in
In re International Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch. 358, 92 Atl. 255, to mean that such
repurchase could only occur when it would not diminish the corporation's
ability to pay its debts or lessen the security of its creditors by reducing the
amount of the assets of the company below the amount represented by the
aggregate outstanding shares of the capital stock of the company.
Presumably the court meant to say net assets in the last clause quoted. It also seems
that the court intended the latter interpretation of the statute as none of the cases it
cites uses an earned surplus test. See In re International Radiator Co., supra;
Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1939). Both cases use a surplus test inter-
changeably with the impairment of capital test, as do H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
611-12 (rev. ed. 1946) and Note, 23 WASH. L. REv. 149, 150 (1948), also cited by the
court. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the court intended to impose a
surplus test. See also Burk v. Cooperative Finance Corp., 62 Wn. 2d 740, 751, 384
P.2d 618, 625 (1963) where the court at one point seems to equate the impairment
of capital stock test with a surplus test.
The court in In re West Waterway Lumber Co., 59 Wn. 2d 310, 318, 367 P. 2d
807, 812 (1962) held that WASH. REv. CODE §23.01.120 (1958) applied to all Wash-
ington corporations, rather than to only those formed after the statute was adopted.
No mention of the vested rights doctrine was made. See part I, 41 WASH. L. REV.
at 208-12 and note 940 infra.
7' If the value of a corporation's assets has appreciated over their original cost,
the corporation's capacity to redeem preferred shares would be increased. The
effect of such a change in the corporation's capacity to reacquire shares depends on
how the court interprets the impairment of capital stock or surplus test. Delaware
courts appear to read the surplus test to preclude dividends (and presumably share
purchases) from unrealized appreciation. See Kingston v. Home Life Ins. Co., 11
Del. Ch. 258, 272, 101 A. 898, 904 Ch. 1917), aff'd without note of the point, 11 Del.
Ch. 428, 104 A. 25 (Sup. Ct. 1918). Moreover, this result is strongly suggested by
the dividend provisions in the old act. See WASH. REV. COPE §23.01.250(4)(a)
(1958) ; part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 148. But see Mountain State Steel Foundries,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737, 741 (4th Cir. 1960) interpreting a West
Virginia impairment of capital statute regulating share repurchases to permit
conservative use of unrealized appreciation; and Baxter v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 213
F. Supp. 92, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) interpreting Florida surplus statute to permit same
result.
If the value of a corporation's assets declines it would appear that both capacities
are decreased. See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 154-57.
" WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.440(1958).
"6 None of the post 1947 cases has offered any hints on the subject. The limited
number of Washington cases prior to 1947 permitting reacquisition of the corpora-
tion's own shares suggest only that the shares could be resold free of the general
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nor were the consequences of the sale of such shares stated.717
Apparently cancellation of such shares could occur only with the
formality of a reduction of stated capital"' and dividends of such
shares had to meet the requirements for dividends of unissued
shares.719
Share redemptions and purchases under the New Act are subject
to the general requirement that the corporation must be able to
pay its debts as they arise in the ordinary course of business both
before and after the redemption or purchase.7 0
Share purchases under the New Act are further regulated by two
sets of provisions that appear to overlap. The first set of provisions
appears in the definitions section of the Act. "Treasury shares" are
defined as shares of a corporation which have been issued, have
been subsequently acquired by the corporation, and have not, by
reason of the acquisition or other action, been cancelled or restored
to the status of authorized but unissued shares.72' The Act then
defines "net assets" as the amount by which the total assets of a
corporation, excluding treasury shares, exceed the total debts of the
corporation.72 2 Surplus is next defined as the excess of the net assets
of a corporation over its stated capital. 23 Finally, stated capital
is defined in terms of shares that have been issued.724 These defini-
tions are identical to provisions in the 1950 version of the Model
Act 725 which were construed by the draftsmen to cause a reduction
in surplus in connection with the acquisition by a corporation of
its own shares.726
consideration requirements for share sales. See Barto v. Nix, 15 Wash. 563, 46 P.
1033 (1896); Shaw v. Carr, 93 Wash. 550, 161 P. 345 (1916). Generally, such
shares were held to have the characteristics attributed to them by the New Act, as
set forth in text following note 743. See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 402-03, 490-91(rev. ed. 1946).
' Presumably the treatment is basically the same, apart from surplus restriction
problems, as under the New Act. See text following note 747.
'See Gose, Legal Significance of "Capital Stock" 32 WASH. L. REv. 1, 28
(1957) and WASH. REv. CODE §23.01.430 (1958) which makes no exception for
treasury shares. As to the process of reducing capital under the old act, see text
supra beginning at note 647.
'See WASH. REv. CODE §23.01.250(6) (1958) which makes no exception for
treasury shares.
I WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23A.16.090 (1965) ; 23A.08.030 e 4 (1967).
'WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(8) (1965). Other characteristics of treasury
shares are discussed in text beginning at note 743 and accompanying footnotes.
12WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010 (9) (1965) (emphasis added).
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(11) (1965).
~'See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23A.04.010 (8) (1965) ; 23A.16.110 (1965).
'See Model Act. §§ 2 (h), (i), (j), and (k) and 61(1950 rev.).
'See Comment to § 5, Model Act (1950 rev.). This result is easily reached
from the definitions set forth above. If treasury shares are not assets, then either
stated capital or surplus must be reduced in connection with the payment of assets
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The second set of provisions in the New Act generally duplicate
the financial regulations added to the Model Act in 1957 as an
amendment to its provision empowering corporations to purchase
their own shares: 72 7  solvent corporations can purchase their own
shares only to the extent of their unreserved and unrestricted earned
surplus, or, if (1) the articles permit, (2) the corporation is a regu-
lated investment company, 28 or (3) a majority 29 of shares entitled to
for the reacquired shares. Since treasury shares remain "issued," stated capital
must remain constant; thus, surplus, either earned or capital, must be reduced.
Section 5 of that Act permitted corporations to acquire their own shares "out of"
earned surplus primarily and capital surplus secondarily. "Out of" as used in this
connection usually means that the named surplus account is reduced. (See, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.420(1) (1965).) Despite the presence of §5 in the Act,
the draftsmen indicated that the definition sections in the Act had the effect of
making surplus unavailable for purchases of shares and for payment of dividends
as long as the shares purchased were held as treasury shares. Hence, they seemed to
have interpreted the definition provisions to give rise to a reduction of surplus on
acquisition of treasury shares. As to the commonness of this construction, see
Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70
HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1392 n.166 (1957).
The definition provisions have been interpreted by most commentators on the
Act to give rise to a reduction of surplus on acquisition of treasury shares. See
Hackney, id. at 1393; D. HERWrTz, Busixrss PLANNING 423 (1966) (endorsing
Hackney's position); Sprouse, Accounting for Treasury Stock Transactions: Pre-
vailing Practices and New Statutory Provisions, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 882, 888-90
(1959); and Kessler, Share Repurchases Under Modern Corporation Laws, 28
FORDHAm L. REv. 637, 641 n.15 (1960).
" Compare Model Act § 5 (1950 rev.) with WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.030
(1967).
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.030 f[ 1 (1967) states that purchases of a corporation's
own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the extent stated in
the text immediately following. This language would prevent purchase of the
corporation's shares by any arrangement with an individual or corporation to pur-
chase the shares for its account, absent compliance with the surplus limitations.
However, the application of the language to a parent-subsidiary situation is far
from clear. Does the language mean that a subsidiary cannot purchase the parent's
shares if the parent has no surplus but the subsidiary does? See Clarke, The New
Colorado Corporation Act, 35 DICTA 317, 329 (1958). Are the two corporations to
be taken on a consolidated basis? Or may subsidiaries purchase the parent's shares
to the extent of their own surplus? The appropriate answer seems to be purchases
of the parent's shares can be made only to the extent of consolidated earned surplus,
as there seems to be little justification for permitting a subsidiary with surplus
to purchase shares of a parent with a deficit larger than the subsidiary's surplus.
If the suggestions earlier made are accepted, see part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at
166-68, the share purchase provision should be amended to make clear that neither
the parent nor any subsidiary would be permitted to purchase either the parent's or
outstanding subsidiary shares when the consolidated group has no earned surplus.
Absent those changes, the New Act provision should be amended to clarify which
corporation's surplus is relevant. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1705 (West 1955).
'This provision was added to the previously adopted Model Act provision by
Wash. Sess. Laws of 1967, ch. 190 § 8. Special provisions for regulated investment
companies appear warranted by the common knowledge that mutual funds' shares
may be subject to shareholder redemption options and by the special type of creditor
such corporations would have. The most interesting aspect of the Washington
addition is that it did not authorize such purchases out of stated capital. For
statutes so providing, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 32 (b) (2) (1957) ; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-52 (b) (5) (1965) ; and OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701-35 (5) (Page 1962).
" Wash. Sess. Laws of 1967, ch. 190 § 8 changed the required shareholder vote
from two-thirds, as it was in Model Act § 5, to a majority, apparently with a view
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vote thereon approve, then to the extent of its unreserved and unre-
stricted capital surplus. The surplus used as a measure of the corpora-
tion's right to acquire its own shares is restricted so long as the shares
are held as treasury shares;, the restriction is removed pro tanto upon
disposition or cancellation of any such shares."'
The combined effect of both sets of New Act provisions appears
to be that generally the purchase by a corporation of its own shares
causes both a reduction of surplus (presumably earned if available)"'
and a restriction of an equal amount of a specified type of surplus712
However, Professor Rudolph has suggested that the two sets of
provisions can be reconciled by interpreting the first set as incorpor-
ating into the statute the cost method of accounting for treasury
shares733 whereby the amount expended for treasury shares is treated
as a floating negative net worth item which effectuates the surplus
to being consistent with the provisions governing distributions from capital sur-
plus. See WASHr. REV. CODE § 23A.08.430(2) (1967). One critical difference between
the two provisions remains: under WAsH. Rav. CODE §23A.08.430(2) (1967), the
required vote is a majority of the outstanding shares of each class whether or not
entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of the articles of incorporation of the
corporation whereas under WAsH. RIEv. CODE § 23A.08.030 (1967) the required vote
is simply a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon. Thus, non-voting shares
are enfranchised and vote as a class on distributions of capital surplus but do not
vote at all on purchases of shares from capital surplus. For better provisions, see
note 761 infra.
One other omission from WASH. Rav. CODE § 23A.08.030 (1967) that should be
noted is the lack of a provision specifically recognizing limitations upon a corpora-
tion's ability to purchase its own shares in its articles of incorporation. Such a
provision qualifies a corporation's right to pay dividends (see WAsH. REV. CODE
§ 23A.08.420(1) (1965)) and no reason is apparent why a similar provision should
not be recognized in connection with treasury share purchases.
' This language presumably means that if half of the treasury shares are sold or
cancelled, half of the restriction is removed. But see Hackney, The Financial
Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 1357, 1394(1957) who suggests it may also be construed to mean that "if 100 shares are
bought for $100 and 50 are resold for $80, 4/10 of the restriction is lifted." This
would seem to say that if part or all of the shares are cancelled, none of the restric-
tion is lifted-a result contrary to statutory language.
'Sprouse, Accounting for Treasury Stock Transactions: Prevailing Practices
and New Statutory Provisions, 59 CoLulm. L. REv. 882, 889 (1959) concludes that
the appropriate surplus account to be reduced first is capital surplus on the ground
that capital surplus is the "residual amount" under the Model Act. The draftsmen's
comment to Model Act § 5 (1950 rev.) clearly states that the effect of the surplus
reduction is to make earned surplus unavailable. Moreover, the general structure of
the Act clearly suggests that unspecified charges will be made to earned rather than
capital surplus. See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 169; Hackney, supra note 730, at
1390. Rudolph, Accounting for Treasury Shares Under the Model Business Cor-
poration Act, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 323, 324 (1959) also reaches this conclusion.
"' This is the conclusion of most of the commentators on the Model Act predecesor
provisions. See Hackney, supra note 730, at 1393; D. HERWiTz, BuSINEss PLANNING
423 (1966) ; Sprouse, supra note 726, at 888-90, and Kessler, Share Purchases Under
Modern Corporation Laws, 28 FORDHAm L. Rav. 637, 641, n.15 (1960).
"I On the mechanics of the cost method of accounting for treasury shares, see
R. AmoRY & W. HARDEE, MAT"RIALS ON AccOUNTING 330-31 (3d ed. by D. HERwrrz
& D. TRAUTMAN 1958); H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF AcCOUNTING,
INTERmEDIATE 126-30 (6th ed. 1965).
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restriction required by the second set of provisions."' It would
appear hazardous to rely on this construction of the Act pending
court interpretation. The Act gives no hint of recognizing a negative
net worth item.735 Moreover, in connection with possible distribution
of treasury shares as a share dividend, the Act uses language indicat-
ing that the acquisition of shares gives rise to a reduction of surplus
rather than a restriction. 36 Finally, as the material following will
indicate, a system involving a double surplus effect is feasible and
may resolve some of the problems that would arise with only a
restriction approach.3 7
The second set of New Act provisions goes on to provide that
"notwithstanding the foregoing limitation", solvent corporations may
acquire their own shares for the purpose of eliminating fractional
shares, collecting or compromising indebtedness to the corporation,
paying dissenting shareholders entitled to payment for their shares
under the provisions of the Act, effecting, subject to the other provi-
tions of the Act, the retirement of its redeemable shares by redemption
or by purchase at a price not to exceed redemption price. 3 ' The other
provisions regulating redemption or purchase of redeemable shares pro-
hibits such action when the result would be to reduce the corporation's
... Rudolph, supra note 731, at 324-26. This construction was endorsed by Ray
Garrett, a member of the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, in Garrett, Treasury
Shares Under the Model Business Corporation Act, 15 Bus. LAW. 916, 918 (1960).
Hackney, supra note 730, at 1393 n.167, offers and rejects one other means of
reconciling the two sets of provisions:
The only way in which the reduction of surplus arising from the definition of
net assets in § 2 (i) and the restriction on surplus imposed by § 5(b) can be
reconciled is to require a reduction in every case and to say that the reduction
effectuates the restriction and so a further restriction is unnecessary. The
restriction language in §5(b) then would become completely superfluous, and
the status of the surplus which would arise upon disposition of the shares is
again put in doubt. This was obviously not the intention of the 1953 amend-
ments to the Model Act.
'See Rudolph, supra note 731, at 326 ; see also Garrett, Capital and Surplus Under
the New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 239, 242 (1958) ("The
Model Act proposes that the interests of shareholders be identified in three cate-
gories: stated capital, capital surplus, and earned surplus.")
"'WAsH. Rav. CODE § 23A.08.420(3) (1965) and its Model Act predecessor, §
40 (c), refer to shares acquired "out of surplus of the corporation."
'See text beginning note 745 infra and notes thereto.
A number of the states that have otherwise adopted the Model Act have amended
the provisions to eliminate the problem outlined by Hackney and Sprouse. See
Wis. STAT. § 180.02 (1961) (providing that treasury shares, while not net assets,
are to be treated as such in computing capital surplus); S.C. Bus. CORP. AcT §§
12-11.2(0), 12-15.17 (1962) (restating test as out of earned surplus; redefining net
assets) (see Folk, The Model Act and The South Carolina Corporation Law, 15
S.C. L. REv. 275, 342 n.228 (1963)); ARE. STAT. ANN. § 64-105 (1965) (restating
test to out of earned surplus) ; and Wvo. Bus. CORP. ACT § 5 (1961) (restating test
as out of earned surplus) (Professor Rudolph was Reporter for the Wyoming
Revision Committee).
' WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.030 11 3 (1965).
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net assets below the aggregate amount payable to the holders of shares
having prior or equal rights to the assets of the corporation upon in-
voluntary dissolution.7 11
It is difficult to determine precisely what the limitation in the
second set of provisions is.7 40 The most sensible construction seems
to be that the surplus limitation and restriction appearing in the
second set of provisions can be ignored in making special purchases
of the types listed. 741 This construction would mean that purchases
for such purposes would be permitted as long as sufficient surplus
was available to be reduced under the first set of provisions. Redeem-
able shares would be excepted from even the latter requirement as
'WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.16.090 (1965).
It is unclear from any of the provisions here concerned what type of share is
"redeemable". As earlier noted, the share authorization provisions in the New Act
seem to allow redeemable common shares. See part I, 41 WASH. L. REv. at 227 n.111,
229. If this interpretation were used in connection with the purchase and redemp-
tion provisions, solvent corporations with only redeemable common shares out-
standing could redeem all their outstanding stated capital from stated capital. While
this power might be useful in closely-held corporations, see note 780 infra, it
appears to undercut the thrust of the regulations regarding treasury shares. Id.
Hence, redeemable shares for this purpose should be interpreted as any shares
callable by a corporation which has a non-callable class of shares outstanding.
It seems reasonably clear that provisions restricting transferability and giving
the corporation an option to purchase the shares do not create redeemable shares.
See, e.g., In the Matter of West Waterway Lumber Co., 59 Wn. 2d 310, 367 P.2d
807 (1962) ; Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own Shares:
The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 697, 723 (1941).
1,0 Model Act § 5 (1957 rev.) used "limitations" to apply to the material appear-
ing in WAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.030 1111 1, 2 and 4 (1967). This use suggests, of
course, that the surplus restriction is a "limitation".
" This result can be reached by determining that the only real "limitation" in
the second set of provisions is the limitation of purchases to surplus and by
treating the restriction merely as a device to effectuate the limitation. Two states
that have adopted the Model Act provision generally have amended it so as to
qualify the surplus limitation specifically rather than the foregoing provisions
generally. See Coux. GEN. STAT. REv. § 33-358(d) (1960); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180-385 (2) (1957).
Construction problems with the "notwithstanding" clause abound even if the
restriction provisions in the New Act are found to be the only regulations of
share purchases. If a corporation has no surplus and purchases its own shares under
one of the exceptions, what source is reduced in connection with the transaction?
Stated capital? Or, as Hackney supra note 732 at 1398 suggests, is a surplus deficit
created? If stated capital is to be charged, as would seem to be intended, is the
effect of the notwithstanding clause to make stated capital available for such trans-
actions even though surplus is available? The answer here would appear to be no
in view of the general protection of stated capital built into the Act. See part II,
42 WASr. L. REv. at 138 n.414. Assuming the provision is limited to cases where
surplus is unavailable, precisely when is it unavailable? Suppose the directors
decide to reserve all of the corporation's earned and capital surplus. May excep-
tional purchases now be made from stated capital? Suppose the corporation has no
earned surplus and its shareholders will not permit its capital surplus to be used to
purchase its shares. May the exceptional purchases be made? Some of these ques-
tions can be resolved in connection with clarification of the statute as to the
effects of various treasury share transactions upon the corporation's accounts. See
text following note 779 infra. But the remainder can be finally resolved only by the
addition of clauses requiring surplus to be exhausted before stated capital can
serve as a source. Cf. part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 137-38 and note 782 infra.
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they are cancelled on acquisition and hence stated capital, rather
than surplus, would be reduced on their acquisition.742 Thus, redeem-
able shares can be redeemed or purchased at a price not to exceed
their redemption price even in the absence of surplus.
Acquired shares that are not redeemable-treasury shares-are
deemed by the New Act to be "issued" but not "outstanding"
shares.743 Because they are not "outstanding", treasury shares are not
entitled to vote, are not counted in determining the required vote
under the various provisions of the Act that specify a required vote,744
and are not eligible to receive any type of dividends.74 Treasury
shares are not covered by the New Act preemptive right provision 746
and may be sold by directors for such consideration as they deem
appropriate. 4 7 In the event of sale of the shares, the surplus restric-
tion, if one was imposed in connection with the acquisition of the
shares, is removed pro tanto.745 The secondary effects of treasury
share sales upon surplus are not clear under the New Act. If the pro-
ceeds equal the cost of the shares, then apparently the surplus reduced
in connection with the acquisition of the shares is restored.749 If the
'
2 See WASH. REV. CODE §23A.16.100 (1), (4) (1965). The difficult question not
answered by the Act is what account is charged for any difference between the
redemption price of shares (or their purchase price) and the amount of stated
capital attributable to the shares. Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARv. L. Rav.
1334, 1354, 1360 (1935) solved the problem by requiring that stated capital for
redeemable shares not be less than the redemption price. Such a provision appears
overly restrictive. For other statutory solutions to the problem, see note 797 infra.
7, WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(8) (1965).
,,WASH. Rav. CODE § 23A.08.300 (1965).
.' See WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 1 1 (1965).
Hackney, supra note 730, at 1399-1400 argues that the act should be amended to
permit treasury shares to receive share dividends. Otherwise corporations would
suffer where the treasury shares were being held as a hedge against an intervening
price rise in fulfillment of future obligations to sell or deliver shares when the
obligation is subject to anti-dilution provisions. See also Jones, Should Treasury
Stock Participate in a Stock Dividend?, 15 ARTHUR ANDERSEN CHRONICLE 37
(1954); Blough, Current Accounting & Auditing Problems, 96 J. ACCOUNTANCY
478 (1953) for evidence that corporations do desire to declare share dividends for
such purpose. While there appears to be little harm that might come from such an
authorization, the corporation's need for a share dividend in the circumstances, as
against simply reserving authorized shares to cover the future obligations, does not
seem strong enough to warrant changing the New Act provision.
'"See WASH. Rv. CODE §23A.08.220 (1965). It therefore seems unlikely that
such shares will be subject to the right. See part I, 41 WASH. L. REv. at 224.
'
7 See WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.150 (1965) and part I, 41 WASH. L. REv. at
243.
"See WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.030 ff 2 (1967).
'The draftsmen's comment to Model Act § 5 (1950 rev.) indicates that on can-
cellation the surplus reduced would be restored. If such is the case, then a break-
even sale should certainly have the same effect. Qualification is necessary, however,
as the resulting entries-a debit to cash and a credit to earned surplus-are not
likely to leave accountants comfortable absent clear statutory direction. See, e.g.,
AICPA, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 1 § B (1953); SEC, ACCOUNTING
RELEASE No. 6 (May 10, 1938); and AMERICAN ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATION, Ac-
COUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARDS FOR CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 7
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proceeds are less than the cost of the shares, apparently the surplus
first reduced remains permanently reduced by the difference.Y5° In the
event the proceeds are greater than the cost of the shares, apparently
the surplus first reduced is restored and some type of surplus-un-
specified by the Act, but presumably capital surplus-is increased by
the amount of the excess.751
Treasury shares may be cancelled by a resolution of the board
of directors.7 52 The effects of cancellation are that the surplus restric-
tion, if one was imposed, is removed pro tanto,75 stated capital is re-
duced by that part of the stated capital which was represented by the
cancelled shares, the shares so cancelled are restored to the status of
authorized but unissued shares,5 4 and the surplus arising out of the
reduction of stated capital apparently is capital surplus.755
(1957) to the effect that issuance of treasury shares should be treated as the
issuance of new shares. Following these suggestions would lead to crediting capital
surplus in connection with the resale of treasury shares. And it seems likely that
the draftsmen's comment, as it regards a cancellation, is incorrect. See note 755
infra. But such would be the result if only the New Actes surplus restrictions were
in effect. See note 751 infra.
'Such is the result suggested by the draftsmen's comment to Model Act § 5(1950 rev.) regarding cancellation of shares purchased for a price in excess of the
stated capital applicable thereto.
=' The issue is whether the excess of the proceeds over the cost of the acquired
shares constitutes a "gain" and hence is part of earned surplus. Generally accepted
accounting principles clearly require such "gain' to be credited to capital surplus.
See STATUS OF AccOUNTING RESEARcH BuLLETils, OPINIONS or THE ACcOUNTING
PRINCIPLES BOARD, OpINIoN No. 6 12 (1965); AICPA, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
BULL. No. 43, ch. 1 §B (1953); id., ch. 8, ff 12 (a) (1953); SEC, ACcoUNTING
SERIEs RELEASE No. 6 (May 10, 1938).
If the New Act provisions are interpreted so that the surplus restrictions are the
only operative regulations over treasury shares, then on all sales the restriction
would be lifted pro tanto. If the proceeds are less than the cost of the treasury
shares, then surplus of some type--probably earned if available, see, e.g., STATUS
OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS, supra at 12(b)-must be reduced. See Hack-
ney, supra note 730, at 1395. But see Garrett, Treamry Shares Under the Model
Business Corporation Act, 15 Bus. LAw. 916, 920 (1960) (charge is to capital
surplus). If the proceeds exceed the cost of the treasury shares, then the gain, as
above, would be capital surplus. See Garrett, supra at 919.
'WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.110 (1965). For procedure, see note 655 supra.
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.030 ff 2 (1967).
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.110(4) (1965).
'This is the direction of WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130 1 1 (1965). The
qualification in text arises from the draftsmen's comment to Model Act § 5 (1950
rev.) that a cancellation of treasury shares "will make the restricted earned surplus
available to the extent that the amount thereof does not exceed the amount of the
reduction of stated capital thus effected" It seems clear that the direction in
WASH. REv. CODE §23A.16.130 ff 1 (1965) or its Model Act predecessor, §63(1950 rev.) must govern.
If the surplus restriction is the only operative regulation of treasury share
acquisitions, the effects of a cancellation upon surplus are uncertain. Under WASH.
REv. CODE § 23A.08.030 ff 2 (1967), the restriction is removed pro tanto. A com-
ment about the section's Model Act prececessor, § 5, states that cancellation "will make
the restricted surplus available." 2 MODEL AcT Alu. § 62 1 4. Hackney, supra note
730, at 1396-97; Garrett, supra note 751, at 919; and Rudolph, supra note 731, at 320
assume the result of a cancellation is the restoration of earned surplus with the
possible effect that a limited amount of surplus in some circumstances can be used
19671
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Finally, treasury shares may be distributed as share dividends."'
The apparent consequences of such a distribution are that the surplus
restriction, if one was imposed, is removed pro tanto, 57 and the
shares are shifted to the category of outstanding, issued shares. 758
The financial effects of a share acquisition on a corporation can
be determined only after some later event occurs. If the shares are
cancelled, distributed as a share dividend, or resold at a loss, the
effects are largely those of a cash dividend: the corporation's assets
have been diminished with nothing to replace them.759 If, however,
the shares are resold for an amount at least equal to their cost, the
effect is similar to a sale from the selling shareholder to the ultimate
to purchase all of a corporation's stock. The difficulty with this assertion is the
direction in WASH. REV. CODE §23A.16.130 1 1 (1965) (and Model Act §63) that
surplus created by or arising out of a reduction of stated capital shall be capital sur-
plus. Reasonably interpreted, the latter provision should override the draftsmen's com-
ment at least insofar as any surplus finally arising from the reduction of stated capital.
D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 426 (1966) reaches this result by treating the can-
cellation as a type of resale-for-less-than-cost-case, and by viewing the cancellation as a
disposition of the shares for zero consideration. To the same effect is Sprouse, supra
note 731, at 892-93.
"See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.420(3) (1965).
7 WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.030 f[ 2 (1967).
'The language in WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.420(3) (1965) indicates quite
clearly ("Dividends may be... paid in its own shares out of any treasury shares that
have been required out of surplus of the corporation") that surplus is not effected by
the distribution of treasury shares as a share dividend. Surplus is reduced when
the shares were acquired and this supports the share distribution. In final effect,
then, the combination of transactions is indistinguishable from a dividend.
The language in WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.420(3) (1965) is some evidence that
surplus reductions must take place in acquisition of shares. Initially, there is the
reference to shares reacquired "out of surplus" which is indicative of a surplus
reduction. Moreover, if the surplus restriction is considered the sole regulation of
treasury shares, then the restriction is lifted pro tanto on the disposition of the
shares; and no surplus account is reduced per WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.420(3)
(1965). This would result in the balance sheet not balancing. See Hackney, supra
note 730, at 1397.
" On the general financial ramifications of a share reacquisition, see BAKER
& CARY at 1400-01; Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1334, 1339-41
(1935).
Secondary financial ramifications of a share purchase include a reduction of the
assets with which the corporation may earn income and an enlargement of the inter-
est of each remaining shareholder in the remaining assets and earnings. A number
of recent financial articles have been concerned with these aspects and in particular
with possible effects of share repurchases on earnings per share. See Brigham,
The Profitability of a Firm's Purchase of Its Own Common Stock, 7 CALIF.
MANAGE.MENT REVIEW 69 (Winter 1964); Guthart, More Companies Are Buying
Back Their Stock, 43 HARv. Bus. REV. 40 (March-April 1965); Ellis, Repurchase
Shares to Revitali;ze Equity, 43 HARV. BUS. REV. 119 (July-Aug. 1965) ; A. RoBI-
CHEK & S. MYERS, OPTI,.IAL FINANCING DECISIONS 133 (1965). Other aspects of
these interesting works are discussed in note 811 infra.
Numerous articles catalog the purposes, good and bad, for share repurchases.
See, e.g., Levy, Purchase By A Corporation Of Its Own Stock, 15 MINN. L. REv.
1 (1930); Nemmers, The Power of A Corporation to Purchase Its Own Stock,
1942 WIs. L. REV. 161; KESSLER, supra note 732, at 644-61. Recent evidence shows
increasing share purchases by corporations, apparently for retirement. See, e.g.,
FORTUNE, Nov. 1965, at 245; and sources noted in paragraph preceding.
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buyer with the corporation as an intermediary."' The substantial
possibility of dividend effect, particularly when the corporation's
fortunes wane, has led to the common requirement that such pur-
chases be made only to the extent, and in the circumstances, that
the corporation could freely pay the funds to be expended as a
dividend. 78 ' In view of this framework, the double surplus require-
ment apparently imposed by the New Act cannot be supported on
financial grounds72 and hence should be eliminated.
The next facet of the New Act that should be re-examined is its
determination that shares reacquired by a corporation are "issued"
but not "outstanding".70 3 It is difficult to understand how a corpora-
tion can own part of itself.6 Indeed, this conception of reacquired
" de Capriles & McAniff, The Financial Provisions of the New (1961) New
York Business Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1239, 1261 n.172 (1961),
analogize the corporation's position in such transactions to that of an escrow
holder. The analogy loses some of its force where the resale price is not equal to
the purchase price as the corporation receives the excess proceeds or loses the
funds. But even such transactions can be made to fit into the escrow holder analysis
by considering any excess proceeds received by the corporation as a contribution to
the corporation by the selling shareholder and any loss in funds as a dividend to
the selling shareholder.
71 See, e.g., 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 5 11 2.02 (1) & (2).
If the analogy to the controls imposed on dividend declarations is to be faithfully
applied to share acquisitions, several changes must be made in the New Act pro-
visions. First, the insolvency test applied to share acquisitions should be broadened
to include both the bankruptcy and the insolvency tests for insolvency. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52 (e) (1965); part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 131-32. Second,
the protection afforded to the liquidation preferences of preferred shares should be
expanded from the current protection in the event of purchase or redemption of
redeemable shares (see WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.16.090 (1965)) to general protection
of liquidation preferences. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-105 (B) (2) & (3)(1967); S.C. CODE § 12-19.17(e) (1962); part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 134-36.
Third, the use of capital surplus for share repurchases should be restricted to situa-
tions where earned surplus is exhausted, and where senior shareholders are present,
further restricted to protect their interests. See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 136-41 ;
Dodd, supra note 739, at 707; cf. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 301.22(b), (g) (1962).
One other addition that appears necessary to protect the interest of preferred
shareholders is the requirement that all accrued dividends or preferred shares be
paid before share repurchases can be made from earned surplus. See TEX. Bus.
Conp. AcT § 2.03 (c) (1964).
" Kessler, supra 732, at 641 n.15, & 656 n.58 argues that the double adverse effect is
desirable in a statutory framework which gives so little other protection to creditors
and shareholders from improvident distributions, cf. Dodd, stpra note 734, at 706.
Equitable problems aside, it is hard to understand why share transactions should be
treated more severely than dividend distributions. As to statutory resolution of
possible equitable problems with share reacquisitions, see text following note 806
infra.
"'WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(8) (1965).
'"Hills, Federal Taxation v. Corporation Law, 1937 Wis. L. REv. 280, 299
states:
Can a corporation have "ownership" in itself? Can it possess "legal rights
and powers" or "legal property" or "property" derived solely from itself? Cor-
poration law holds it cannot. Treasury shares do not have voting rights,
dividend rights or distribution rights on liquidation, so what rights, if any,
remain? Perhaps the "right" of the corporation to reissue its treasury shares
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shares does much to foster the discredited analysis of the shares
as assets.765 It would seem far sounder to view such shares, as
Ballantine7 6  and most accountants doT1 7 as reverting to the status
of authorized, unissued shares. Such a change would mean that
directors could no longer issue "treasury shares" free of the general
consideration requirements.76 ' However, that exception has been sub-
iect to considerable abuse in the past and most of its beneficial
for a valuable consideration if its charter law permits-but that is a mere
incident of incorporation which is applicable to unissued as well as issued
shares. Treasury shares are not a corporate "asset" and cannot be considered
as an asset in computing net assets or surplus available for dividends or share
purchases. They have no more value to the corporation than ordinary unissued
shares, which is nil. They are not a property, interest or claim and not a
form of self-ownership.
See also Ballantine, The Curious Fiction of Treasury Shares, 34 CALIF. L. REv.
536, 537-38 (1946); Glenn, Treasury Stock, 15 VA. L. REV. 625 (1929); and W.
PATON & W. PATON, JR., CORPORATION AccoUNTS AND STATEMENTS 184-85 (1955).
" Treasury shares were once commonly shown on the corporation's balance
sheet as an asset. See Hills, Statement of Legal Concepts of Accounting, 36 IOWA
L. REv. 198, 214-15 (1951); R. AMORY & C. HARDEE, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING
324 (3d ed. D. Herwitz & D. Trautman, 1958). (On the role of this concept in the
historical development of treasury share regulations, see Nussbaum, Acquisition By A
Corporation of Its Own Stock, 25 COLUm. L. REV. 971, 978 (1935).) Generally ac-
cepted accounting principles still permit display of treasury shares as an asset "in some
circumstances" (e.g,. when acquired for the specific purpose of resale to employees).
See AICPA, ACCOUNTING RES. BULL. No. 43 ch. 1 B (4) (1953); STATUS OF Ac-
COUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS, OPINION OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD,
OPINION No. 6 ff 12 (b) (1965); L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 14.18 (2d ed. 1966). However, "the vast majority of accounting authorities
do not recognize any legal basis for showing treasury shares as an asset." R. WixoN,
ACCOUNTANT'S HANDBOOK 21.33 (4th ed. 1956). See also W. PATON & W. PATON,
JR., CORPORATION ACCOUNTS AND STATEMENTS 189 (1955) (analogizing acquisition of
treasury shares to retirement of a seasonal bank loan).
The statement in WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.04.010(9) (1965) that "net assets means
the amount by which the total assets of a corporation, excluding treasury shares,
exceed the total debts of the corporation" (and its Model Act predecessor, § 2 (i))
apparently was intended in part to end the controversy. See G. HILLS, THE LAW OF
ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 143 n.17 (1957) and sources cited therein.
However, the approach adopted heavily implies that for purposes other than the
computation of net assets, treasury shares are assets. But see Hackney, supra note
730 at 1394 n.169 where the author reads the Model Act provisions as preventing
display of treasury shares as assets.
If the contraction of capital approach to reacquired shares is adopted, there can
be no argument that reacquired shares are assets. The approach would prevent
reacquired shares from being displayed as assets even in the exceptional circum-
stances now approved but Wixon's statement supra indicates that this deprivation
would scarcely be significant enough to block adopting the approach.
" See Ballantine, The Curious Fiction of Treasury Shares, 34 CALIF. L. REv.
536, 538 (1946); H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 614-17 (rev. ed. 1946). Hills,
despite his statement quoted supra note 764, did not adopt the contraction of capital
theory in his Model Corporation Act. See Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARV. L.
REV. 1334, 1373 (1935).
"See, e.g., AMERICAN ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATION, ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING
STANDARDS FOR CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 7 (1957); R. Wixon, Accouy-
TANT'S HANDBOOK 21.32 (4th ed. 1956); E. SPILLER, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 338
(1966); and W. MEIGS, C. JOHNSON & T. KELLER, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING
715 (1963).
'" See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.150 ff 3 (1965).
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aspects could be achieved by relaxation of the requirement that par
value shares must always be sold for par, as previously suggested.769
Another effect of the change would be that reacquired shares would
be subject to the preemptive right.770  This extension would aid
closely-held corporations and would not be onerous to publicly-held
corporations in view of the numerous exceptions thereto and the
statutory power to abolish the right.77 1
The major difficulty with the "contraction of capital" approach
to share reacquisitions becomes apparent when the operation of its
supporting financial provisions is analyzed. 772  Presumably such a
statute would provide that share acquisitions could only be made
to the extent of earned surplus. On reacquisitions stated capital
applicable to the shares would be reduced immediately with the
difference between the purchase price and stated capital charged
to earned surplus, if positive, or capital surplus, if negative. A surplus
restriction would be imposed to the extent of the reduction in stated
capital (or purchase price if less than stated capital reduction) in
recognition of potential dividend effects. On resale of the shares at
a price equal to or greater than the amount of the restriction, the
'LSee Ballantine, The Curious Fiction of Treasury Shares, 34 CALIF. L. REv.
536, 538-39 (1946); BAKER & CARY at 849; and part I, 41 WASH. L. REv. at 243,
247.
'See WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.220 (1965).
See part I, 41 WASH. L. Rev. at 221-24.
'-The text following models its entries basically upon the accounting technique
devised to follow the contraction of capital theory. That technique, called the par
value method of reporting reacquired shares, differs in one major respect from the
entries set forth in text: on reacquisition, a treasury shares account is opened with
a value equal to the stated capital value of the shares, rather than a direct reduction
of stated capital. Accountants would make the latter entry but for the legal restric-
tions upon reducing stated capital. See, e.g., AMERICAN ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATION,
ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARDS FOR CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
7 (1957). On the mechanics of the par value method, see R. AMORY & W. HARDEE,
MATERmLS ON ACCOUNTING 327-30 (3d ed. D. HERWiTZ & D. TRAUTMAN 1958);
H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING, INTERMEDIATE 130-31 (6th ed.
1965); J. MAURIELO, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 493-97 (1950). For other views as
to how to record the contraction of capital, see W. PATON & W. PATON, JR., CORPORA-
Tiox ACCOUNTS & STATEMENTS 190-204 (1955) (including the authors' controversial
proposal to revalue the corporation's assets in connection with the contraction).
Only Ohio currently uses the contraction of capital theory but its statutes differ in
two significant respects from those described in text: (1) the only limitation im-
posed upon acquiring shares is that the fair value of the corporation's assets not be
less than its liabilities and stated capital immediately after the acquisition (see OHIO
Rev. CODE ANN. § 1701.35 (c) (Page 1964); (2) despite immediate reduction of
stated capital (see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.31 (A) (Page 1964)), the shares
acquired are treated as issued but not outstanding (see OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.1
(K), (L) (Page 1964) and 1701.36 (0) (Page 1964)). The effects of "profits" and
"losses" from transactions in the corporation's own shares upon the corporation's sur-
plus are specified (see OHIO Rrv. CODE ANN. § 1701.32 (a) (Page 1964)) but it is
unclear from the statute whether gains are measured on acquisition or resale. See
Sprouse, supra note 731, at 897. On the operation of the Ohio act provisions generally,
see Note, Accounting For Treasury Shares, 29 U. CIN. L. REv. 235, 243-44 (1960).
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restriction would be lifted. Note, however, that the resale is treated
as a sale of new shares, which means that any excess of the resale
price over the amount of stated capital attributable to the shares
would be capital surplus. Hence, even on a break-even sale at prices
above the stated capital per share, earned surplus will be reduced
and capital surplus increased in the amount of the excess of the
purchase price over stated capital." 3 But this defect, if indeed it is a
defect,"' can be overcome by providing that on resale any excess of
the price over stated capital may be used to restore earned surplus
previously reduced. 775
If the "contraction of capital" theory is rejected, it then becomes
relevant to choose either the surplus reduction or the surplus restric-
tion technique as the means of effectuating the New Act's general
limitation on purchases of treasury shares to surplus. The restriction
technique is generally favored by accountants776 and apparently the
Model Act draftsmen because of the ease with which earned surplus
78Even where the resale price is less than the purchase price but above the
stated capital value, the contraction approach causes a greater reduction in earned
surplus than would occur under the reduction method. See R. AMORY & W. HARDEE,
MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING 331 (3d ed. D. Herwitz & D. Trautman 1958).
'Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1707, 1711, and 1714 (West 1955) providing that
earned surplus is reduced in acquisition of treasury shares but that paid-in surplus
is increased by the amount of any proceeds "insofar as an excess of net assets over
the amount of stated capital results therefrom." Id. (As to the operation of the
quoted clause, see Buttimer, Statutory Influence on Treasury Stock Accounting, 35
ACCOUNTING REV. 476, 478 (1961).) Ballantine, The Curious Fiction of Treasury
Shares, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 536, 541 (1946) states: "The proceeds do not represent
profits, but a new investment by the purchaser." 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING,
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS 309 (4th ed. 1966) states that the purpose of the
California scheme is to limit and discourage speculation by a corporation in its
own shares.
.. This provision may provoke a reaction from accountants who argue as
Ballantine does in the preceeding footnote that a new investment in a corporation
cannot give rise to earned surplus. See, e.g., AMERICAN ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATION,
ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARDS FOR CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 7
(1957); W. PATON & W. PATON, JR., CORPORATION ACCOUNTS & STATEMENTS 206
(1955); KATZ, Accounting Problems in Corporate Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. REV.
764, 784 (1941); Hackney, supra note 730, at 1393 n.166. However, it is difficult
to distinguish a statute of the sort suggested and the provision in WASH. REv.
CODE § 23A.08.170 f[ 3 (1965) permitting directors on a merger or acquisition of
substantially all the assets of another corporation for shares to allocate what would
otherwise be capital surplus on the issuance of shares to earned surplus. On this
general subject, see part 11, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 141-47.
'See de Capriles, Modern Financial Accounting (Part II), 38 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1, 30 (1963) ; Katz, supra note 775, at 788. But see W. PATON & V. PATON, JR.,
CORPORATION ACCOUNTS & STATEMENTS 212 (1955). AICPA, ACCOUNTING TRENDS
AND TECHNIQUES 263 (20th ed. 1966) indicates that over two-thirds of the companies
surveyed owning treasury shares purchased not for retirement carried them at cost, a
part of the restriction technique. To this same effect is the table, id., at 156. Few
companies deducted the cost of treasury shares from surplus. Yet, a majority of
states' statutes, including those of New York, Delaware and California, call for a
reduction of surplus on acquisition.
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can be freed in the event of break-even resale of the shares.777
However, if the New Act were amended to spell out carefully the
effect upon surplus of each type of treasury share transaction, as
would seem necessary to provide planning certainty, the statute would
be inordinately complex.778 A far simpler approach 779 would reduce
earned surplus (or capital surplus, if shareholders approve) at the
time of acquisition, label surplus from cancellation of reacquired
shares as capital surplus,78 0 make no surplus entry in the event of
I See comment appearing in 2 MODEL AcT ANN. §§ 61, 62 1 4; de Capriles
& McAniff, The Financial Provisions of the New (1961) New York Business Corpora-
tion Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1239, 1261 (1961).
' See de Capriles & McAniff, The Financial Provisions of the New (1961)
New York Business Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1239, 1261 & n.169 (1961). Cf.,
the Pennsylvania provisions described in Mulford, Corporate Distributions to Share-
holders and Other Amnendinents to the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 536, 552-56 (1958).
' The provisions suggested are modelled on Wyo. Bus. CORP. Acr § 5 (1961);
and S. C. Bus. CoRP. AcT § 12-15.17 (1962). See also Rudolph, supra note 731, at
330-31; de Capriles & McAniff, supra note 778, at 1260-61; Hills, Model Corporation
Act, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1334, 1370, 1372 (1935).
These provisions, as do those previously discussed in connection with the con-
traction of capital theory, have the added benefit of prescribing the accounting
technique for treasury shares, to which presumably accountants will adhere. See,
e.g., ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, STATUS OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS,
OPINIONS OF THE ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, OPINION No. 6 ff 13 (1965). Con-
siderable evidence exists that accountants in the past have not shown surplus restric-
tions on financial statements. See Rabel, Financial Statements Should Show Corporate
Surplus Restrictions from Treasury Stock Purchases, 95 J. ACCOUNTANCY 572 (1953) ;
data noted in note 776 supra. But see Hackney, supra note 730, at 1392-93 n.166 who
prefers the restriction technique in part because the method of accounting would then
be left to the accountants. Note that the reduction of surplus technique will also answer
problems regarding status of the shares as assets. See note 765 supra. Finally, the
reduction technique seems to provide a neater solution to cases involving constructive
retirement of the shares. Cf. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, STATUS OF ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH BULLETINS, OPINIONS OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, OPINION No.
6 12 (1965).
' This provision would prevent the revolving cancellation and reacquisition
possibility that Hackney and Rudolph see if the New (Model) Act restriction is
viewed as the sole financial regulation of share acquisitions. See note 755 spra;
Rudolph, supra note 731, at 326-31. The revolving cancellation and reacquisition
possible in New York because of use of surplus generally for repurchases is
defended by de Capriles and McAniff, supra note 778, at 1270, as a useful method
in a close corporation for corporate acquisition of a deceased or retiring partner's
shares without need of amending the articles of incorporation. They state that the
dangers in the device are exaggerated in view of the solvency test protection for
creditors. (See also, Katz, supra note 775, at 787). While the device may be of
value in closely-held corporations, it would appear quite easy to get shareholder
approval for distributions of capital surplus in such corporations. In any event,
the privilege afforded under a revolving cancellation and reacquisition statute is in
no way confined to closely-held corporations. The effect of a general grant of a
revolving cancellation and reacquisition approaches abolishing stated capital pro-
tections in favor of a test based on equitable insolvency. Since the rest of the Act
has not adopted this view, there seems to be no reason to do so with share repur-
chases.
Rudolph, supra note 731, at 331 suggests as an alternative approach, which would
permit revolving cancellation and reacquisition, requiring the same procedure for
cancellation of treasury shares as for other reductions of capital. (Cf. PA. STAT.
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distribution of the shares as a share dividend 78' and permit earned
surplus restoration in the event of sale of shares purchased out of
earned surplus up to the amount of the original purchase price.
An immediate question with such a statutory formulation is whether
some types of share acquisitions should be permitted even in the
absence of surplus.712 It is assumed that any such acquisitions from
stated capital will be subject to both the equity and the bankruptcy
tests of insolvency as previously suggested.83 Of the four exceptions
to the second set of provisions in the New Act,78 the easiest to
support is the one almost universally granted to purchases made in
ANN. tit. 15, § 1708 (1967)). He rejects this approach on the grounds that it puts
too much emphasis on cancellation as compared to the purchase and that the
reinstatement of earned surplus would be basically inconsistent with an earned
surplus test for determining legal capacity to purchase shares.
' Ballantine argues that surplus must be capitalized in connection with a
share dividend of treasury shares, even though surplus was reduced in connection
with the acquisition of the shares. See Ballantine, The Curious Fiction of
Treasury Shares, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 536, 541 (1946) ; 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STER-
LING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS 277 (4th ed. 1966). He relies on footnote dictum
in Bass v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 300, 305 n.3 (1st Cir. 1942) to the effect that
such a distribution of treasury shares would not be a stock dividend for federal
tax purposes as there had been no reduction of the corporation's earnings and
profits. That case seems unpersuasive on the corporate point because the court
assumed that state law will not require capitalization of surplus as the premise
for its conclusion. It would seem that the appropriate entries on the transactions
in question can best be determined by integrating the acquisition of the shares
and their later distribution. Thus, the effect of the transactions would be similar
to a dividend distribution in which each of the recipient shareholders took the
cash received and purchased his pro rata share of the selling shareholders' shares.
Under this scheme, treasury shares purchased out of surplus could then be issued
as a share dividend without further surplus effects. This result would be produced
under the contraction of capital theory if the amount of earned surplus capitalized
is simply the par value of the shares concerned. (See text discussion infra begin-
ning at note 825 concerning this point.) And such result would obtain under a
restriction scheme. See Hackney supra note 730, at 1397. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 511(d) (McKinney 1963) and S.C. Bus. CORP. LAW § 12-15.15(2)(1962) so
provide specifically. As to other protections that might be provided shareholders in
connection with such dividends, see note 843 infra.
'Both Wyo. Bus. CORP. AcT §5 (1961) and S.C. Bus. CORP. AcT § 12-15.17 (1962)
(essentially) retain the Model Act "notwithstanding" clause. To avoid questions as
to whether purchases for the purpose noted can be made from stated capital even if
surplus is available, the Act should be amended to provide purchases can be made
from stated capital only in the absence of available surplus. For statutory form, see
Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1364 (1935). It would appear
that capital surplus should be available for the exceptional purchases without
shareholder vote since otherwise stated capital might be reduced but capital surplus
would remain intact. Following the scheme earlier discussed, capital surplus
attributable to junior classes should be exhausted first. See part II, 42 WASH. L.
REv. at 140.
Model Act § 5 (1953 rev.) permitted share purchases for the four purposes listed
in WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.030 13 (1967) notwithstanding possible insolvency as
a result of the acquisitions. As the text following indicates, the advantages to the
corporation and its shareholder groups from such purchases do not outweigh the
creditors' interest when insolvency is imminent. Thus, the current New Act pro-
vision making such purchases subject to the insolvency test should be retained.
See note 761 supra and citations therein.
' WAsH. REv. Con § 23A.08.030 ff 3 (1967).
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good faith compromise of a debt owing to the corporation. 85 Neither
the creditors of the corporation nor its various shareholder groups
will be injured by such a transaction where it results in the corpor-
ation maximizing its return on the debts in question. 7 6 The exception
for purchases made to eliminate fractional shares, which is also
common,787 seems acceptable in view of the de minimis effect that
such transactions are likely to have on the corporation's assets and
the record-keeping convenience resulting from the shares' elimina-
tion.718  The exception for purchases or redemptions of redeemable
shares at a price not to exceed the redemption price, also common,
has been forcefully supported on the grounds that redeemable shares
are viewed by investors and creditors as a type of long-term loan
that may be paid off at any time, and that management, usually
representing common shareholders, would not undertake the trans-
actions unless the common shareholders' interest would be stronger
for the action. 89 While these arguments support the general excep-
' See WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.030(2)(1967). This exception was per-
mitted even to the prohibition against acquisition of treasury shares extant in Wash-
ington prior to 1947. See, e.g., Barto v. Nix, 15 Wash. 563, 46 P. 1033 (1896), and
cases cited in note 712. As to the generality of the exception, see 6A W. FLETCHER,
CopoRAioxs § 2857 (rev. ed. 1950) ; R. STEVENS, COmORATIONS 277 (2d ed. 1949) ;
Levy, Purchase By A Corporation of Its Own Stock, 15 MiNx. L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1930).
Neither WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.030 (2) (1967) nor its Model Act predecessor,
§ 5(b), require that the compromise be made in good faith. Even though it seems
clear that courts would imply such requirement, Texas amended the Model Act pro-
visions to require good faith by directors. See TEx. Bus. Corns. AcT, art. 2.03
(B) (1955). As a precaution, such language should be added to the New Act.
'See, e.g., R. STEVENS, CORPORATIONs 278 (2d ed. 1949). Past uses of the excep-
tion appear to have been primarily in connection with subscription or assessment
defaults on stock in insolvent corporations (see, e.g., cases cited in note 712 supra)
in which the corporation is in essence writing off a bad debt. Here the creditors'
interest is not effected adversely because no real asset decrease takes place. How-
ever, where the debtor is solvent or where the corporation's stock can be resold by
the debtor, the corporation's acquisition of the stock does effect a decrease in the
creditors' cushion of assets. This decrease seems generally acceptable because it is
likely to be small and chances for abuse are not great. Also, the corporation's liquid
assets are not decreased as a result of the transaction, except possibly to the extent
required to equalize an even number of shares with the amount of the debt. See
Kessler, supra note 732, at 657. Despite these points, Hills, Model Corporation Act,
48 HARv. L. REV. 1334, 1370-71 n. 63 (1935) would permit acquisition of only
redeemable shares for this purpose out of stated capital. See also Hackney's
qualified endorsement, Hackney, supra note 730, at 1399.
'WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.030 (1) (1967). The statutes of 31 states provide
exceptions to general share acquisition rules for fractional shares.
'See, e.g., Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 H.xv. L. REv. 1334, 1371-72 n. 64
(1935).
Kessler, mipra note 732, at 659 argues that because there is nothing in the Model
Act to prevent a corporation from issuing all of its shares as fractional shares, pur-
chases of fractions should be made only out of earned surplus. It is hard to believe
that a court faced with that set of facts would not conclude that the shares did not
constitute fractions for purposes of the exception.
Dodd, Purchase and Redemption By A Corporation of Its Own Shares: The
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tion,9 0 the size of the potential stated capital invasions here seems
significant enough to warrant application to such redemptions of the
assets test previously suggested in connection with distributions of
assets from reduction surplus.7 9 1
The final New Act exception for share acquisitions from share-
holders dissenting to organic changes authorized by the Act 792 pre-
sumably reflects the notion that the ordinary acquisition rules should
not be allowed to block the acquisition of the corporation's assets
by merger or by purchase.79" Hackney argues that to protect creditors,
dissenters' rights should only be paid out of surplus."' But the
creditors' position in most of the transactions concerned can be
determined only by examining the financial position of the acquiring
or surviving corporation, 95 which position is quite unrelated to the
amount of the acquired corporation's surplus. It would thus appear
that problems of creditor protection in connection with such trans-
actions can be better dealt with by specific regulation of the sale
or merger rather than through repurchase limitations; thus, the cur-
rent exception should be retained. 79
Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 697, 724-25 (1941). See also Note, Redemption
of Preferred Shares, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 888, 889 (1935).
"But see Kessler, supra note 732, at 654, who argues: "Even if a redeemable
shareholder [sic] be regarded as a species of a corporate creditor, is there anyjustification for favoring him in preference to the other, and the only legally
recognized, creditors, which is the real effect of such a grant of power?" Kessler
nowhere discredits Dodd's analysis; indeed, he seems to agree that redeemable
shares are commonly viewed as a type of debt. Id. at 645. On the general resemblance
of redeemable shares to debt, see Jones, Redeemable Corporate Securities, 5 S. CAL.
L. REV. 83, 87-88 (1931).
" See text supra beginning at note 683. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.440 (1958)
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513(c) (McKinney 1963) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §
1.137(2) (Page 1954). This test is suggested by Dodd's statement that the corporation
will scarcely redeem shares unless it has a substantial margin of assets over liabilities
after paying the redemption price, see Dodd, supra note 789, at 725, and serves as a
check on the second assertion.
Note that the test proposed is a substantial change from the test in the New Act
which requires only that net assets after a redemption of a class of shares exceed
the liquidation preference of shares having prior or equal rights to the assets of the
corporation. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.16.090 (1965).
-WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.030 (3) (1967).
"See, e.g., Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1372 n. 65
(1935) ; Kessler, supra note 732, at 658.
"' Hackney, supra note 730, at 1399 states: "It might seem better not to allow
the merger or sale to go through where there are dissenters sufficient to demand
withdrawals of capital."
'In a merger or consolidation, the surviving corporation is liable for all of the
obligations of the disappearing corporations. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.20.060 (5)
(1965). According to Darrell, The Use of Reorganiriation Techniques in Corporate
Acquisitions, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1183, 1202 (1957), most asset acquisitions are ac-
companied by an express assumption of at least some of the transferor's liabilities.
" A number of corporation statutes go on to provide an exception for situations
,%here the corporation has either an option to repurchase shares or a binding
obligation to repurchase shares. See, e.g., N. C. GEX. STAT. § 55-52 (b) (4) (1965),
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Three questions concerning the financial aspects of the New Act
provisions remain.797 The first is whether the acquisition of shares
by a corporation pursuant to either the exercise of a conversion
privilege contained in its articles of incorporation or a recapitalization
exchange constitutes a "purchase" under either set of New Act regu-
lations. From the standpoint of the corporation's creditors and vari-
ous shareholder groups, it would appear that the initial acquisition
should be integrated with the issuance of new shares with the critical
issue being whether the newly issued shares have sufficient consider-
ation backing their issuance. It is not clear, however, that such
result obtains under the New Act; 798 hence, the New Act should
and CAL. CORP. CODE § 1706 (e) (West 1955), relating to shares issued to employees;
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.35 (a) (5) and (7) (Page 1964) relating to repurchase
contracts generally and shareholder repurchase rights granted in articles of incorpo-
ration. It would appear that these provisions are designed primarily to assist
closely-held corporations in affording compensation to employees and in retaining
ownership in a closely.knit group. Serious consideration should be given to an
exception for shares issued to employees other than officers and directors subject to
either an option to repurchase or a binding obligation to repurchase. Such a
provision would give corporations freedom to use shares as a compensation device
but would avoid the possibility of controlling shareholders being able to resell their
shares to the corporation in the absence of surplus. See generally Dodd, supra note
739, at 715-16.
" Other problems of lesser importance concern how purchases out of stated
capital are to be recorded in the corporation's accounts and how shares so acquired
are treated. Consider the purchase or redemption of redeemable shares at theift
redemption price, which includes a premium over the shares' par value. Under
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.100 (1965), if a statement of cancellation is filed, stated
capital is reduced by the acquisition of redeemable shares to the extent of the part
of stated capital which is represented by the shares. But what happens to the
excess? If the corporation has no surplus available, stated capital is reduced (or
least would be under the amendment proposed supra note 782); but which stated
capital account is reduced? The stated capital attributable to the redeemable
shares? To junior shares? It would appear appropriate to charge all such excesses
over the stated capital attributable to the shares repurchased to the stated capital ofjunior classes until exhausted.
Redeemable shares are cancelled on acquisition and are restored to the status of
authorized but unissued shares unless the articles provide that on acquisition such
shares should be removed from the authorized category. WASH. REv. CODE §
23A.16.100 (1) (1965). Other reacquired shares become treasury shares on acquisi-
tion, even if acquired out of stated capital. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23A.04.010
(8) (1965), 23A.16.110 (1965). But if this classification is to be adhered to, the
following changes should be made in the New Act: (1) consideration received from
the sale of such treasury shares must be transferred to stated capital up to the amount
paid for the shares; (2) such shares must be treated as unissued shares for pur-
poses of share dividends; and (3) on cancellation of such shares, no further reduc-
tion of stated capital is made. See Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARV. L. REv.
1334, 1374 n.74 (1935). At the cost of not completely restoring stated capital on
resale, it would appear simpler to deem such shares as authorized unissued shares.
See id. at 1373.
Several contrary indications can be found in the Act. If the shares acquired
are not redeemable, they apparently are treasury shares under WASH. REv. CODE§ 23A.04.010 (8) (1965). This suggests a surplus reduction on their acquisition
under the first set of New Act provisions. But this step and the provisions
regulating the type of surplus arising on cancellation (WASH. REv. CODE §§
23A.16.110 (1965) and 23A.16.130 (1965)) do not mesh with the provisions in
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be amended to clarify treatment of these transactions.799
The second question is how the various provisions in the New
Act will be (and should be) applied to an installment acquisition by
the corporation of its own shares. The insolvency limitation appearing
in the second set of New Act provisions states that "[N]o purchase
WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.150 5 (1965) which provide that consideration for
shares issued in exchange for other shares shall be deemed to be the stated capital
then represented by the shares exchanged or converted and that part of the surplus,
if any, transferred to stated capital upon the issuance of shares for the shares so
exchanged or converted. This language and the language in WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 23A.16.010 (5) (1965), and 23A.16.030 (4) (1965), stating that share exchanges can
occur by article amendment suggest that the acquisition of shares is not a purchase.
Hackney, supra note 730, at 1399 assumes that shares received on both types of
exchange are purchased. Kessler, supra note 732, at 656 n.58, feels that acquisition
of shares in connection with a conversion is not a purchase but argues that
recapitalization exchanges should be purchases to help avoid problems in deter-
mining fairness in recapitalizations. In Kessler's favor is the fact that those state
statutes considering the problem appear to stop with exchanges pursuant to conver-
sion privileges. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1707 (West 1955) ; GA. CODE ANN. §
22-1828 (b) (1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. AmN. § 17-3004 (Supp. 1961); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 15-801 (9) (1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.136 (1953). It is
difficult to distinguish recapitalization exchanges from conversion of shares, how-
ever, insofar as ultimate effect on the corporation's dividend capacity is con-
cerned.
One problem with special treatment for recapitalization exchanges is determining
precisely which transactions are recapitalizations. For this purpose, it would
appear that the exceptions ought to be limited to the part of a transaction which
involves an exchange of shares. If debt or cash is exchanged in addition to shares,
then only the portion of the transaction equal to the ratio of the value of shares
exchanged to the value of total consideration exchanged should be considered not a
purchase. The acquisition of the remaining shares would be subject to the surplus
rules.
Hackney, supra note 730, at 1399, suggests that an exception should be added
to the New (Model) Act exceptions to permit conversions and recapitalization
exchanges out of stated capital. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1828 (b) (1966); KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-3004 (Supp. 1961) and MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 15-801 (9) (1967)
so provide on conversion exchanges. This approach, however, only avoids one of
the problems resulting from characterization of the transaction as a purchase. If the
transactions are purchases, the "price" paid for the shares acquired appears to be
the value of newly issued shares and correspondingly the initial surplus or stated
capital reduction will be equal to that amount. A portion of this reduction can be
retrieved by cancelling the acquired shares. But the price would also apparently
govern the issuance of new shares with the effect that any excess of value over the
par value of the newly-issued shares will be capital surplus. This problem can be
avoided by considering the price of the acquired shares as the par value of the
acquired shares, or if none, then the stated capital represented by the shares ex-
changed. Though this appears to be a rather odd method of determining the pur-
chase price of shares received, this alternative would reduce the accounting for the
transaction to only that required by WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.150 15 (1965), as is
suggested in text. Assuming that this is what Hackney meant by his suggestion,
his approach would permit stated capital to be applied to stated capital deficits
between shares acquired and those issued without shareholder vote. It is unclear
which class of stated capital he would reduce, but in any event free shifting of
stated capital appears to be far in excess of the corporations' need for capital
structure flexibility. (Note that if previous suggestions, see part I, 41 WASH. L.
REV. at 231, are followed, convertible shares would not be a problem here.) Thus,
it would appear better to provide that conversion and recapitalization exchanges are
not purchases for purposes of the Act. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1707 (West 1955);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.136 (1953); Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARV.
L. REV. 1334, 1370 (1935).
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of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the
corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would
make it insolvent."'8 00 The words "payment for" were added to the
Act's Model Act predecessor section in 1957; 1 hence, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the insolvency limitation is to be applied
both at the time of purchase (presumably the date of contract for
the shares) and when each installment payment is made on the
contract. 02 This view is in accord with the clear majority of court
decisions on the question and appears to be the best resolution of
the interests involved.80 3 It appears that both the surplus reduction
occurring in the first set of provisions and the surplus restriction
appearing in the second set of provisions are applied only at the
time of purchase. 804 As Herwitz has carefully demonstrated, this
application of the two financial limitations avoids many difficult
problems inherent in installment by installment application of the
surplus test with no major disadvantages. 80 5 Hence, if the Act's
surplus tests are amended, all that need be done on this issue is to
make clear that the amended surplus test is to be applied to install-
ment purchases at the outset.
The third and final financial issue that can be raised about the
New Act provisions is whether share repurchases should be per-
mitted from extraordinary dividend sources, i.e., current earnings or
WAsu. Rv. CoDE § 23A.08.030 1 4 (1967).
Compare Model Act § 5 (1953 rev.) with Model Act § 5 (1957 rev.).
""See Her witz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 Haxv. L.
REv. 303, 322 (1965).
8See id. at 305-311, 321 for a review of the cases and policy considerations.
A fairly good case can be made for requiring the insolvency test only at the outset,
particularly if the surplus test is so applied. See note 805 infra. But as I-erwitz
points out, id., it seems unlikely that courts or legislatures will allow shareholders
to share in any guise on a parity with creditors in the event of insolvency.
One difficulty with the New (Model) Act provisions is that it is not clear what
the selling shareholder's rights are in the event of insolvency. See Herwitz, supra
at 309. Kessler, supra note 732, at 677, 687, attempts to solve this problem by apply-
ing the insolvency cut off at the outset, giving the corporation's obligations to the
selling shareholder priority over rights of shareholders, and subordinating the
selling shareholder's interest to that of creditors of the corporation. It is not clear
precisely when the selling shareholder's interest is subordinated. This approach
also would seem to permit a corporation on the brink of insolvency to make another
payment on the shareholder's obligation, which would be prohibited under the New
(Model) Act. Finally, it is unclear why the selling shareholder must end up a
quasi-creditor in the event of insolvency rather than as a shareholder with respect
to shares as yet unpurchased.
' Under WAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010 (8) (1965), shares become treasury
shares on subsequent acquisition, which would seem to occur at the same time as the
shares are considered purchased for purposes of WAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.030
fTff 1, 2 (1967).
'See Herwitz, supra note 802, at 313-20.
The surplus limitation could be applied at the outset, on an installment-by-
installment basis, or both at the outset and on an installment basis, as is done with
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depletion reserves (if retained as a source). There would appear to
be no valid financial reason why such repurchases should not be
permitted .816
The last issue arising under the New provisions is whether those
provisions should have gone beyond financial controls in an attempt
to protect against such other possible abuses 0 7 as use of the power
to purchase shares to insure or acquire voting control,8 08 to benefit
the insolvency limitation. Maximum protection for creditors would be afforded by
dual application of the surplus test. But had the entire amount been paid to the
departing shareholder, and the corporation's fortunes declined for unforeseeable
reasons, creditors would receive no such protection. The departing shareholders'
agreeing to accept an installment obligation from a corporation with sufficient
surplus in essence permits the corporation to keep the assets for the creditors'
protection during the period of the obligation. It seems harsh to penalize the
departing shareholder for having done so. (One need not pursue this argument
much further, however, to conclude that the insolvency limitation ought to be
applied only at the outset also. See Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Co., 112 N.J. EQ.
34, 163 A. 140 (Ch. 1932).) As between the outset test and an installment by install-
ment test, creditors will receive greater protection generally under the former.
Note, however, that such application will prevent some companies from making re-
purchases that might well have made them under an installment by installment test.
See Herwitz supra at 320 for planning suggestions.
" Such is the logical result of permitting share repurchases to the extent of a cor-
poration's dividend capacity. See text supra beginning note 759. One deterrent to adop-
tion of such a change is the resulting statutory complexity. However, while the list of
sources might be extended by such action, it would appear that the only addition
required to the portion of the statute tracing consequences of later treasury share
transactions would be language permitting restoration of the purchase source in
the event of a break-even or better sale.
If the corporation has no surplus, it may be argued that to permit it to use
extraordinary sources to repurchase its own shares will tempt management to bail
out favored shareholders from a shaky situation. But if the requirements discussed
in the text paragraph following are imposed, the possibility is substantially
eliminated.
'The possibility of equitable remedies for the abuses listed is beyond the
scope of this paper. For difficulties with such remedies, see, e.g., Comment, Buying
Out Insurgent Shareholders With Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L. J. 308 (1960);
Note, Is There A Fiduciary Duty Between Majority and Minority Shareholders,
36 CALIF. L. REv. 325 (1948). Additional remedies for the abuses may be available
under rule lob-5. See Note, Rile 10b-5 and Purchase By A Corporation Of Its
Own Shares, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 307, 322-24 (1966); Israels, Corporate Purchases of
Its Own Shares-Are There New Overtones, 50 CORNELL L. Q. 620 (1965).
'Hendricks v. Mill Engineering & Supply Co., 68 Wn. 2d 463, 413 P.2d 811
(1966) appears to be as clear a case of this abuse as could be presented. Hendricks
in a two year campaign to acquire control of the corporation acquired 269V shares
of common stock in the corporation and 25 shares of voting redeemable preferred
stock. The majority directors group owned 288% shares of common stock. Before
Hendricks could vote his majority position for new directors, the old board
redeemed his preferred shares. The court, relying on Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch.
47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960), concluded that the directors had "in the exercise of their
honest business judgment adopted a valid method of eliminating what appeared to
them a clear threat to the future of the corporation." Id. at 493. The ease with
which the court reached its decision is surprising in view of the extensive
criticism of the Kors doctrine. See, e.g., Comment, Buying Out Insurgent Share-
holders With Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308 (1960); Israels, Corporate Pur-
chase of Its Own Shares-Are There New Overtones, 50 CORNELL L. Q. 620, 624
1965). Even if the Kors line of cases is accepted, that line could have been easily
distinguished on the ground that the sellers in both cases receiving the Delaware
court's approval (Kors and Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) )
were willing insurgent sellers. In Hendricks, by virtue of the fact that the shares con-
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majority shareholders financially,80 9 to silence insurgents, l and to
manipulate the price of the corporation's stock."1 ' While all potential
abuses cannot be eliminated by simple statutory amendments, many
would be alleviated""2 through adoption of the controls present in
cerned were redeemable, the seller was not a willing seller. (It is interesting that the
court chose not to deal with the various authorities concerned with abuse of the redemp-
tion procedure. See, e.g., State ex rel. Waldman v. Miller-Wohl Co., Inc., 42 Del.
73, 28 A.2d 148 (1942); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947);
Specht v. Eastwood-Nealley Corp., 25 N. J. Super. 69, 95 A.2d 485 (App. Div.
1953)). Moreover, the result of the purchases in the Kors and Cheff cases merely
eliminated potential insurgents and avoided a potential proxy fight whereas the
result of the acquisition in Hendricks was a shift of control from Hendricks to
the directors presently in office. In short, in Hendricks the court itself, and not
the shareholders, decided who should run the corporation. From all that appears in
the case, the majority directors had an equal opportunity throughout the period that
Hendricks was acquiring shares to acquire sufficient shares to give themselves
majority ownership of the corporation's shares. If they did not have such an
opportunity, particularly in connection with the redeemable shares, then the court
might have ordered that the shares be put up for public auction as a solution to the
disharmony present. See Andrews, The Stockholders Right to Equal Opportunity In
the Sale of Shares, 78 HARv. L. Rxv. 505, 562-63 (1965).
The Hendricks case also demonstrates how far the Kors doctrine has taken the
courts away from an inquiry into whether maintenance of control was the dom-
inant motive for the directors' action in acquiring the shares. It is difficult not to
conclude that any acquisition of swing shares from an unwilling seller is not
undertaken primarily to maintain the directors' control of the corporation. Yet the
court was able to uphold the transaction without any determination that the direc-
tors' "honest" belief that Hendricls acquisition of control would harm the corpora-
tion outweighed their obvious desire-to maintain their offices.
I See, e.g., H. BALLANTinE, CoRP'oRTIONs 609 (rev. ed. 1946).
'See, e.g., Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962) and cases
cited in note 808 supra.
'See, e.g., Dodd, Purchase and Redemption By A Corporation of Its Own
Shares: 77Te Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. Rxv. 697, 706 (1941).
In this connection, the recent financial literature concerning the use of share
repurchases as a means of increasing the corporation's earning per share (and
presumably share price) and improving the capital structure "mix" is of interest.
See articles cited supra note 759 and Bierman & West, The Acquisition of Common
Stock By The Corporate Issuer, 21 J. FINAN c 687 (1966) (arguing that the same
financial results can be achieved by a dividend payment and a reverse stock split
and that favorable tax results for shareholders involved is the real factor leading to
increased purchases of shares by corporations). A number of financial commentators
feel that full disclosures should be made of corporations' repurchase plans so that
selling shareholders can make informed decisions as to the potential value of their
shares. See Stevenson, Corporate Stock Reacquisitions, 41 AccouNTING REv. 312(1966); Bierman & West, supra at 696; A ROBICHEK & S. MYERS, OPTIMAL
FINANCING DECISIONS 133 (1965). Stevenson, supra at 313, determined that rela-
tively few corporations actively acquiring their own stock ever reported that fact
in the Wall Street Journal. For discussions of possible duty to disclose under rule
10b-5, see L. Loss, 3 SEcuIrrms REGULATIoN 1453-54 (2d ed. 1961) ; Zilber, Corpo-
rate Tender Offers for Their Own Stock: Some Legal and Financial Considera-
tions, 33 U. CiNN. L. REv. 315, 336-38 (1964); Note, Rule 10b-5 and Purchase
By A Corporation of Its Own Shares, 61 Nw. U. L. Rv. 307, 320-22 (1966); and
Comment, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal Securities
Law: A New Challenge for Rule 10b-5, 33 U. CH, L. REv. 359, 361-72 (1966).
Other abuses are listed in Nemmers, The Power Of A Corporation To Purchase
Its Own Stock, 1942 Wis. L. Rv. 161, 165-67; Dodd, supra note 739, at 706; Levy,
Purchase By A Corporation Of Its Own Stock, 15 MINN. L. REv. 1, 22-25 (1930);
Nussbaum, Acquisition By A Corporation Of Its Own Stock, 35 CoLUa. L. PEv.
971 (1935).
'As to the efficacy of provisions involving a shareholder vote in resolving
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the original version of the recent North Carolina act: purchases
must either be made after a pro rata offer to all of the corporation's
shareholders or all of a class of shareholders,8 13 or be approved by
a majority of shareholders of the class to be repurchased after full
disclosure of any plan to purchase shares. 14 These provisions, subject
to an exception for purchases pursuant to restrictions upon the
transfer of the corporation's shares, 15 would be a valuable addition
to the Act.
C. Share Dividends.
The old act provided that a corporation could pay a dividend of
its own shares only from surplus, which for this purpose included
unrealized appreciation.816 It required that surplus be transferred to
such abuses, see Zilber, Corporate Tender Offers For Their Own Stock: Some
Legal and Financial Considerations, 33 U. CibN. L. Rv. 315, 330-32 (1964);
Kessler, supra note 732, at 660-74; Comment, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders
With Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L. J. 308, 318-20 (1960); and Kennedy, Transac-
tions By A Corporation In Its Own Shares, 19 Bus. LAw. 319, 331 (1964).
13 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52 (c) (2) (1965), requires pro rata purchases from the
shareholders involved. However, as Kessler, supra note 732, at 672 points out, this
appears impractical since the refusal of any shareholder in the class to participate
would defeat the purchase plan. A pro rata offer to shareholders of the class would
appear sufficient.
"
14 See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52 (c) (2) and (3) (1965). Purchases of the type
discussed in text immediately preceeding are generally free of these requirements.
It would appear, however, that redeemable shares should be chosen for redemption
by lot or pro rata (cf. New York Stock Exchange Company Manual § 1 (9), at
A 24) and that purchases of redeemable shares should be made only after adequate
notice to shareholders of the class. See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52 (f) (1965) (requiring
such notice in the event of default in payment of accrued dividends). It has been
argued that corporations should not be able to purchase preferred shares with
accrued dividends without favorable vote of that class. See Comment, Purchase
By A Corporation Of Its Own Preferred Shares With Dividends in Arrears, 14
U. CHL L. REv. 66, 74 (1946). However, as Dodd, supra note 732, at 726 notes, the
real difficulty is not with the corporation's power to purchase shares in such a situation
but rather with the strength of the preferred's interest in the event of default.
In 1963, the North Carolina statute was amended to allow free purchase (subject
to financial regulations) from any shareholder of shares listed on any securities
exchange regulated by the S.E.C. or other regulatory authority of the U.S. Govern-
ment. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52 (c) (6) (1965).
1'See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52 (c) (4) (1965). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52 (c) (5)
(1965) makes a further exception for shares acquired in connection with stabilizing
operations authorized by the S.E.C.
Kessler, supra note 732, at 687-88, offers a more stringent set of regulations.
Under his scheme, a corporation could purchase shares from earned surplus only
with two-thirds approval of holders of each class of shares (whether or not voting)
immediately prior to the reaching of the offer by the corporation and by lot selec-
tion or pro rata offer, as shareholders choose after full disclosure. He would permit
the latter purchase methods to be avoided with respect to purchases of up to 5% of its
outstanding shares if two-thirds of shareholders of each class, voting or not,
authorize the corporation to do so at least one year after incorporation.
Other statutes requiring a shareholder vote at least in certain circumstances are
listed in Comment, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders With Corporate Funds,
70 YALE L.J. 308, 319 n.54 (1960).
"See WAsH. REv. CODE §23.01.250(4) (b) and (a) (1958). On the general sub-
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capital stock equal to the aggregate par value of shares issued, if any,s"'
or in the event no par shares were issued, apparently the value
attributed to the shares by the directors."" The act prohibited
payment of a dividend in shares of any class to shareholders of
another class unless the articles so provided or such payment was
authorized by the vote of the holders of a majority of the shares
of the class in which the payment is to be made."1 9 The -New Act
provisions regarding share dividends differ only in the following
substantive respects:8 20  (1) share dividends may not be declared
when the corporation is insolvent;8 21 (2) dividends of treasury shares
reacquired out of surplus of the corporation may be declared without
further capitalization of surplus;821 2 (3) the amount of surplus trans-
ferred to stated capital in the event par value shares are distributed
must be at least equal to the aggregate par value; 21 (4) the amount
ject of uses and abuses of share dividends, see Note, Share Dividends-their
Validity and Desirability, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1949). See also M. SussMAN,
THE STOCK DIVDEND 73-97 (1962).
' WAsH. REV. CODE § 23.01.250(6) (a) (1958).
"8Neither WASH. REv. CODE §23.01.250(6) (1958) nor WAsH. REv. CODE
§ 23.01.150(1) (b) (1958) (regulating consideration for share issuances) covers the
point. However, WAsH. REv. CODE §23.01.010 (10) (1958) includes as part of a
corporation's capital stock "such amounts as may have been transferred from surplus
upon the allotment of stock dividends in shares having no par value" which clearly
suggests that some corporate group has the power to determine how much surplus
is capitalized on such distributions. But that provision also suggests that no
surplus need be capitalized on a dividend of no par shares, which is hard to square
with the language in WAsH. REv. CODE §23.01.250(4)(b) (1958). See generally
Gose, Legal Significance of "Capital Stock," 32 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 18 (1957);
Greenough & Ayer, Funds Available For Corporate Dividends in Washington,
9 WAs H. L. ZEv. 123, 137 (1934).
8.8 WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01250(6) (c) (1958).
'WAsH. REv. CODE §23A.08.420(4) (1965) authorizes share dividends from
unissued shares out of any unreserved and unrestricted surplus. It is assumed that
unrealized appreciation, if recognized under the Act, will be capital surplus, and
hence available for share dividends. See part II, 42 WAsH. L. REv. at 153. Also,
WAsH. REv. CODE §23A.08.420 q1 (1965) prohibits declaration and payment of
share dividends in violation of restrictions in the articles of incorporation. While
not specifically mentioned in the old act, the latter would appear to be a limitation
on share dividends there also. On the issue of no par shares, the amount of surplus
capitalized is to be determined by the directors. WAsH. REv. CODE §23A.08.4201 1 (1965). Finally, WAsH. REv. CODE §23A.08.420(5) (1965) contains a provision
relating to share dividends of shares of other classes identical in substance to the
old provision.
I WAsH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.420 1 (1965). The provision goes on to prohibit
share dividends "where the payment thereof would render the corporation insolvent."
The fact that a share dividend could not possibly render a corporation insolvent
and does not cause a distribution of assets suggests that the insolvency test was
inadvertently applied to share dividends. See Sprouse, Accounting Principles and
Cortoration Statutes, 35 AccoIrrNiG REv. 246, 254 (1960).
IWAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420(3) (1965). See discussion supra note 781. It is
assumed for purposes of this section that treasury shares to be distributed as a dividend
at some point--either acquisition of at the time of proposed distribution-cause a reduc-
tion of surplus equal to the price of the shares.
' WAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 (4) (a) (1965).
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of surplus per share capitalized in connection with a distribution of
no par shares must be disclosed to the shareholders concurrently
with the distribution; 824 and (5) a split-up of the issued shares of
any class into a greater number of shares of the same class without
increasing the stated capital of the corporation is construed not to
be a share dividend for purposes of the New Act provisions. 25
The primary inquiry that may be raised about these provisions is
whether they should have incorporated the views of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2 the New York Stock
Exchange 2 and the Securities and Exchange Commission8 2 ' regarding
requirements for any distribution of shares to be designated a "stock
dividend." Generally, these authorities define a stock dividend in
terms of the intent of the corporation to give shareholders "some
ostensibly separate evidence of a part of their respective interests
in accumulated corporate earnings without distribution of cash or
other property.81 2  Despite the fact that they characterize the receipt
"WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.420(4)(b) (1965). It is clear under this provision
that some amount of surplus must be capitalized in connection with a dividend of
no par shares. However, this requirement can be avoided under the New Act by
the simple expedient of labelling the distribution as a stock split. See WASH.
REV. CODE §23A.08.420 fJ 2 (1965); D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 344 n.11
(1966).
"WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.420 iI 2 (1965). Even if the proposals later pre-
sented are not adopted, this provision should be amended to expand the concept of a
split-up beyond transactions in which stated capital does not change. See Manne,
Accounting For Share Issues Under Modern Corporation Laws, 54 Nw. U. L. REV.
285, 319 (1959).
'See AICPA, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, Ch. 7B (1953).
"7See N.Y. STOCK EXCH. Co. MANUAL §§ A13 (1954-66), A14 (1954-67).
' See L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 16.32 (2d ed.
1966) indicating that the SEC agrees with the pronouncements of the AICPA on
the matter of accounting for stock dividends.
" AICPA, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, Ch. 7B ff 1 (1953). A "split-
up" may be identified by the desire of the corporation to increase the number of
outstanding shares for the purpose of effecting a reduction in their unit market
price and, thereby, of obtaining a wider distribution and improved marketability
of the shares. Id. at [ 2. Distributions of shares of another class are not covered
by this bulletin. Id. at II 3.
Although the New York Stock Exchange Company Manual makes reference to
AICPA ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, Ch. 7B in its discussion of stock
dividends, it goes on to define as a stock dividend all share distributions represent-
ing less than 25% of the number of shares outstanding prior to the distribution.
(Classification of the distribution as a stock dividend means that earned surplus
equal to the fair value of the shares distributed must be transferred to the corpora-
tion's permanent capitalization.) Distributions of 100% or more of the number of
shares outstanding prior to the distribution are split-ups. Distributions of more
than 25%, but less than 100%, may be classified by the Exchange as stock dividends if
"such distributions assume the character of stock dividends through repetition
under circumstances not consistent with the true intent and purpose of stock split-
ups." See N.Y. STOCK ExcH. Co. MANUAL § A13 at 235 (1966); Id. at § A14
(1964-67).
Compare with these definitions the typical legal definition of a stock dividend
as any share distribution accompanied by a capitalization of earnings and of a
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of a stock dividend as not giving rise to income,8 30 they state: 83 1
... [A] stock dividend does not, in fact, give rise to any change
whatsoever in either the corporation's assets or its respective share-
holders' proportionate interests therein. However, it cannot fail to
be recognized that, merely as a consequence of the expressed purpose
of the transaction and its characterization as a dividend in related
notices to shareholders and the public at large, many recipients of
stock dividends look upon them as distributions of corporate earnings
and usually in an amount equivalent to the fair value of the additional
shares received. Furthermore, it is presumed that such views of recipi-
ents are materially strengthened in those instances, which are by far
the most numerous, where the issuances are so small in comparison
with the shares previously outstanding that they do not have any
apparent effect upon the share market price and, consequently, the
market value of the shares previously held remains unchanged. The
committee therefore believes that where these circumstances exist the
corporation should in the public interest account for the transaction
by transferring from earned surplus to the category of permanent
capitalization (represented by the capital stock and capital surplus
accounts) an amount equal to the fair value of the additional shares
issued. Unless this is done, the amount of earnings which the share-
holder may believe to have been distributed to him will be left, except
to the extent otherwise dictated by legal requirements, in earned sur-
plus subject to possible further similar stock issuances or cash distri-
butions.
Shareholders of closely-held corporations are presumed to have such
intimate knowledge of the corporation's affairs as to preclude the
incorrect implications noted; thus, in connection with distributions
stock split-up as any increase in shares without an increase in stated capital.
See, e.g., In re Fosdick's Trust, 176 N.Y.S.2d 966, 152 N.E.2d 228 (1958).
AICPA, AccorrIN sREsEAR H BULL. No. 43, Ch. 7B, 6 (1953).
Two recent statutes dealing with allocation of trust receipts to principal and
income, N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRusTs LAW §11-2.1(e)(2) (McKinney 1967)
and PA. STAT. Ax. tit. 20, § 3470.5 (1964), both take the unfortunate view that
small share distributions (6% or less) are income. While this approach will
simplify the trustee's problems in connection with such distributions (see, e.g.,
Flickinger, A Trustee's Nightmare: Allocation of Stock Dividends Between In-
come and Principal, 43 B.U.L. REv. 199 (1963); Dunham, A Trustee's Dilemma
As to Principal and Income, 26 U. CHL L. REv. 405 (1959)), it does so at the cost
of propounding the confusion surrounding share distributions. The trustee's problem
is as effectively solved by the Massachusetts and Uniform Principal and Income
Act rules that all share distributions are principal and the beneficiaries' interests
could have been protected equally through careful application of the trustee's duty
to advance the interests of both income and principal beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
Barclay, Stock Dividends Belong to Principal, 103 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 482, 484
(1964).( AICPA, ACCOnJNTING REsEARcH BULL. No. 43, Ch. 7B, 10 (1953).
In connection with split-ups, the absence of circumstances that might mislead
shareholders means that earned surplus need not be capitalized in excess of the
amount required by the consideration requirements. The bulletin goes on to
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by such corporations there is no need to capitalize earned surplus
other than to the extent required by the basic legal consideration
requirements. 32  As a guide to when the relative size of the share
distribution is large enough to influence the unit price of the stock
materially, the authorities state that few share distributions of less
than 20 or 25% of the number of shares previously outstanding will
not have the effect indicated.833
The New Act's general approach of enabling, 34 rather than re-
quiring,835 corporations to meet these accounting requirements appears
recommend that every effort be made to avoid the use of the word "dividend" in
related corporate resolutions, notices and announcements. Id. at 1 11.
In addition to the AICPA's justifications stated in text, several other explana-
tions of the market value capitalization approach have been offered. Thus, W.
KARRENBROCK & H. SIMONS, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING (COMPREHENSIVE) 699 (3d
ed. 1958) argue that a stock dividend is in essence two transactions: (1) the pay-
ment by the corporation of a cash dividend; and (2) the return of such payment
to the corporation in exchange for shares of stock. As Herwitz points out, how-
ever, both parts of this transaction have independent legal and tax consequences
making it difficult to accept such a constructive view of a share dividend. See
D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 347 (1966); see also Manne, supra note 825, at
322-23. R. MILROY & R. WALDEN, ACCOUNTING THEORY AND PRACTICE-INTEuIE-
DIATE 534 (1960) believe that a better construction of the transaction is that
capitalization of market value recognizes the opportunity cost to the issuer of
issuing additional shares without consideration. The difficulty with this view of
a share dividend is that it is not clear why the same analysis does not apply to a
share split-up. Moreover, it is unclear that the corporation has lost any oppor-
tunity to issue shares simply by increasing the number of shares outstanding.
="AICPA, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, Ch. 7B 1f 12 (1953). Criticism of
the exception appears in Wilcox, Accounting for Stock Dividends: A Dissent from
Current Recommended Practice, 96 J. ACCOUNTANCY 176, 180-81 (1953).
It is unclear whether the accounting requirements apply to distributions of
treasury shares. See Sprouse, Accounting Principles and Corporation Statutes,
35 ACCOUNTING REv. 246, 255 (1960).
'AICPA, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, Ch. 7B 13, 15 & 16. Compare
the N.Y. Stock Exchange rules noted in note 829 supra.
There is no doubt as to companies' adherence to the standards described in text.
According to AICPA, ACCOUNTING TRENDS & TECHNIQUES 254 (20th ed. 1966), all
companies declaring stock dividends in 1965 reduced earned surplus in connection
therewith, a result that would not obtain under the legal rules. See note 842 infra.
"The Model Act predecessor of WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 (1965), § 40, as
originally adopted provided simply that on the issuance of par value shares surplus
equal to the par value should be transferred to stated capital. See I MODEL ACT
§40(d)(1) (1950 rev.). The language "at least" was inserted after the word
"surplus" in the 1955 Addendum to the Act, I MODEL ACT ANN. § 40(c) to (e) ff 1,
for the purpose of enabling corporations to meet the accounting requirements. Id. at
114. It should be noted, however, that the New (Model) Act language does not fully
capture the accounting technique for the language suggests that surplus in excess of
par value may be transferred to stated capital. As the quotation in text in note 831
indicates, accountants would permit any excess over par value to be transferred to
capital surplus.
m'TENN. CODE ANN. §§48-211, 48-708 (1964) are the only provisions in the
United States requiring that surplus equal to the fair value of the shares distributed
as a share dividend be transferred to stated capital in connection with the dividend.
Note that this statute is both more liberal and more conservative than the accoun-
tants' requirements. The accountants require that only earned surplus be used to sup-
port a share dividend whereas the Tennessee statute will permit any kind of surplus
to be used. But the accountants do not require, as the Tennessee statute does, that all
the surplus be transferred to stated capital.
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to be the best current solution 36 Considerable doubt has been raised
about their propriety as accounting requirements.117  Thus, it is not
clear why a corporation should treat a share dividend as a distribu-
tion of current earnings simply because some shareholders may incor-
rectly think of it that way.8 " And it is also unclear why the market
effect of a share dividend should be taken into account where a
similar effect, arising from basically the same causes, is ignored in
The 1960 Study Bill prepared by the Joint Legislative Committee to Study
Revision of Corporation Laws in New York embodied the accountants' formula.
See Proposed N. Y. Bus. Corp. Law, S. Int. 3124, S. Pr. 3316, 183d Sess. § 5.12(a) (5)(1960). The proposal was dropped for a variety of reasons including the possibility
of unpredictable repercussions in trust law and conflict with the stock dividend
provisions of the New York Personal Property Law. See deCapriles & McAniff,
The Financial Provisions of the New (1961) New York Business Corporations
Law, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1267 (1961).
If the accounting requirements were to be required by statute, it would appear
necessary to promulgate a definition of a closely-held corporation which would be
excluded from the requirements, to define with precision what types of distributions
constitute a stock dividend, and to determine the accounting requirements regarding
a distribution of treasury shares. The Tennessee provisions referred to above under-
take none of these tasks.
'Only CoLO. REv. STAT. §31-5-10 (1963); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §33-356
(1958); IND. ANN. STAT. §25-211 (1960); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §37 (1957);
Miss. CODE ANY. § 5309-81 (1964); NEB. Bus. CoRP. AcT § 42 (1963); N.Y. Bus.
CoRP,. LAw § 511 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-51 (1965); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-19-44 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1702.1 (1967); S. C. CODE ANN.§ 12-5.15 (Supp. 1966); S. D. Sess. Laws ch. 22. § 42 (1965); UTAHa CODE ANN.§ 16.10.41 (1962); and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.39 (1965) contain the New Act's
language. However, it seems reasonably clear' that directors have the power to
transfer amounts of earned surplus in excess of the minimum legal consideration
requirements to stated capital.
In addition to the citations in the following footnotes, see L. RAPPAPORT,
SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 16.33 (2d ed. 1966) where the author
indicates that many foreign accountants are strongly opposed to the position
espoused by AccouNrTIa REsEARcH BULL. No. 43 and "are at a complete loss to
understand the reasoning on which it is based." See also Barker, Are Accounting
Requirements for Stock Dividends Obsolete?, 14 ANALYSiS JOURNAL 69 (Nov.
1958) who argues that use of market value as the amount to be capitalized subjects
managements to great uncertainty in connection with planning a consistent stock
dividend policy. It is not clear why this problem is not now easily avoided by
split-ups.
' See dissent by Calkins and Mason, AICPA, ACCOUNTING RESEARcH BULL.
No. 43, Ch. 7B (1953); Wilcox, Accounting for Stock Dividends: A Dissent from
Current Practice, 96 J. ACCOUNTANCY 176, 179-80 (1953); Horngren, Stock Divi-
dends and the Entity Theory, 32 AccoUNTING REv. 379, 383 (1957); D. HERwiTz,
BUsINEss PLANNING 346 (1966). See also Vatter, Corporate Stock Equities in,
HAmDOOK OP MODERN AccoUrrING THEORY 392 (M. Backer ed. 1955) who argues
that it does not make sense to say that capitalization of earned surplus reduces the
shareholder's expectation of cash dividends:
The ability of a firm to pay dividends does not depend upon past earnings, but
upon future income and its management. The additional shares merely change
the arithmetic of such distributions as may be made.
Id. at 392 n.5.
In addition to the fact that accountants generally treat stock dividends as not
giving rise to income, share distribution generally does not constitute income to
the shareholder for federal income tax purposes. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 305a,
See D. HERWITZ, BusiNEss PLANNING 344-46 (1966).
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connection with share split-ups.8 39 Even if the requirements can be
justified from an accounting standpoint, it is hard to rationalize the
requirements in terms of the relevant legal interests in the size of
the corporation's dividend fund.84 0  Viewed from the latter context,
share dividends and split-ups both appear to be types of recapitaliza-
tions accomplished by director action.84 1 Hence, it would appear that
generally the amount and type of surplus to be capitalized should
be left up to the board of directors except to the extent of minimum
legal consideration requirements.84 2
See D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 344-46 (1966).
Barker, Evaluation of Stock Dividends, HARV. Bus. REV. 90 (July-August 1958),
concluded from a study of all stock dividends of 5 percent or more by companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange during the years 1951 to 1954 that stock
dividends, in themselves, had no lasting influence on market price. He asserted
that lasting price increases associated with stock dividends were the result of
simultaneous increases in cash dividend payments. He reached similar conclusions
in studies of the effect of stock splits upon the overall value of a corporation's
shares. See Barker, Effective Stock Splits, HARV. Bus. REV. 101 (Jan.-Feb. 1956),
and Barker,Stock Splits in a Bull Market, HARV. Bus. REV. 72 (May-June 1957).
M. SUSSMAN, THE STOCK DIVIDEND 61-72 (1962) examined all stock dividends paid by
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange during 1958. Using techniques
slightly different from those used by Barker, he concluded that "there appears to be a
slight tendency for stock dividends, particularly those of relatively small size, to en-
hance the market value of their respective stocks." Id. at 69. Other studies, less helpful
for lack of isolation of cash dividend increases as a factor, include Myers & Heath,
The Periodic Stock Dividend--Boom or Sop!, Com. & FIN. CHRON., Feb. 13, 1958 at
731; Bothwell, Periodic Stock Dividends, HARV. Bus. REv. 89 (Jan.-Feb. 1950);
Sheehan, The Big Pay-Out, FORTUNE, Nov., 1956, at 147; Livermore, The Value of
Stock Dividends, 20 Am. EcoN. REv. 687 (1930) ; and Siegel, Stock Dividends, HARV.
Bus. REv. 76, 87 (Oct. 1932).
"'°The fact that the corporation distributes no assets in connection with a
stock dividend (or for that matter, a stock split) makes it exceedingly difficult to
integrate the accounting analysis with traditional interest analysis of the dividend
fund. Even assuming that such integration could be made, it is hard to justify the
results that would obtain under the New Act's provisions. Under the Act, earned
surplus capitalized in excess of the amount of the aggregate par value of the shares
issued may be transferred to capital surplus. (See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.170
(1965).) Thus, unless the New Act's provisions regarding possible distribution of
capital surplus are amended, that portion of the earned surplus transfer may be
readily available for dividends by the corporation. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08-
.430 (1967) ; and part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 136-139.
" See the excellent analysis in Vatter, Corporate Stock Equities, in HANDBOOK
OF MODERN ACCOUNTING THEORY 391-93 (M. Backer ed. 1955); Eiteman, Are There
Two Kinds of Stock Dividends? NAA BULL. (Oct. 1963) 53, 57; Manne, supra
note 825, at 317-27 (1959) ; Hills, Model Corporation Act, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1334,
1339 (1935); and cf. W. PATON & W. PATON, JR., CORPORATION AcCOUNTS AND STATE-
MENTS 123-25 (1955); Horngren, Stock Dividends and the Entity Theory, 32
ACCOUNTING REV. 379 (1957); D. HERWITz, BUSINESS PLANNING 343-44 (1966).
As Vatter states, "A stock dividend is really very much in the nature of recap-
italization-a realigning of share equities to meet current financial patterns and
demands, such as 'greater cushions' to protect creditors with the need to regard
earnings as 'frozen' because of higher price levels and greater working capital
requirements." Id. at 392.
The statement in text assumes, of course, that sufficient authorized shares are
available to cover the distribution.
2 On the basic legal consideration requirements, see WASH. REV. CODE § 23A-
.08.150 (1965) ; and part I, 41 WASH. L. REV. at 242-49. An exception to the basic
rules would be necessary so as to require that surplus equal to the redemption price
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The basic problem which the accounting requirements attempt to
solve is shareholder misconception as to the nature of a share "divi-
dend.1114 3 It would appear that the best way to solve this problem
is an educational campaign by the stock exchanges, financial press,
analysts and declaring corporations to bring home to shareholders
the basic diluting effect of all types of share distributions and the
fact that such distributions do not represent divisions of current
earnings. 44 The following amendments in the New Act's general
of any redeemable shares distributed must be transferred to stated capital. Other-
wise a corporation could in effect make a cash dividend out of stated capital by
means of a share distribution of redeemable shares backed by little surplus which
shares it then redeemed out of stated capital. See D. HERwiTz, BUSINESS PLANNING
348-49 (1966). If the shares distributed have a liquidation preference, strong
arguments can be made that surplus equal to the liquidation preference ought to be
capitalized. See id. at 349; Manne, supra note 825, at 326-27 (1957); and part
I, 41 WASH. L. REV. at 245 n.225. But if the relative rights of outstanding
classes are protected, (see text following note 848), and if dividends from earned
surplus are prohibited (as they are under the New Act by WASH. REV. CODE
§23A.08.420(1) (1965)) until the liquidation preference is protected, there seems to
be no need to capitalize surplus equal to the liquidation preference.
With respect to the type of surplus that can be capitalized in connection with a
share distribution, once share distributions are recognized as recapitalizations
involving capitalization of surplus, capital surplus would appear as eligible for
capitalization as earned surplus. See D. HERwrrz, BUSINESS PLANNING 348 (1966);
Wilcox, vtpra note 832, at 181; Horngren, mpra note 841, at 380; see also AICPA,
AccouNTING TRENDS & TEcHNiQus 254 (20th ed. 1966) (indicating two-thirds of
stock splits recorded charged capital surplus). But see W. PATON & W. PATON, JR.,
CORPORATION ACCOUNTS AND STATEMENTS 124 (1955) labelling the use of capital
surplus as a "weird performance." However, difficulties arise where the shares
distributed are redeemable, and hence potentially a cash dividend substitute, or
where the corporation has two classes of shares already outstanding with varying
contributions to capital surplus. The latter problem could be dealt with by means
of an adverse effect statute (see text beginning note 848). But to avoid construction
problems under such a test, and to impose the appropriate limits on distributions of
redeemable shares, it appears best to impose the limitations previously described for
cash distributions upon use of capital surplus for these types of share distributions.
See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 138-40.
It should be noted that it is by no means clear that anything need be capitalized
in the event of a distribution of even par value shares. Thus, Hill, Model Corporation
Act, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1334, 1339 (1935) treated all share distributions as a read-
justment of shares similar to an amendment of the articles. In conformity with
this view, surplus was not required to be capitalized on a single class dividend
which was authorized by consent of the shareholders. Id. at 1368-69. Stated capital
was defined to exclude such dividends. Id. at 1360, 1363 n.46. See also Manne,
supra note 825, at 322. Hills' scheme was not recommended above because of the
effect of the proposal on long-held notions of stated capital (see Mulford, Corporate
Distributions to Shareholders and Other Amendments to the Pennsylvania Business
Corporation Law, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 536, 549 (1958)) and because the requirement
of a shareholder vote on each share distribution seemed overly burdensome in view
of possible benefits to shareholders from the requirement.
'See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH. Co. MANUAL §A13 at A-235 (1966); Blough,
Accounting and Auditing Problems, 108 J. ACCOUNTANCY 76 (Aug. 1959); A.
BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 167 (1932).
"In this connection, managements might well reexamine their companies'
policies concerning the use of share distributions. M. SUssmAN, THE STOCK
DrVIDEND 97 (1962) concludes from a survey of companies to determine the reasons
for share distributions that the primary reason why corporate managements issue
stock dividends is for purposes of public relations. See also Myers & Health,
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scheme would help in this campaign: (1) the provisions regulating
share distributions should be removed from the section regulating
dividends and placed in a separate section labelled "share distribu-
tions;" '  and (2) provisions should be added requiring (a) that
every distribution of shares be accompanied by a written notice
denominating the distribution as a "share distribution," '8 46 and (b)
that such notice inform the recipient of the effects of the distribution
on the corporation's stated capital, capital surplus and earned sur-
plus s47 and the effect upon his proportionate interest in the corpora-
tion if he sells the shares received . 48
A second area of inquiry concerning the New Act provisions relates
to the sufficiency of its controls over potential abuses of share distri-
butions possible where the distribution is of shares of a different
class than those owned by the recipients or is of the same class
The Periodic Stock Dividend-Boom or Sop!, 187 Com. & FIN. CnRON. 731,
757 (Feb. 13, 1958) who point out that despite the expense of small share distribu-
tions :
From the corporate standpoint, stock dividends offer nothing except that they
please the stockholder. Broadening the base by increasing the number of shares
can be done more economically by an occasional large stock dividend or split
than by many small ones. Fractions can be avoided and the many issuing
expenses on a single distribution can hardly be determined by the number of
shares to be issued to a given number of stockholders.
"'See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §511 (McKinney 1963); and PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1702.1 (1967).
As part of this change, the amended provisions could omit, as do those cited
immediately above, all reference to insolvency. See note 821 supra.
" It seems generally agreed that the label "stock dividend" is a misnomer(see, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 481 (rev. ed. 1946) ; Vatter supra note 841, at
391; Burke, Stock Dividends-Suggestions for Clarification, 37 ACCOUNTING REV.
283 (1962)) but few statutes attempt to remove this source of confusion. See
Mulford, supra note 842, at 550-51 discussing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1702.1
(1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 511(e) (McKinney 1963).
"'7See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK ExcH. Co. MANUAL §A13 at A-235-36 (1966); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 511(f) (McKinney 1963) ; CAL. CORP. CODE § 1506 (West 1955) ; and
Barclay, Stock Dividends Belonging to Principal, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES, 482, 484
(1964). In the event of a distribution of treasury shares, such notice would inform
the shareholder that the distribution was of treasury shares and that no transfer
to stated capital from surplus had been made. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-51(d)
(1965); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §511(d) (McKinney 1963) and text supra beginning
note 780.
Following the New York pattern, there probably should be a provision clearly
authorizing additional transfers from earned surplus to stated capital or capital
surplus in connection with a share distribution (N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 511(e)
(McKinney 1963)) and provision stating that a split-up or division of issued
shares into a greater number of shares represented by the same stated capital does not
require a transfer to stated capital. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §511(d) (McKinney
1963).
8
"See N.Y. STOCK EXCH. Co. MANUAL § A-13 at A-235-36 (1966); AICPA, Ac-
COUNTING RESEARCH BULL. No. 11 (1941) ; Wilcox, Accounting For Stock Dividends:
A Dissent from Current Recommended Practice, 96 J. ACCOUNTANCY 176, 180 (1953).
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but the corporation has more than one class of shares outstanding.
Under the New Act, it appears that the directors, without shareholder
approval, could distribute shares of a class not previously outstanding
despite the significant effects possible on the relative rights of the
outstanding class or classes.84 Similarly, the directors apparently
by their own action can distribute voting common shares to common
shareholders even though this has the effect of reducing the relative
voting power of other classes. To avoid these problems, the New
Act should be amended to require that share distributions of any
class of shares not previously outstanding must be authorized by
the vote of a majority of shares of each class outstanding voting as
a class and that other share distributions be specifically authorized
by the majority vote of each class that might be adversely affected
by the distribution.5 0
A final inquiry concerns the propriety of the New Act's limitation
of the source for share distributions to surplus. This statement of
the limitation will permit share distributions from unrealized appre-
ciation generally to the same extent that cash dividends may be
paid from that source, which seems appropriate 51 But the statement
also has the effect of prohibiting share distributions from the two
extraordinary dividend sources previously discussed, current earnings
'See D. -- %rrz, BusIxss PLANNING 349 (1966); Vatter, stpra note 841, at
393-94; A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY
197 (1932). Cf. Note, Manipulation of oting Control--The Stock Split, 4 STAN.
L. REV. 575 (1952). This assumes, of course, that the shares were previously
authorized.
ICf. N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-51(b) (1965); and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.33(c)(Page 1964). So that the shareholders of a corporation with two classes of shares
outstanding can determine the effects of a proposed distribution on their rights,
the shareholders' notice should spell out the capitalization procedure including
sources of surplus to be capitalized, amounts to be capitalized and effects of the
transaction on book values. Cf. Vatter, supra note 841, at 394-95.
SA number of states follow the old act's approach of permitting unrealized
appreciation to be used as a source of share distributions but prohibiting cash
dividends from that source. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 32, § 157.41(c) (1954).
This approach puts heavy burdens upon supervision of reductions of capital since
some screening must be done to determine if the surplus resulting and available
for distribution arose from unrealized appreciation. See Gose, Legal Significance
of "Capital Stock," 32 WASH. L. REv. 1, 19 (1957). Hence, if unrealized appreciation is
not to be used as a source for cash dividends, then share dividends should also be
prohibited from that source.
On the other hand, if unrealized appreciation is available as a source of cash
dividends or share reacquisitions, no dividend policy dictates that a different
treatment ought to be afforded to the appreciation for purposes of a share dividend.
In connection with possible use of unrealized appreciation as a source of share
dividends and the earlier suggestion regarding recognition of such appreciation by
reduction of capital procedure, see Chambers, Asset Revaluations and Stock Divi-
dends, 106 J. ACCOUNTANCY 55 (Aug. 1958) discussing widespread Australian




and depletion reserves. The omission of the latter is explicable on
the ground that share distributions are antithetical to the basic ration-
ale of the depletion reserve privilege. 5 - But there would seem to
be little reason why a share distribution from current earnings should
not be permitted.
D. Director and Shareholder Liability for Illegal Distributions85 3
Under the old act, directors who knowingly, or without making rea-
sonable inquiry, voted in favor of payment of a dividend in violation
of Wash. Rev. Code § 23.01.250 or any other unlawful distribution of
assets to shareholders were jointly and severally liable to the corpora-
tion for the amount of the dividend or distribution so made."'4 Share-
holders receiving unlawful payments were liable to the corporation
for amounts so received in two situations: (1) when no director was
liable to the corporation in connection with the payment; and (2)
when, and to the extent that, the corporation was unable to obtain
satisfaction on judgments recovered against directors for unlawful
payments.85 5 Actions against directors had to be brought within two
years of the date on which the distribution was made. Actions against
shareholders had to be brought within two years from the date on
which final judgment against the directors was entered." 6 The right
of directors held liable for illegal payments to contribution from co-
directors or reimbursement from shareholders was left to the uncer-
tainty of the common law. 57
' See text supra beginning at note 628.
'This section is limited to a discussion of liability imposed on directors
and shareholders for illegal corporate distributions by provisions typically found
in corporation codes. For a brief discussion of other types of potential shareholder
liability for corporate distributions, see part II, 42 WASH. L. REV. at 129 n.372.
SWASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.260(1) (1958).
' WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.260(2) (1958). Note that this provision would impose
liability in connection with illegal stock dividends, in addition to illegal cash and
property dividends. Compare the situation under the New Act regarding stock divi-
dends, noted in note 859 infra.
WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.260(3) (1958).
'American decisions on the common law right of a director held liable for
illegal dividends to seek contribution from co-directors are not consistent. Sharp
v. Call, 69 Neb. 72, 95 N.W. 16, 96 N.W. 1004 (1903), the only holding on the issue,
denied a director contribution in connection with a judgment rendered against him
for making a distribution from an insolvent corporation knowing of a pending
action against the corporation. Cf. Rogers v. Bonnett, 2 Okla. 553, 37 P. 1078
(1894). However, the Sharp court in dictum recognized the possibility of contribution
if the original action had been in good faith and with the defendant's participation.
95 N.W. at 17. Other dicta to the same effect appear in Hodde v. Nobbe, 204 Mo.
App. 109, 221 S.W. 130, 133 (1920) ; Wiles v. Snydom, 64 N.Y. 173, 177 (1876) ; cf.
Wallach v. Billings, 195 Ill. App. 605, 617-18 (1915), aff'd without discussion of the
point, 277 Ill. 218, 115 N.E. 382 (1917), cert. denied, 244 U.S. 659 (1917). The
adverse reactions to contribution in the circumstances appear to be based on the gen-
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The New Acts58 provides that directors who vote for or assent to
the declaration of any dividend or other distribution of assets"59 of a
corporation to its shareholders contrary to the provisions of the Act or
any restrictions in the articles of incorporation will be jointly and
eral common law rule that there can be no contribution between joint wrongdoers.
In view of the current dissatisfaction with that rule, see generally 1 F. HARPER & F.
JAmES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.2 (1956), it seems likely that the dicta would be the
prevailing modern rule on the question.
What little American authority there is on the right, in absence of statute, of
directors held liable for illegal dividends to seek reimbursement from share-
holders would permit it in at least some circumstances. See Lexington & O.R.R.
v. Bridges, 7 B. Mon. (46 Ky.) 556, 562 (1847) (dictum) ; cf. Kisterbock's Appeal,
51 Pa. 483 (1866). Briggs, Stockholders' Liability for Unlawful Dividends, 8
TEmP. L. Q. 145, 183 (1934) says that as a general rule, directors are entitled to
reimbursement by stockholders if the directors are innocent of fraud. However,
his only American authority is Sharp v. Call, supra, which did not involve the
question. See also Fuld, Recovery of Illegal and Partial Liquidating Dividends
from Stockholders, 28 VA. L. REv. 50, 69 (1941); and 2 A. MACHEN, MODERN LAW
OF COmORATIONS § 1364 at 1127 (1908) discussing English cases permitting
reimbursement.
I WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.450(1) (1965).
It is not entirely clear from this language whether directors are liable under
this provision for illegal share dividends. The overall effect of the words "any
dividend or other distribution of assets of a corporation" seems to be a limita-
tion of director liability to dividends of assets. Steadman, Liabilities of Direc-
tors Under the Model Business Corporation Act, 7 Bus. LAw., July 1952, 9, 13
appears to read the Model Act predecessor section this way. On the other hand,
if the words "of the assets of a corporation" were intended to modify "any divi-
dend," it is not clear why it was necessary later in the same paragraph to make
directors liable "for the amount of such dividend which is paid... or the value of
such assets which are distributed ... " (Compare WASH. REv. CODE §23.01.260(1)
(1958) making directors, who clearly are liable for illegal stock dividends, see
note 854 supra, liable for the amount of the dividend so paid.) Moreover, there is
an obvious parallelism between the dividend and distribution language in WASH.
REv. CODE §23A.08.450(1) (1965) and the provisions in WASH. REv. CODE §§
23A.08.420 (1965) and 23A.08.430 (1967). Dividend as used in §23A.08.420 1 1
(1965) includes share dividends.
The draftsmen's comments offer no assistance on the question. See 2 MODEL
ACT ANN. § 43 ff 4.
The liability imposed by WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450 (1965) is "in addition
to any other liabilities imposed by law upon directors of a corporation' Id. at
111. Hence, it becomes relevant to determine what liability exists apart from that
section for illegal share dividends. See Precision Extrusions, Inc. v. Stewart,
36 Ill. App. 2d 30, 183 N.E.2d 547 (1962). The few cases dealing with the problem
characterize the shares distributed illegally as watered shares. See, e.g., Whit-
lock v. Alexander, 160 N.C. 465, 76 S.E. 538 (1912); Anglo-American Land,
Mortgage & Agency Co. v. Lombard, 132 F. 721, 735 (8th Cir. 1904) (by impilca-
tion); First Nat!l Bank v. Patton Co., 13 Ohio C.C. 239 (1910) (by implication).
The results of such characterization appear to be that directors will rarely, if
ever, be held liable in connection with the distribution (see 1 E. DODD & R.
BAKER, CASES ON BusINEss ASSOCIATIONS 961-65 (1940)) while shareholders, who
have nothing to do with the transaction, may later be subject to watered shares
liability. See BAKER & CARY, at 849. In apparent recognition of this possibility, the
statutes in CAl.. CORP. CODE § 824 (West 1955); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 174 (1967);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-131 (1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3506 (1949); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 271.275 (1963); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12.27(A) (1951); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 23, § 62 (a)(1) (1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.48 (1963); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 301.23 (1947); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351-345 (1966); NEV. REv. STAT. §
78.300 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-3-17 (1962); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.95
(A)(1) (1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 146(a) (1953); LI. GEN. LAws ANN.
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severally liable to the corporation 60 for the amount of such dividend
which is paid or the value of such assets which are distributed in
excess of the amount of such dividend or distribution that could have
been lawfully paid. 6 ' Directors who vote for or assent to the pur-
chase by a corporation of its own shares contrary to the provisions of
the Act..2 will be jointly and severally liable to the corporation for
the amount of consideration paid for such shares which is in excess of
the amount that could have been lawfully expended for such shares."63
These liabilities, according to the prefatory clause to the director
§ 7-3-28 (1957); and TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-212 (1964) make directors liable for
illegal share dividends in provisions covering director liability for illegal dividends or
distributions of assets.
The arguments against making directors liable for illegal share dividends
presumably center on the fact that no assets are distributed and that it is difficult
to find any injury to existing creditors from an illegal share dividend (except
possibly in the case of a distribution of redeemable shares, where the problem
may be dealt with in the event of redemption.) Cf. Whitlock v. Alexander, 160
N.C. 465, 76 S.E. 538 (1912). However, the possibility of injury to future credi-
tors is generally as clear here as in the watered stock cases. Moreover, since
illegal share dividends will involve surplus, and hence asset, overstatement,
present creditors may have been injured by the directors' past failure to take
such overstatements into account. To encourage directors to eliminate overstate-
ments and hopefully to avoid unfair shareholder liability, the New Act provisions
should be amended to make directors liable for illegal share dividends. It is
later argued that the directors' liability for illegal asset distributions ought to
be limited to claims arising from injuries to creditors and shareholders at the
time of distribution. See text infra beginning note 915. In the case of illegal
share dividends, the remedy ought to benefit future creditors as well as present;
hence, a separate director liability provision ought to be enacted on the subject
modelled on WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.450(1) (1965), which gives the benefit of
recovery to future creditors.
" Both statutes thus make the corporation the beneficiary of any recovery of
illegal dividends. This formulation seems preferable to one permitting creditors
or shareholders to sue individually as often such statutes do not cover all in-
terested groups. See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 596 (rev. ed. 1946); Steadman,
Liabilities of Directors Under the Model Business Corporation Act, 7 Bus.
LAW, July 1952, 9, 14.
"By stating the amount of the liability in this way, the Act precludes the
possibility of holding directors liable for a distribution simply because of a
failure to give notice to shareholders. See WASH. REv. CODE §23A.08.430(5)
(1967). While it is clear that directors should not be liable for the full amount
of a distribution simply because of a ministerial omission, it also seems clear
that some liability should arise from failure to give notice where shareholders
are injured as a result of the omission. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §520 (McKinney
1963) seems a suitable solution to the problem. It makes the corporation liable
for any damage suffered by a shareholder as a result of a failure to give required
notice. If the corporation suffers such liability as a result of director mis-
conduct, it can then seek recovery from the responsible directors. See deCapriles
& McAniff, The Financial Provisions of the New (1961) New York Business
Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1271-72 (1961).
S2 As previously noted, see note 729 supra, WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.030
(1967) does not specifically mention restrictions in the articles of incorporation
as a limitation on treasury share acquisitions. WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.450(2)
(1965) also omits this term. It would appear that the clause ought to be added
to both provisions.
" WASH. REV. ConE § 23A.08.450 (2) (1965).
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liability section, are imposed "in addition to any other liabilities im-
posed by law upon directors of a corporation." '
Any director present at the meeting of the board of directors at
which an illegal dividend or distribution of assets is declared, or an
illegal purchase of shares is approved, is presumed to have assented
to such action unless (1) his dissent is entered in the minutes of the
meeting, (2) his written dissent is filed with the secretary of the meet-
ing before adjournment thereof, or (3) his written dissent is for-
warded to the secretary of the corporation by registered mail imme-
diately after the adjournment of the meeting. These techniques for
registering dissent are not available to directors voting in favor of the
action.8 65
A director will not be liable in connection with illegal dividends,
distributions of assets or purchases of treasury shares if he relied and
acted in good faith upon financial statements of the corporation (1)
represented to him to be correct by the president or the officer of the
corporation having charge of its books of account, or (2) stated in a
written report by an independent public or certified public accountant
or firm of such accountants fairly to reflect the financial condition of
such corporation.8 66 Moreover, a director will not be liable in connec-
tion with an illegal dividend, distribution of assets or purchase of
'WAsH. REv. CoDE § 23A.08.450 1 (1965).
'See WASH. REV. CoDE § 23A.08.450 11 2 (1965) which applies the presumption
stated in text to all questions of which directors assented to particular corporate
action.
Steadman, Liabilities of Directors Under the Model Business Corporation
Act, 7 Bus. LAW, July 1952, 9, 14 states that the Model Act scheme "eliminates all
controversy as to whether a particular director is responsible for a particular
act." Consider, however, the director who is absent from the directors' meeting
at which an illegal distribution is declared and who acquiesces in the decision
when learning of it. The presumption does not apply to such a director, and since
the presumption is not written to preclude proof of assent by other means, it
would appear that plaintiffs could argue that such conduct by the absent director
constituted assent. Cf. Aiken v. Insull, 122 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
315 U.S. 806 (1942). See also 3 W. FLETcHER, PaivATx CoORATixONs § 1237 at 894
(repl. vol. by M. Wolf 1965). Controversies of this sort could be eliminated by
amending the New Act to impose liability upon directors under whose adminis-
tration an illegal distribution is made except for those who cause their dissent
to be recorded in the minutes of the meeting at which such action was authorized,
or who being absent at the time promptly file their written objection to the action
with the secretary of the corporation upon learning of the action. See PA. STAT.
AwN. tit. 15, § 1707 (1967).
Under either the Pennsylvania form of statute or the New Act provision,
counsel must warn directors that simply voting against a proposed action will
not prevent them from being held liable for its consequences. Query whether a
vote against an illegal distribution is sufficient to constitute recorded dissent
under either provision where the dissenting director is identified in the minutes.
I" WAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.450 ff 3 (1965). The first clause of this paragraph
makes this defense also applicable in connection with distributions in liquida-
tion which violate WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.450(3) (1965).
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treasury shares if in determining the amount available for any such
dividend or distribution, he, in good faith, considers the assets to be of
their book value.1
6 7
Any director held liable for an illegal dividend or other distribution
of assets is entitled to contribution from shareholders who accepted or
received the dividend or assets knowing that the dividend or distribu-
tion had been made in violation of the Act, in proportion to the
amounts received by them respectively. 68 Any director against whom
a claim is asserted for unlawful dividends, distributions of assets or
purchases of treasury shares is entitled to contribution from other
directors who voted for or assented to the action upon which the
claim is asserted.86 9
1. Directors' Liability. One obvious result of the adoption of the
New Act provisions is that plaintiffs will no longer have to prove fault
on the part of directors in actions involving illegal distributions.1
7
This change seems sound in view of the severe practical problems that
plaintiffs would otherwise face in proving that directors had negli-
gently or intentionally made an illegal distribution.8 7 ' However, since
" There is a conflict in language in the last clause of WASH. REV. CODE§ 23A.08.450 f" 3 (1965), as noted in text. That clause reads:
nor shall he be so liable [under subsections I (illegal dividends and other
distributions of assets), 2 (illegal treasury share purchases) and 3 (illegal
liquidation distributions) of this section] if in good faith in determining
the amount available for any such dividend or distribution he considers the
assets to be of their book value.
Treasury share purchases can be encompassed in the italicized language only
with difficulty. It would appear, however, that the omission was inadvertent.
'WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450 IT 4 (1965). Note that a director held liable in
connection with an illegal treasury share purchase is not entitled to contribution
from even a shareholder recipient who knew of the illegality. The same result also
apparently obtains for a director held liable in connection with an illegal distribu-
tion in liquidation. Compare WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.450 IT 3 (1965) with
WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450 ff 4 (1965).
"WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.450 IT 5 (1965). This provision extends to all
other matters for which directors may be held liable under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23A.08.450 (1965).
"'See Steadman, Liabilities of Directors Under the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, 7 Bus. LAW, July 1952, 9, 13. Compare WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.260(1)
(1958) ("The directors who knowingly, or without making reasonable inquiry,
voted in favor"...[of the illegal distribution shall be liable]) with WASH. REV.
CODE §23A.08.450(1) (1965) ("Directors of a corporation who vote for or assent
to"...[any illegal distribution shall be liable].) Thus, under the old act plaintiffs
had to prove that directors had intentionally or negligently violated the substantive
provisions regulating dividend declarations. See Commissioner's Note, 9 U.L.A. 172
(1957).
"' See R. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 465 (1949). Cf. the report of the Federal
Trade Commission, with reference to the dividend provisions of the Delaware
Act: "There is such a thing as an illegal dividend in that state, rendering the
directors liable in that amount, but the directors are so hedged in with safeguards
as to render problematical the value of such a cause of action against them."
S. Doc. No. 92, pt. 69-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 284 (1934).
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removal of this burden from plaintiffs, without further changes, would
have resulted in the imposition of absolute liability on directors for
illegal distributions, the New Act goes on to give directors the above
noted defenses of good faith reliance on financial statements and on
book value. Numerous construction problems are raised by these pro-
visions which must be resolved before the efficacy of the statutory
scheme can be appraised.
The first such problem is presented by the term "good faith", which
is not defined in the Act." 2 The following comment of the Model
Act draftsmen gives some hint as to its meaning: 73
"Net assets" are not necessarily equivalent to net book value.
For example, if the actual value of assets has fallen so far below
book value that the directors cannot be shown to have relied in
good faith on the book value...current value may be the govern-
ing standard.
Thus, it seems that the existence of good faith on the part of directors
in connection with any distribution depends on whether they were
aware of information contrary to that appearing on the statements
rather than on whether they exercised reasonable diligence in deter-
mining that the financial data appearing on the statements were ac-
curate and reliable.8 74 It also seems clear that directors for this pur-
pose will be charged not only with those discrepancies between the
actual facts relevant to the question and the data appearing on the
statement of which they were aware, but also with the discrepancies
of which they should have been aware in view of facts and circum-
stances known to them . 5
It may seem that the relative distribution of the burden of proof as between
directors and plaintiffs resulting from the New Act provisions unduly favors
the plaintiffs. It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs must still demonstrate
that a distribution was made illegally, a task not without difficulty. See Note,
Actions Against Stockholders to Recover Illegal Dividends, 33 CoLUm. L. REv.
481, 482-83 (1933).
r-This omission possibly reflects confidence of the type stated in Adkins & Janis,
Some Observations on Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 20 Bus. LAw, 817, 829(1965): "An explanation of what is meant by 'good faith' seems hardly necessary
and should be perfectly clear to anyone who feels confident enough to shoulder the
responsibilities of a corporate directorship."
' 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 2 4.04(i) (1960, Supp. 1964).
871 D. KEHL, CORPORATE DviEmTs 247 (1941); and H. BALLANTINE, COPO ATIONS
594-95 (rev. ed. 1946) reach this conclusion on such good faith provisions generally.
rAn example of the latter appears in Cabaniss v. State, 68 S.E. 849 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1910). The court was willing to imply a good faith defense to a criminal
action for illegal distributions by a banking corporation. The bank was hope-
lessly insolvent, but its financial statement did not so indicate as numerous
worthless accounts were still carried as assets. The court held that the director
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The "financial statements" mentioned in the defenses appear to be
defined by the reference to statements "[S] tated in a written report by
[a] ... certified public accountant ... fairly to reflect the financial con-
dition of [the] ... corporation. . .. ,,"71 Under generally accepted aud-
iting standards, such statements will include the corporation's balance
sheet and income and earned surplus statement(s), and notes thereto,
and such other supporting statements as the auditor includes within his
opinion.
The remaining terms in the defense section are more troublesome.
Directors are not liable if they rely and act in good faith upon finan-
cial statements. But precisely what type of reliance is here compre-
hended? Does the section mean that directors desiring to ascertain
legal dividend determinants, say the corporation's earned and capital
surplus, will be safe if they simply accept the figures shown as bal-
charged, who was president of the bank and spent long hours there, could not
claim good faith in making the distributions: "[I]t is hardly conceivable that
he could have failed to know that the bank was carrying as live assets this
large amount of paper which was long since hopelessly dead." Id. at 854. Com-
pare the treatment of an inactive, frequently absent director under the Delaware
good faith statute as interpreted in Stratton v. Anderson, 278 Mich. 499, 270
N.W. 764 (1936). The dividend there was possible only because the corporation's
executive committee voted to allocate 10 percent of the price paid for a bulk inven-
tory purchase to a Franchise Rights account. No record of this action appeared
in the directors' minutes and there was no evidence that prior to suit defendant "ever
had any knowledge of this action of the executive committee." Held: defendant acted
in good faith when he relied on the corporation's financial statements and the presi-
dent's statements that sufficient surplus was present.
'See also Seward, Earned Surplus-Its Meaning and Use in the M11odel Busi-
ness Corporation Act, 38 VA. L. REV. 435, 440 (1952): "The book values may be
relied on unless there is good reason to believe them to be incorrect." To the
same effect is N. LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 490 (1959) ; and Mulford, Corporate Distri-
butions to Shareholders and Other Amendments to the Pennsylvania Business Corpo-
ration Law, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 536, 559-60 (1958).
" WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450 ff 3 (1965).
' The language in WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450 f[ 3 (1965) regarding written
reports stating that financial statements fairly reflect the financial condition of
the corporation appears to be a paraphrase of the first clause in a typical auditor's
opinion: "In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and statement(s) of
income and retained earnings present fairly the financial position of X Com-
pany at..., and the results of its operations for the year there ended...." See
AICPA, AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, STATEMENTS ON AUDITING PROCE-
DuPE, No. 33, 57 (1963). (Query, however, whether "financial condition" in the
statute was meant to restrict the statements to the balance sheet and supple-
mentary statements. It does not appear likely since the definition of earned
surplus has reference to the income statement, see part II, 42 WASH. L. REV.
at 125 n.361, as does the concept of current net earnings. See text snpra begin-
ning note 604.) Other statements may be covered by the auditor's report, in which
case the report will state that in the auditor's opinion, the supplementary statements
are fairly stated in all material respects in relation to the basic financial state-
ments taken as a whole. See AICPA, AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, supra
at 84-85.
WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450 f[ 3 (1965) is substantively identical with MODEL
ACT § 43 ff 3, which was taken from ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42-10 (1954).
The latter uses the words "balance sheet and profit and loss statement" in place
of the former's financial statements.
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ances in those accounts in the financial statements? Or does it mean,
instead, that directors can rely on the accounting balances only as
accurate starting points from which to make the adjustments neces-
sary to reach the financial data relevant to resolving the legal issues
present? 7 1 Most of the commentators and the few cases available
seem to accept the first construction. 79 Two points should be noted
about this conclusion. First, even if it is accepted, directors may not
find it a complete defense as certain legal determinants, e.g., the cor-
poration's solvency and restrictions in the articles of incorporation,
may not appear on the financial statements.8 0 Second, the first con-
struction means that the effective valuation standard in the statute is
the standard governing the preparation of the financial statements
concerned. In the case of financial statements stated by certified pub-
lic accountants to reflect the financial condition of the corporation
fairly, such statements must have been presented in conformity with
generally accepted principles of accounting applied on a basis con-
sistent with that of preceding years in order to merit such certifica-
tion. 81 But what standard is implicit in a representation by the cor-
poration's accounting officer that the financial statements are "cor-
rect"?88 ' And by what standard must the "book value" of assets be
'sSee Hackney, The Pennsylvania Corporation Law Amendments, 19 U. PITT.
L. REv. 51, 81 (1957):
It would seem, on the one hand, that every book entry made by a corporate
officer cannot be taken blindly without further investigation by the board in
determining the funds available for dividends. Many entries in the accounts
involving an exercise of judgment and discretion, such as charges for main-
tenance and repairs (expensing v. capitalizing), or for building up a proper
reserve for uncollectibles, are matters of such importance that the financial
position reflected by the books may be completely reversed as a result of the
decision made; and it would seem that the board of directors must assume
the responsibility of at least reviewing and examining the action of the
corporate officers in these areas.
'See, e.g., deCapriles & McAniff, The Financial Provisions of the New
(1961) New York Business Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1239, 1271
(1961); D. KIC_., CoRoRax Drymaims 247 (1941); and Stratton v. Anderson,
278 Mich. 499, 270 N.W. 764 (1936) (good faith reliance on financial statements
and president's representations upheld with no discussion whether financial data met
relevant standard). But see Hackney, supra note 878.
'See, e.g., deCapriles & McAniff, supra note 879, at 1271 & n.234 and sources
cited therein.
Article restrictions on corporate distributions should be presented in the
financial statements and notes thereto under generally accepted auditing proce-
dures. See AICPA, AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, STATEMENTS ON AUDIT-
ING PROCEDURE, No. 33, 54 (1963). However, as previously noted, see note 779
supra, accountants on occasion have omitted mention of such restrictions.
'See AICPA, AUDITINa STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 880, at 40-43
(1963).
" One wonders whether directors will ever be able to get a corporate accountant
to represent that financial statements are "correct" since that word has such
heavy connotations that the resulting statements present items in the only
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determined? The structure of the Act strongly suggests that the stan-
dard to be applied in both cases is the same as that applied in connec-
tion with certified statements.88 3
With the aid of these assumed definitions, the combined operation
of the New Act's provisions on director liability and defenses against
such liability can now be examined. It is clear under these provisions
that if directors make a distribution without referring to the corpora-
tion's accounting data, they will be absolutely liable if the distribu-
tion proves to be illegal. In some cases this result can be justified on
the ground that the directors have failed to make even the most rudi-
mentary investigation of the effect of the distribution on the corpora-
tion.884 But suppose the directors were acting in good faith on opin-
ion of counsel that the valuation standard used in the Act was current
value 8 ' and hence relied upon qualified appraisers' reports as to the
value of the assets? The responsible directors would still be absolutely
liable if any part of the distribution was found to be illegal, even
though they had used due care throughout the proceedings. 8 6 This
seems to be harsh treatment of the directors.
The fact that analysis of financial statements is generally accepted
as the first step in determining the amount available for any dividend
offers strong general support for the New Act defenses. But numerous
problems arise under those defenses when the directors consult the
corporation's accounting data because of the way the statutory scheme
is set forth. Suppose, for example, that the directors involved were
negligent in selecting key accounting personnel or in supervising the
corporation's operating procedures which control the accuracy and
defensible way that the underlying transactions could be shown. Barring greater
uniformity in accounting reporting standards than now exists, see generally the
symposium on this subject in 30 LAw & CONTEP'. PROB. 621-931 (1965), con-
scientious accountants are far more likely to represent that the financial state-
ments have been prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles
applied on a consistent basis and that all reasonable steps have been taken
within the corporation to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and reliability
of its accounting data, and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial policies.
'It seems reasonable to assume that the acceptable valuation standard here
should conform to the valuation standard imposed in the Act as closely as is
possible without denigrating its use as a defense. For arguments to the effect
that valuations resulting from application of generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples are the standard imposed by the Act, see part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at
125-28.
'Cf. Ballantine & Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dividends
Under Modern Corporation Laws, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 229, 260-61, 262 (1935).
'Counsel here could rely on Seward, Earned Surplus-Its Meaning and Use
in The Model Business Corporation Act, 38 VA. L. REv. 435, 440 (1952); Gib-
son, Surphs, So What?, 17 Bus. LAw. 476, 487 (1962).
' See Gibson, snpra note 885, at 489.
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reliability of its accounting data.88 7 It would appear that so long as
the directors' negligence was not so gross as to preclude good faith
reliance on the financial data concerned, the defenses would still be
available; hence, the directors would not be liable under the director
liability provisions even if the distribution was determined to be ille-
gal. However, a recent Illinois case88 interpreting the statutory
scheme on which the New Act provisions are based s8 9 can be read as
imposing liability on directors in this situation for breach of the gen-
eral duty of due care under the prefatory clause to the director lia-
bility section which states that statutory liability is "in addition to
any other liabilities imposed by law upon directors." 80° Courts inter-
preting the New Act will have difficulty reaching this result because
of the specificity of the director liability provisions 91 and the drafts-
' This example is suggested by Dodd, Purchase and Redemption By a
Corporation of Its Own Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. Rxv. 697,
712 (1941).
It is clear that failure to exercise adequate supervision in these areas will
constitute negligence on the part of the directors concerned. See, e.g., H. BALLAN-
TNzE, CORPORATIONS 164 (rev. ed. 1946); N. LATriN, CoRPoRaAIoNs 248 (1959);
3 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1048 at 640 (repl. vol. by M. Wolf 1965).
According to accountants, the fact that in the process of rendering an opinion as
to a corporation's financial statementts a certified public accountant examines
the corporation's books and records does not relieve management of any of its
responsibility regarding supervision of the corporation's accounting system.
See AICPA, AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 880, at 9-12 (1963).
Under the case law, however, it would appear that such an examination would be
considered as a factor in determining whether directors had been negligent.
See W. FLETCHER, supra at § 1054.
S Precision Extrusions, Inc. v. Stewart, 36 Ill. App. 2d 30, 183 N.E.2d 547
(1962) involved an action against directors for voting in favor of an illegal pur-
chase of treasury shares. The Illinois Act does not contain a provision equiva-
lent to WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450 (2) (1965) making directors specifically
liable for illegal purchases of treasury shares. As one ground for upholding
the complaint against a motion to dismiss, the court stated:
In the present case had the directors authorized the repurchase by the cor-
poration of its own stock under the same circumstance, they could have been
held liable at common law. Section 6 of the statute formulates rules with
regard to an authorization of the repurchase of its own stock by a corpora-
tion, which places a definite duty on the directors. When the directors violate
that duty it is not necessary that the statute specifically provide that they
can be held responsible. At common law an action against them by the
corporation or creditors would lie, since the result of such repurchase would
be to illegally withdraw and pay to a stockholder a part of the assets of
the corporation. When liability is imposed upon a director of a corporation
by statute, his common law liability for itisfeasance and negligence in the
performance of his duty is not thereby excluded. (Emphasis added.)
IIll. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42 (1954) (which is the source for Model Act§ 43, the predecessor of WAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.450 (1965).)
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.450 1 1 (1965).
sxlIn Precision Extrusions, Inc. v. Stewart, 36 Ill. App. 2d 30, 183 N.E.2d 547
(1962), the court was filling a gap in the Illinois statute where share pur-
chases in certain circumstances were proscribed but no liability was attached
to that proscription. In the situation posed in text, the directors have specifically
been made liable in connection with illegal distributions but given a defense that
may be too broad. Here, in short, the legislature has spoken.
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men's clear intention to avoid problems with a negligence standard.89 -
Hence, it would appear that a statutory amendment is necessary if
this type of negligence is to be clearly proscribed.
Consider, as a second situation, the plight of directors of a corpora-
tion for which a financial statement has not been prepared. The Act
provides that they will not be liable even if the distribution is in fact
illegal as long as they in good faith considered the assets to be of their
book value in determining the amount available for distribution.893
Apparently all of the other factors necessary in the determination of
the size of the fund available for distribution, i.e., the total amount of
surplus available (and hence the amount of the corporation's debts
and stated capital), the type of surplus present, and the corporation's
solvency must be determined in accordance with the legal rules ex-
tant. 94 If a distribution is illegally made because of an error in one
of these determinations, be it an error in compiling data or in deter-
mining the appropriate standard for compilation, the assenting direc-
tors will apparently be liable even though the mistake did not arise
from their negligence. 95 Assuming that the appropriate standard for
determining the assets' book value is generally accepted accounting
principles, it is hard to understand why, if the remaining accounts
are also kept in accord therewith, directors are entitled to rely on such
account balances if they appear on a financial statement but are not
so entitled when they merely appear in the corporation's books.
An even more troublesome case arises where the directors have a
certified financial statement prepared to be used as a basis for the
distribution, and then in a step most careful directors presumably
" See Steadman, Liabilities of Directors Under the Model Business Cor-
poration Act, 7 Bus. LAw., July 1952, 9, 13.
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.450 f[ 3 (1965).
It is interesting to note that Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois
Business Corporation Act, 1 U. CHi. L. R1v. 357, 372 (1934) called attention to
this problem shortly after the Illinois act was adopted.
' A number of cases dealing with statutes imposing liability upon directors
who "assented to" illegal distributions have avoided absolute liability for direc-
tors by interpreting the assent required to be with knowledge or reason to know
that the dividend was illegal. See, e.g., Chick v. Fuller, 114 F. 22, 24, 28-29 (7th
Cir. 1902) (involving an early Illinois statute), and cases cited in D. KEHL,
CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 243 n.37 (1941). The Illinois Act was thereafter amended
to provide that a director present at the meeting considering the illegal distribu-
tion was conclusively presumed to have assented to the distribution, apparently
in part to overcome the Chick line of cases. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.42-9
(1954). The provisions in the Model and New Acts regarding assent are
modelled on those in the Illinois Act but both omit the word "conclusively." See
MODEL ACT §43 ff 3; WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.450 1 3 (1965). It would appear,
however, that even this less powerful assent clause is sufficient to block argu-
ments based on the Chick cases.
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would take, consult counsel regarding the legality of a questionable
distribution. To be more specific, assume that the corporation ac-
cording to its financial statements has no earned surplus, capital sur-
plus or current earnings and that the corporation's solvency would not
be adversely affected by the proposed distribution. The corporation's
assets have substantially appreciated in value, but in accord with
generally accepted accounting principles, that appreciation has not
been recorded on the corporation's books80 6 or financial statements.
Also assume that the corporation's counsel is of the opinion that un-
realized appreciation is recognizable as earned surplus under the New
Act.897 There are two possibilities for error here, both of which could
make the distribution, or a part of it, illegal. First, it may be deter-
mined that counsel's opinion was correct but that the value placed on
the assets was excessive. Here the directors would be absolutely liable
for the amount of the illegal distribution even if the error were clerical
in nature or even if the directors relied for their valuation of the assets
upon reliable appraisers. 8" The second possibility for error is that
counsel's opinion is determined not to be the law. Again the directors
would be absolutely liable for the illegal distribution."' The full di-
mensions of this second possibility become clearer when the attorney's
advice concerns matters which appear on the financial statements but
which in his opinion should be treated differently under the statute.00
'See, e.g., Status of Accounting Research Bulletins, OPINIONS OF THE Ac-
couNTING PRINCIPLES BoARD, OPINION No. 6, 17 (1965).
'See, for support, Seward, Earned Surplus-Its Meaning and Use In The
Model Business .Corporation Act, 38 VA. L. Rxv. 435, 440-43 (1952).
" The appraisers may have used approved techniques in determining the
value, but could well err on the appropriate valuation standard. As to the latter
difficulties, see Hackney, Accounting Principles In Corporation Law, 30 LAW
& CoNTEmP. PROP. 791, 819-21 (1965).
m This result seems to have been recognized by Gibson, Surplus, So What?,
17 Bus. LAw. 476, 489 (1962).
' A frequent problem under the Act calling for attorney's advice is the makeup
of the corporation's capital surplus account. An attorney might well advise his
client that there is a fair probability that the corporation's capital surplus account
as computed under generally accepted accounting principles is less (and the
corporation's earned surplus account is more) than it should be for purposes
of the statute. Examples of such overstatements: (1) The accountant may have
charged amounts against capital surplus which under the Act should have been
charged against earned surplus. (E.g., compare the charges arising from a re-
tirement of purchased treasury shares under generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples, see Status of Accounting Research Bulletins, OPINIONS OF ACcOUNTING
PRINCIPLES BoARD, OPINION No. 6, 1 12 (1965), and under the statute. See text
supra beginning note 752.) (2) The accountant may have increased earned surplus
with amounts that under the statute are capital surplus. (E.g., the accountant may
have used the economic method of reporting an investment in a subsidiary and
credited earned surplus for the increase in the parent's equity in the subsidiary.
See part II, 42 WASH. L. REv. at 162. Under the statute, such increase apparently
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If counsel's advice causes directors to analyze the amounts shown as
surplus on the financial statements, good faith reliance on the ac-
counting balances is no longer possible; hence, directors will be ab-
solutely liable if it is later determined that the distribution, or part
of it, was illegal.'" 1 Practical directors are likely to conclude that in-
clusion of lawyers in deliberations concerning distributions can only
lead to trouble.
These problems suggest that a different statutory scheme should be
adopted. But latent in the preceding analysis is the fact that such
schemes require resolution of some of the most difficult policy issues
in corporation law.90 2 The directors involved face huge potential lia-
bility in connection with transactions in which their own interests may
be slight.90 3 The issues involved are so complex that directors in most
cases are likely to rely heavily on the advice of the corporation's
accountants and attorneys in making any distribution. °4 Because
these transactions are so recurrent, directors will desire a fairly cer-
tain standard by which their possible liability can be determined. But
at the same time, directors generally would presumably not favor a
certain standard that had the result of making them liable where they
were not at fault.9 5 Creditors and shareholders would prefer that any
liability standard adopted would encourage maximum compliance with
the statutory protections afforded them by the Act. And, as previously
noted,0 6 they obviously would desire that the scheme be so designed
that suits on their behalf would not be a practical impossibility.
The draftsmen's weighing of these factors obviously ranked cer-
is treated as unrealized appreciation and hence probably is credited to capital
surplus.)
'It may seem that if the attorney's advice does reduce the amount of divi-
dends payable to an amount less than would have been payable under the financial
statements, the distribution will not be illegal. Unfortunately, liability depends
on a comparison with the legal standards for dividends, so that if the legal
capacity is smaller than the attorney's determination, part or all of the distribu-
tion is illegal regardless of the propriety of the payment under generally accepted
accounting principles.
'2See, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 592 (rev. ed. 1946).
'See in this connection the historical and policy discussion in D. KEHL,
CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 235-36 (1941).
' D. KEHL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 247 (1941) argues that for this reason, the
defense of good faith reliance on financial statements is "quite clearly the most
workable rule."
This interest seems to be the source of the defense in OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.95 (1964) for directors who follow what they believe "to be sound account-
ing and business practice." With a defense this broad, there seems to be very
little reason to have statutory provisions regulating asset distributions.
'See Comment, The Statutory Responsibility of Directors for Payment of
Dividends Out of Capital, 35 YALE L.J. 870, 875 (1926).
9' See text supra beginning note 869.
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tainty primary,9"7 with the deleterious effects on the other interests
already noted. Most of the problems noted would be avoided if in
place of the present defenses directors were required to demonstrate
that they had acted in good faith and with due care in connection
with the illegal distribution. 08 This standard has not received general
acceptance909 presumably because of the fear that simple reliance on
financial statements might not constitute due care. °10 Provisions in
the recently enacted New York act and in two other acts appear to
have overcome this problem. 11 The New York statute provides that
assenting directors will not be liable for an illegal distribution if, in
the circumstances, they have discharged their duty to the corpora-
tion.912 The director's duty to the corporation is discharged (a) when
he acts in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill
which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circum-
stances in like positions and (b) when he in good faith relies upon
financial statements of the corporation represented to be correct by
the president or the officer of the corporation having charge of its
books of account, or stated in a written report by an independent or
'See Steadman, Liabilities of Directors Under The Model Business Cor-
poration Act, 7 Bus. LAw, July 1952, 9, 14.
'See Ballantine & Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Divi-
dends Under Modern Corporation Laws, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 229, 262 (1935).
SNo United States corporation statute currently uses this precise formula-
tion. However, TEx. Bus. CoR. Act, art. 2.41 (c) and (d) (1955), which inserts the
words "in the exercise of ordinary care" before the Model Act good faith defenses
and adds a similarly conditioned good faith reliance on counsel's opinion clause,
seems to reach the same result in most cases. Also, a number of states still
require that plaintiffs prove that defendants intentionally or negligently declared
the illegal distribution. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12.27 (1950); Mica.
STAT. ANN. § 21.48 (1963); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 14:8-19 (1937). And such was the
rule at common law. See D. KEHL, CORpORATE DIVIDENDS 237 & n.12 (1941).
'M See, e.g., Cornell v. Seddinger, 237 Pa. 389, 85 A. 446 (1912). But see
Ballantine & Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dividends Under
Modern Corporation Laws, 23 CALI. L. RFv. 229, 263 (1935), who seem to be of
the view that due care may not even require examination of the financial state-
ments. It is hard to believe that a modern court would reach that conclusion.
Ballantine and Hills also raise the issue of whether directors may be liable
for violation of the duty of due care if they declare a dividend which is permis-
sible under the statute but which no reasonable and prudent man in the exercise
of due care would have made in the circumstances. Id. at 260. The loose language
in Precision Extrusions, Inc. v. Stewart, 36 IIl. App. 2d 30, 183 N.E.2d 547
(1962), quoted supra note 888, could be interpreted as authorizing such an action.
But the addition of the equitable solvency test to the Act should do much to
eliminate problems of the sort mentioned by Ballantine and Hills. Moreover,
that type of liability seems to undercut the whole notion of having statutes
regulating the distribution of assets from corporations since the thesis of such
statutes must be that directors need fairly clear rules by which to determine
the propriety of distributions.
"N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAv §§719, 717 (McKinney 1963); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 301.23(2) (1945) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-321(b) (2) (1958).
"N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §719(e) (McKinney 1963).
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certified public accountant to reflect fairly the financial condition of
the corporation." 3 This provision permits directors whose diligent
inquiries about the relevant financial data would otherwise disqualify
them from asserting the good faith defenses to defend themselves
from liability on illegal distributions by demonstrating that the dis-
tributions were made with due care. It seems to produce a fair ac-
commodation of the interests discussed above and a resolution of the
problems raised by the New Act provisions.914 The provision thus
would be a valuable addition to the New Act.9 15
A second issue raised by the New Act provisions on director liability
concerns the propriety of holding assenting directors liable for the
amount of the illegal distribution in every case. 11 6 This provision,
" N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963).
It should be noted that the New York provision contains no reference to good
faith reliance on book values. If the corporation's accounting records are kept in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, there seems to be no
reason why good faith reliance on such account balances should not be permitted.
To avoid the asset limitation in the New Act, see text supra beginning note 866,
the words "corporation's accounts or" could be inserted before the words "finan-
cial statements" where the latter first appear in WAsH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450ff 3 (1965). Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 172 (1953); ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21 (31)
(Supp. 1965).) (The words "financial statements" would have to be added before
"stated in a written report.. ." to complete the section.) The good faith reliance
on book value provision could then be deleted. Deletion of the book value clause
might be viewed with dismay by those espousing the use of current values as
the valuation standard in the Act (see Seward, supra note 875, at 440). But it was
doubtful that that clause had that effect in any event. See part II, 42 WASH. L.
REV. at 125-27 & n.364.
"' It is not crystal clear that the statute deals with the problem of director
negligence other than by a provision similar to the prefatory clause to the New
Act director liability section providing that the New York director liability pro-
vision shall not affect any liability otherwise imposed by law upon directors.
See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §719(f) (McKinney 1963). However, the overall tone of
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §717 (McKinney 1963) certainly suggests that directors
will not have discharged their duties if they are negligent in supervising the
accounting operations of the corporation.
"' Alternatives to the New York approach, attempting to resolve some or all
of the problems noted in text, appear in TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2 .41(c) and
(d) (1955) discussed supra note 909, and ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21 (31) (Supp.
1965) (adding reports made by an appraiser selected with reasonable care to good
faith reliance defenses). Of these provisions, TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.41 (c) and
(d) (1955) is the closest to the New York provisions, with deviations that are both
more restrictive and more liberal. Under the Texas provision, directors must act with
"ordinary" care in using the financial statement. This may mean that directors
may not be able to use the statements without the advice of counsel. The New
York statute does not impose this requirement. The Texas provision speci-
fically authorizes reliance on advice of counsel, which presumably would be
recognized under the New York provision by means of the due care portion of
the statute with about the same end result. But there is no room in the Texas
statue for the use of appraisers, which would also be permitted under the New
York due care provision.
As the Alabama provision illustrates, some of the problems mentioned in
text could be solved by expanding the good faith reliance items. But this ap-
proach would not resolve the absolute liability questions.
"'See Ballantine, A Critical Survey of The Illinois Business Corporation
Act, 1 U. CHL L. REv. 357, 372 (1934).
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taken from the Model Act, has been amended by some of the legisla-
tures adopting that Act. These amendments provide that directors
will be liable for illegal distributions only to the extent of (a) the
claims of creditors as of the date the distribution was voted who obtain
judgment against the corporation on which execution is returned un-
satisfied and (b) the claims of any shareholder who is injured by
the distribution, subject to an overall limitation to the amount of the
illegal distribution. 1 These provisions are superior to those in the
New Act because they recognize that creditors whose claims arise
after a distribution is voted could not have relied on the assets dis-
tributed.918 They also recognize that there is no reason for director
liability on an illegal distribution where no injury results to either
predistribution creditors or shareholders. 9 Thus, such provisions
should be considered as an amendment to the New Act.
A third question regarding the new director liability provisions con-
cerns the propriety of leaving to the common law920 the determination
of an appropriate statute of limitations for actions against directors for
illegal distributions. Prior cases on the subject have not produced
consistent results. Thus, one line of authority takes the position that
because directors are trustees, no statute of limitations is applicable
to such actions.92' And in the line of cases holding that limitations are
applicable, there is considerable disagreement as to which of the more
general statutes of limitation should be applied to such causes of
action.9"2 Finally, there is considerable disagreement in the latter
17See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §33-321(b) (1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-32(c)
(1965); cf. N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAW § 719(a) (McKinney 1963); HAWAII REV. LAWS
§ 172-110 (Supp. 1965); Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.95(A) (Page 1964); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.146(b) (1953).
"Cf. Fuld, Recovery of Illegal and Partial Liquidating Dividends from Stock-
holders, 28 VA. L. REv. 50, 52 (1941).
"'To allow the corporation to recover in such circumstances would allow the
funds recovered to inure to the benefit of shareholders who were not injured in
connection with the distribution. Some courts have not permitted such recoveries
even though the statutes authorized them. See Spiegel v. Beacon Participations,
297 Mass. 398, 8 N.E.2d 895 (1935).
"WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450 (1965) contains no statute of limitations on
such actions.
' 'See Note, The Statute of Limitations in Stockholders' Derivative Suits Against
Directors, 39 CoLUM. L. REv. 842, 845-46 (1939) ; 3 W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONs § 1301 (repl. vol. by M. Wolf 1965).
''In the cases involving dividends paid in violation of statute, a number of
courts have held that the appropriate statute of limitations is that governing
actions based on liabilities created by statute. See Purcell v. Baker, 270 Ky.
772, 110 S.W.2d 1079 (1937); McGill's Adm'r[x] v. Phillips, 49 S.W.2d 1025 (Ky.
1932); Gallagher v. New York Dry Dock Co., 19 N.Y.S. 2d 789, affd, 32 N.Y.S.
2d 348 (1942). In jurisdictions like Washington which do not have -statutes of
limitations on statutory liabilities, the cases split between analyzing the basic
cause of action as a tort (see Smalley v. Bernstein, 115 So. 347 (La. 1927) ), a viola-
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group of cases as to when the cause of action can be said to arise.923
It would have been helpful had the draftsmen followed the old act's
example92 and included a specific limitation in the Act to resolve
these unnecessary controversies.92
Finally, the New Act section enabling directors held liable for an
illegal distribution to seek reimbursement from shareholder-recipients
appears to have omitted inadvertently a provision enabling directors
to seek reimbursement from a shareholder whose shares were illegally
purchased.926
2. Shareholders' Liability. The New Act omits the old act's pro-
visions regarding the circumstances in which shareholders receiving
illegal distributions would be liable on suit by the corporation or its
creditors.92 ' The effect of this omission seems to be that questions of
direct shareholder liability are to be determined under the line of de-
cisions involving shareholder liability in the absence of statute. '
tion of contract (see Note, The Statute of Limitations in Stockholders Deriva-
tive Suits Against Directors, 39 CoLum. L. REv. 842, 851 (1939)) or as a cause of
action covered by the catch-all statute of limitations. See WASH. REv. CODE
§ 4.16.130 (1958); Corsicana Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919).
" See Note, The Statute of Limitations in Stockholders' Derivative Suits
Against Directors, 39 COLUmf. L. REV. 842, 851-52 (1939); V. FLETCHER, supra
note 921, at § 1306.
"'WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.260(3) (a) (1958) (limiting actions to txwo years from
date of payment).
" Other statutes dealing specifically with the question include: N.C. GE-N.
STAT. § 55-32 (m) (1965); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANY. § 33-321(b) (1960) (both pro-
viding limitation of three years from the time when the cause of action was
discovered or ought to have been discovered); DEL. CODE AxN. tit. 8 § 174 (1953)
(six years after payment). Of these two forms, the date of payment appears the
most certain starting point. Compensation can be made for problems in discovery by
a longer limitation period of the type used in the Delaware statute.
"There appears no logical basis on which to distinguish illegal dividends
or asset distributions from illegal treasury share acquisitions on the right of
directors to contribution. Indeed, if one pursues Dodd's notion that shareholders
whose shares are purchased illegally ought to be liable to the corporation in
every case, see Dodd, Purchase and Redemption By a Corporation Of Its Own
Shares: The Substantive Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 697, 710-11 (1941), director
contribution rights in such cases should be even greater. The omission may
have resulted from the fact that the Model Act draftsmen added the subsection
imposing liability on directors for illegal share repurchases to the Illinois
Act which the draftsmen used as a model (see ILL. REv. STAT. § 157.42 (1954);
Precision Extrusions, Inc. v. Stewart, 36 Ill. App. 2d 30, 183 N.E.2d 547 (1962))
without considering the effect of that change on the contribution section.
" Compare WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.450 (1965) with WASH. REv. CODE §
23.01.260(2) (1958).
"It may be argued that the draftsmen intended that shareholders should be
liable only to directors for possible contribution (see BALLANTINE, supra note
916, at 373) and hence that liability to creditors or the corporation could arise only
by virtue of a creditor's bill upon the directors' statutory right of contribution
from knowing shareholders. See Sussex Trust Co. v. Bacon, 11 Del. Ch. 380,
102 A. 785 (1917). However, the Illinois court recently interpreted the predecessor
provisions to the Model (New) Act provisions on director liability as not
foreclosing a common law action against shareholders for illegal distributions.
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Those decisions indicate generally 929 that (a) recipients with knowl-
edge of the illegality of the distribution are likely to be liable for the
amount received, and (b) innocent recipients will be liable if the
corporation was insolvent at the time of distribution, may be liable if
the corporation was solvent at the time of distribution but later be-
came insolvent, and probably will not be liable if the corporation was
solvent both before the distribution and thereafter. Apparently cor-
porate recovery of the illegal distribution from the directors will exon-
erate the shareholders. 93
0
It is unfortunate that the New Act draftsmen chose not to deal with
the subject because they could have eliminated much of the uncer-
tainty concerning when shareholder-recipients will be liable and could
have taken into account other factors that have not been focused upon
in the cases decided thus far. If such an amendment is considered,
it should begin with provisions of the sort found in the old act which
make shareholders liable only in the event that no director is liable
in connection with the illegal distribution or in the event that execu-
tion of judgments against the directors held liable produces insufficient
returns. 31 These provisions make it clear that directors are primarily
responsible for illegal distributions932 and that there is no justification
for double recovery by the corporation of amounts distributed
illegally.9 33  Further qualifications upon shareholder liability and
standards for determining which shareholders should be liable for ille-
gal distributions should be made in accord with the provisions in the
recent Pennsylvania statute. Addition of the Pennsylvania provisions
to the New Act would mean that when shareholders were liable under
See Reilly v. Segert, 31 Ill. 2d 297, 201 N.E.2d 444 (1964). This result seems to
be the majority rule on the subject. See, e.g., Ulness v. Dunnell, 61 N.D. 95, 237
N.W. 208 (1931); Briggs, Stockholders' Liability for Unlawful Dividends, 8
TEMPLE L.Q. 145, 180 (1933).
" The text immediately following is a paraphrase of the excellent review of
the common law results in such cases presented by Fuld, Recovery of Illegal
and Partial Liquidating Dividends from Stockholders, 28 VA. L. REv. 50, 50-54(1941). Other authorities dealing with the situation at common law include
BRIGGS, supra note 928; D. KEHL, CoiRoRATE DDENDS 270-76 (1941).
The authorities listed above and cases cited therein deal primarily with illegal
dividends. However, the courts seem to apply the same rules to illegal treasury share
purchases. See, e.g., Reilly v. Segert, 31 Ill. 2d 297, 201 N.E.2d 444 (1964).
'See Williams v. Boice, 38 N.J.Eq. 364 (Ch. 1884).
See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.260(2) (1958).
"-See R. STEvENs, CopoRAs0ioNs 464 (1949).
IN. LATTIN, CoaPoPAsios 493 (1959) states the Washington statute has
"more insight into the facts of corporate life" than provisions making the
shareholder directly liable to the corporation even though some or all of the
directors may be liable and able to satisfy the judgment. See also Williams v.
Boice, 38 N.J.Eq. 364 (Ch. 1884).
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the Act, all shareholders would be liable to the corporation for the
amount of any illegal distribution received by them only when the
corporation at the time of the distribution was insolvent or when its
net assets were less than the liquidation preference of preferred shares
at the time of distribution. In all other cases in which shareholders
would be liable for illegal distributions, only shareholders who knew
or should have known from facts within their knowledge at the time
the distribution was received that the distribution was illegal would
be liable.934 This provision favors the innocent shareholder over cred-
itors in cases where the corporation was solvent at the time of dis-
tribution but later became insolvent.9 35  That resolution of the con-
troversy previously alluded to seems appropriate since creditors, as
compared to shareholders, can more easily take steps to protect their
interest in this respect.' 36 The provision expands the common law
notions by prescribing general shareholder liability where the pre-
ferred shareholders' interest may be affected by an illegal dividend.
This extension is appropriate because generally there is no reason to
prefer even an innocent common shareholder over a preferred share-
holder in such a case.937 These changes, along with modifications of
the directors' right of contribution9 3' and the addition of the old act's
statute of limitations,939 would be valuable additions to the New
Act.94
0
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1707(B) (1967). This provision includes as a
distribution of assets the purchase of the corporation's own shares. Dodd,
Purchase and Redemption By a Corporation of Its Ozwn Shares: The Substantive
Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 697, 710-11 (1941) would make shareholders whose shares
are repurchased illegally liable to the corporation in virtually every case. It is
hard to understand why such liabilities should result where the shareholder
was not at fault and the interests of the creditors and preferred shareholders are
protected. Hence, the Pennsylvania provision seems more appropriate.
'Accord, McDonald v. Williams, 174 U.S. 397 (1899); Carlisle v. Ottley,
143 Ga. 797, 85 S.E. 1010 (1915).
'See Fuld, supra note 929, at 52-53; Note, Actions Against Stockholders to
Recover Illegal Dividends, 33 CoLtJua. L. REV. 481, 491 (1933).
'See Mulford, Corporate Distributions to Shareholders and Other Amend-
ments to the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 536,
560 (1958).
This change is necessary to make the contribution provisions correlate with the
provisions regarding shareholder liability.
'WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.260(3)b (1958) provides that the statute of limita-
tions on actions against shareholders is two years from the date of final judg-
ment against the directors. This seems to be an appropriate limitation under
the liability scheme described above, as it affords some protection to the share-
holders' reliance interest. See Note, Actions Against Stockholders to Recover
Illegal Dividends, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 481, 492 (1933).
' Statutory changes adopted in the 1967 session of the legislature require
an addendum to the first subject in this paper: the effect of the adoption of the
New Act provisions on the rights of shareholders in corporations organized
before its effective date. See part I, 41 WAst. L. REV. at 209-13. It will be recalled
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that the ocurt in Swanson v. Perham, 30 Wn. 2d 368, 191 P.2d 689 (1948), relied,
in addition to its constitutional ground, (as to the validity of its constitutional
analysis, see Kummert, Limitations on Alteration of Shareholder Interests in
Connection with the Adoption of a New Corporation Statute in A REVIEW OF THE
EFFEcT OF WASHINGTON" BusiNEss CORPORATIOIN ACT ON EXISTING CORPORATIONS(King County Bar Association ed. 1967)), upon the following language that ap-
pears in the savings clause (Laws of 1933, ch. 185, § 63, 814) of the Uniform
Business Corporations Act: "This act shall not impair or affect any.. .right
accruing, accrued or acquired... prior to the time this act takes effect... ." The
court used this language to conclude that the legislature in enacting the Uniform
Act had intended that no right accruing, accrued or acquired prior to the effec-
tive date of the old act should be impaired or affected by the adoption of that
act. Id. at 376. (Emphasis the court's.)
The savings clause in the old act is similar to the savings clause appearing
in § 143 of the Model Act:
The repeal of a prior act by this Act shall not affect any right accrued or
established, or any liability or penalty incurred, under the provisions of such
act, prior to the repeal thereof.
In an apparent attempt to avoid the statutory ground in Swanson, the New Act
as adopted in 1965 contained the following clause (WASH. Rxv. CODE §23A.44.140(1965)) in place of the Model Act savings clause:
Neither the enactment of this title nor the amendment or repeal thereof .. .shall
take away or impair any liability of [or?] cause of action existing or accrued
against any corporation, its shareholders, directors or officers.
The effects of this provision were qualified by the adoption by the 1967 Legis-
lature of the following separate section:
The repeal of a prior act by ch. 53, Laws of 1965, shall not affect any right
accrued, acquired or established, or of any liability or penalty incurred under
the provisions of such act prior to the repeal thereof.
Wash. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 190, § 10.
Precisely what the draftsmen had in mind in connection with their latest
change is not dear. It is evident, however, that the latest provision varies from
the substantive language in the Model Act provision only in the addition of
the word "acquired" between the words "right accrued or established." One is
tempted to say that all that was intended was to realign the Washington statute
with the Model Act. Such desire would be consistent with the earlier apparent
intent of avoiding any question regarding vested rights under Swanson as the
draftsmen of the Model Act have made clear their intention not to preserve any
broad class of shareholder rights. See Comment, 2 MODEL AcT ANN., § 142 11 4;
Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LA.w & CoNTEmP. PROB.
283, 292-94 (1958). However, the addition of the word "acquired" may indicate
a different purpose on the part of the draftsmen, for the word appears in the
Uniform Act savings clause interpreted by the court in Swanson, supra, and
indeed was the subject of a number of references by the court in the process of
reaching a conclusion that certain shareholder rights cannot be affected by the
adoption of a new statute. See 30 Wn. 2d at 376. Therefore, perhaps the intent
was to add a savings clause substantively identical to that considered in Swanson
with a view to preserving the rights preserved by the court in Swanson.
If the second intrepretation prevails, the question then becomes whether the
court, in accord with the holding noted above, meant to protect all shareholder
rights or simply those shareholder rights that are "vested." It may seem that
under the broader interpretation the difficult question of which shareholder rights
are vested is avoided. But in its place a new question arises as to which
rights are shareholder rights, or in other words, whether any of the New Act's
provisions can be applied to an existing corporation because in some sense
they may affect a shareholder's rights. Assuming that the court intended to
protect only "vested" rights, one then encounters difficulty in trying to determine
which rights are vested because of the increasing dissatisfaction with that
term. See, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, CORPOATIONS 649 (rev. ed. 1946); McNulty v.
W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (S. Ct 1945). About the best that
one can do is to examine the cases and the commentators to see what rights(and in particular those rights that may be affected by differences between the
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old and new acts) have at some point been labelled "vested." Using this stand-
ard, the following rights would be "vested":
1. The right to vote cumulatively (and presumably any amendment designed to
make that right less effective [e.g., classification of directors]). See Swanson
v. Perham, supra. But see Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 40, 147 A. 255
(1929).
2. The right to arrears of accrued dividends on cumulative preferred shares.
See, e.g., Keller v. Wilson, 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (1936).
3. Pre-emptive rights to subscribe for new issues of shares. See H. BAL-
LANTINE, CORPORATIONs 649 (rev. ed. 1946).
4. Sinking fund provisions for the accumulation of a fund for the retirement of
preferred shares. See Yoakum v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F.2d 533
(D.R.I.1929).
5. The right to have preferred shares redeemed in cash (as against possible
redemption with debentures). Cf. Bowman v. Armour & Co., 17 I11. 2d 43, 160
N.E.2d 753 (1959).
6. The right to have shares remain non-callable (i.e., not subject to redemption
at the option of the corporation). See Breslav v. New York & Queen Elec. Light
& Power Co., 273 N.Y. 593, 7 N.E.2d 708 (1937).
7. Compulsory redemption rights to resell shares at the option of the holder.
See Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works, 276 Mich. 200, 267 N.WV. 815 (1936).
On the general problem of what rights are vested, see Curran, Minority Stock-
holders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters, 32 MIcH. L. REv. 743 (1934);
Hayes, Extent of the Legislature's Reserve Power to Change Common Law
Attributes of Corporations, 13 VAND. L. REv. 261, 282-85 (1959) ; Note, Limitations
on Alteration of Shareholders' Rights by Charter Amendment, 69 HARV. L. REV.
538, 545-51 (1956).
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